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Taking Preschool Education Seriously as an Economic Development Program: Effects on Jobs 
and Earnings of State Residents Compared to Traditional Economic Development Programs  
by Timothy J. Bartik, Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, bartik@upjohn.org 
 
This report takes preschool education seriously as a state economic development program by 
measuring the effects of a high-quality universal preschool program on the economic 
development goals of more jobs and earnings of state residents.  Universal preschool=s effects on 
state residents’ jobs and earnings over a 75-year period are compared with the effects of a 
program of economic development subsidies to businesses of the same cost. 
 
These jobs and earnings effects of preschool programs are calculated using estimates on the 
effectiveness of the Chicago Child Parent Center (CPC) program in increasing educational 
attainment.  These estimates are extrapolated to future effects on employment and earnings. 
These calculations also use new estimates of the proportion of preschool participants who remain 
in the same state in which they attended preschool.  In addition, a regional econometric model is 
used to estimate the economic effects of spending more government funds on universal 
preschool.  Previous estimates of how lower child care costs affect parents= labor supply are used 
to estimate earnings effects of the part-time free child care provided by universal preschool.  
Finally, comparable effects are calculated for economic development subsidies by using previous 
estimates of how subsidies affect job growth, and how state job growth affects the employment 
and wages of state residents.   
 
The key conclusions of the report are the following. 
 
$ Preschool programs and economic development subsidies both have about the same 
cost-effectiveness in producing earnings benefits for state residents, yielding about 
$3 in present value of earnings benefits for every dollar invested in these programs. 
 
$ In achieving economic development goals of more jobs and earnings for state 
residents, preschool programs and economic development subsidies should be 
viewed as complementary programs, rather than as potential substitutes for one 
another.  Economic development subsidies offer greater benefits over a 5 to 10 year 
period, while preschool programs offer more longer-term benefits. 
 
$ Most of the earnings benefits of preschool are due to effects of high-quality 
preschool in increasing the future educational attainment and employability of 
preschool participants.  Other economic development benefits of preschool education—
such as the effects of extra government spending or lower priced child care—are present 
but modest in size. 
 
$ State government investments in preschool education not only produce sizable 
economic development benefits for the state economy, but also produce large 
 v
positive spillovers on other states and the nation, due to out-migration of preschool 
participants with better job skills.  These spillover benefits of preschool make a case 
for federal subsidies to encourage greater state government investment in preschool 
education.  In contrast, a state’s use of traditional economic development subsidies often 
harms the economies of other states by attracting job growth that would have otherwise 






UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Analyzing Preschool as Economic Development  
Universal, high-quality preschool education in the United States has recently been 
advocated by many groups, including the Committee for Economic Development, the Pew 
Charitable Trusts, and the group Pre-K Now (e.g., see CED 2002, and websites at ced.org, 
pewtrusts.org, and preknow.org).  The case for universal preschool education is based in part on 
rigorous research that shows that high-quality preschool has large positive effects on participants 
and society, including reductions in special ed costs and costs from students having to repeat 
grades, reductions in criminal activity, increases in educational attainment, and increases in 
earnings (Schweinhart et al. 2005; Belfield et al. 2004; Reynolds et al. 2002). 
A prominent recent argument to promote preschool education expansion is that preschool 
programs may be superior in achieving economic development goals to traditional economic 
development programs.  An early prominent argument in this vein was made by Art Rolnick and 
Rob Grunewald, economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis:  “The conventional 
view of economic development typically includes company headquarters, office towers, 
entertainment centers, and professional sports stadiums and arenas... Early childhood 
development programs are rarely portrayed as economic development initiatives, and we think 
that is a mistake.  Such programs, if they appear at all, are at the bottom of the economic 
development lists for state and local governments.  They should be at the top” (Rolnick and 
Grunewald 2003).  Rolnick and Grunewald’s argument has been widely cited by preschool 
advocates and scholars.  More recently, the CED has published a paper elaborating on Rolnick 
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and Grunewald’s argument (Ehrlich and Kornblatt 2004).  A related initiative is a large scale 
research project at Cornell University that has over the past few years published numerous 
papers and reports exploring the links between regional economic development and child care 
(see the website government.cce.cornell.edu and the recent paper by Warner et al. 2004). 
The economic development argument for preschool may be made in part to try to create a 
broader constituency for preschool programs that will include business groups and state and 
local economic developers, and not just the usual advocates for better social services or 
education.  Furthermore, by an interesting coincidence, the governmental resources devoted to 
state and local economic development are of the same order of magnitude as the resources 
required to fund universal preschool, which is estimated to require at least $25–$35 billion 
nationwide (CED 2002). 
What are these traditional economic development programs?  Traditional economic 
development programs, mostly pursued by state and local governments in the United States, 
provide financial incentives or customized services to individual businesses to encourage the 
creation of more or better jobs in a particular local labor market.  Table 1 lists some examples of 
these types of financial incentives or services.  Estimates are that economic development 
programs may cost at least $30 billion a year (Bartik 2001), and possibly over $50 billion a year 
(LeRoy 2005; Peters and Fisher 2004; Thomas 2000), with some uncertainty depending upon 
whether we only count tax breaks that are at least somewhat discretionary, or count any state 
business tax credit or deduction that is rationalized on economic development grounds.  Most of 
these costs are in the form of customized tax breaks.  Potential beneficiaries of traditional 
economic development programs include the businesses who directly receive the subsidies, those 
out of work or at risk of being out of work (potentially most of the adult working-age 
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population), workers who might receive upgrading to a better job (potentially most workers), 
owners of property who might gain from higher property values, owners of businesses whose 
profits go up with higher local retail demand (e.g., local newspapers), and state and local 
governments that might hope to gain tax revenue exceeding the costs of needed additional public 
services and the costs of the economic development subsidies.  The potential constituency for 
economic development programs is large. 
The Rolnick/Grunenwald argument, that preschool education may be a superior way to 
achieve economic development goals, has so far been made rather loosely.  The first part of the 
argument is that traditional economic development programs are costly and ineffective.  Many 
economic subsidies do not affect location decisions, which means that “from a state and local 
perspective, the economic gains are suspect because many would have been realized without the 
subsidies” (Rolnick and Grunewald 2003).  Even if subsidies are effective from a state and local 
perspective, the subsidy competition is a “zero-sum game,” from a national perspective, with a 
zero national gain as one state’s gain is matched by another state’s loss: “jobs are not created—
they are only relocated” (Rolnick and Grunewald 2003).   
The second part of the argument is to use the high quality research on preschool 
programs to argue that these programs have high benefit-cost ratios, or equivalently, high rates 
of return.  For example, Rolnick and Grunewald argue, based on research on the Perry Preschool 
program, that preschool programs have rates of return of 16% for program participants and the 
rest of society, and 12% for the rest of society.  These high rates of return are taken to imply that 
preschool programs have large economic benefits, which are equated with economic 
development benefits, and are asserted to be far greater than typical returns to economic 
development projects.  For example, Rolnick and Grunewald mention various economic 
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development projects in the Twin Cities area, and ask, “Can any of these projects stand up to a 
12% public return on investment?” 
There are two major problems with this argument.  The first problem is that “economic 
development” is being defined much more broadly than is typical.  State and local policymakers 
think of economic development as being mainly about the goal of jobs: more and better jobs for 
the local area, particularly those that go to local residents, and the tax base these more and better 
jobs bring.  According to surveys of elected local officials in cities with more than 100,000 in 
population, by far the most frequently mentioned “first priority” for local economic development 
is increasing the jobs located in the city, listed by 48% of all respondents, with the next most 
mentions for increasing the local tax base, listed by 18% of all respondents (Furdell 1994).  
Some of the key benefits of preschool education, such as reduced crime of participants, and 
reduced special ed and other K-12 education costs, while important social benefits, have little 
directly to do with the economic development goals of more and better jobs.  For example, in the 
latest benefit-cost analysis of the Perry Preschool program, two-thirds of the total benefits of the 
program to participants and the rest of society are due to the benefits of reduced crime rates of 
participants, and reduced crime is an even larger percentage of the benefits that accrue to society 
excluding participants (Belfield et al. 2004, Table 6.2, p. 57).  Thus, much of the 12% public 
return cited by Rolnick and Gruneweld has nothing to do with economic development as usually 
defined.   
We could define economic development as anything that increases any social benefit. In 
that case, “economic development” is synonymous with social benefit, and becomes a 
superfluous term.  But the constituency that interprets economic development as more and better 
jobs is unlikely to perceive preschool education as a substitute for traditional economic 
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development programs simply because preschool has large social benefits unrelated to jobs, 
regardless of how we label those benefits.  
A second problem with the Rolnick and Grunewald argument is that instead of subjecting 
traditional economic development programs to a rigorous evaluation, they only point out that 
some benefits claimed for traditional economic development programs are exaggerated.  Much 
research analyzes the benefits and costs of traditional economic development programs (see 
reviews by Bartik 2004a and 2004b).  This research corrects for the usual exaggerations of the 
benefits of traditional economic development programs, for example, it considers that most 
subsidies for location or expansion will not affect the location decision.  A fair review of this 
research suggests that it is an exaggeration to claim that traditional economic development 
programs are always and everywhere a mistake.  A more accurate summary of the research 
evidence is that traditional economic development programs too often are excessively costly, 
compared to their likely benefits.  However, properly designed economic development programs 
can sometimes provide useful benefits for a reasonable cost.  This is true both from a state and 
local perspective, and from a national perspective.  These arguments will be elaborated later. 
This report takes preschool education seriously as an economic development program by 
focusing on how effective preschool education is in accomplishing the economic development 
goals of more jobs and earnings for a state’s residents.  I also consider the effectiveness of 
traditional economic development programs, using the same metric of more jobs and earnings 
for a state’s residents.  This allows a fair comparison of preschool education and traditional 
economic development from the perspective of constituencies interested in economic 
development.  Can preschool education be a useful substitute or complement to traditional 
economic development programs in achieving the traditional goals of economic development 
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programs?  I also consider how alternative policies for designing and implementing preschool 
education or traditional economic development programs may alter their effectiveness in 
achieving economic development goals. 
My analysis focuses on the effectiveness of these programs in increasing jobs and 
earnings for current state residents, and not on increases in jobs and earnings that accrue to in-
migrants.  Faster state growth is not good in and of itself, but only because it improves the 
opportunities of specific persons.  Research on state and local economic development programs 
suggests that the great majority of the benefits from local job growth come from increasing 
employment rates or wage rates of the original local residents.  In-migrants who take jobs gain 
but slight benefits as they could have otherwise moved to another similar local economy.  In 
contrast, because local residents have valuable attachments to their current local area that make 
them reluctant to move, they can gain significantly if local job growth increases that local area’s 
employment rate (the employment/population ratio) or real wage rate.  Local growth also may 
have benefits for local property owners in increased property values, and local business owners 
in increased sales and profits.  But, research suggests that the magnitude of these property value 
and business profit benefits are small compared to the effects on the earnings of local residents 
(Bartik 1991, 1994, 2005).  Finally, research suggests that the fiscal effects of increasing both 
employment and population by the same magnitude are often negative, particularly if there is no 
excess capacity in local infrastructure and services (Bartik 2004b, 2005).  Businesses tend to pay 
more in state and local taxes than they directly require in state and local public services, whereas 
households tend to pay less in state and local taxes than they require in state and local public 
services; if new infrastructure is required, the cost of providing additional services for new 
households will be particularly high.  Therefore, fiscal benefits of job growth are likely to be 
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much greater if local employment increases faster than local population, increasing local 
employment rates.   
Focusing on how preschool education and traditional economic development programs 
affects employment rates and earnings of a state’s residents therefore focuses on the main 
sources of the usual benefits from traditional economic development programs.  I emphasize that 
a measure of these effects on state residents’ jobs and earnings is by no means a comprehensive 
benefit-cost analysis of either preschool education or traditional economic development 
programs.  As previously mentioned, this analysis omits the benefits of preschool education for 
reducing crime or saving public education costs, which previous research suggests are important 
components of the overall benefits of preschool programs.  As just mentioned, this analysis also 
omits the slight benefits of traditional economic development programs for the jobs gained by in-
migrants, as well as the somewhat larger benefits of job growth for property value gains and the 
profits of state businesses.  Any anti-crime benefits of faster state job growth from traditional 
economic development programs are also omitted.  Fiscal benefits of either preschool education 
or traditional economic development programs are also not directly measured, except insofar as 
fiscal benefits tend to be positively related to higher employment rates of state residents.  
Finally, any adverse effects of increased jobs and economic activity from either preschool or 
economic development subsidies in creating environmental problems, or traffic jams or other 
congestion problems, are also not considered.  
I do try to measure some of the effects of higher employment rates and earnings of state 
residents in various forms that may be useful to state and national policymakers.  In addition to 
measuring effects on jobs and earnings of state residents, I also measure the associated increase 
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in gross state product, and the tax revenue raised by this increase in gross state product.  These 
effects are measured for each state and for the nation. 
Finally, a full benefit-cost analysis of the net benefits of increasing employment would 
subtract some opportunity cost of the time that is devoted to increased employment, which 
presumably had some value to those who are working more.  However, the dollar value of the 
time of the unemployed is a topic on which there is little good research.  Labor economists 
commonly presume that the unemployed place a lower value on their “non-work” time in a high 
unemployment local labor market, in which jobs are hard to find even for those who are 
desperate for jobs.  In addition, a full analysis of the benefits of increasing employment rates of 
local residents would recognize that there is some social value to lower unemployment rates, 
because research shows that even the happiness of the employed is increased by lower 
unemployment, whether by sympathy with the plight of the unemployed or the worker=s self-
interest in lowering his or her own risk of becoming unemployed (Layard 2005). 
Although this report is not a comprehensive benefit-cost analysis of either preschool 
education or traditional economic development programs, the effects of these programs on jobs 
and earnings of state residents is important to many constituencies.  The claimed effects of 
traditional economic development programs on jobs and earnings are the main reason the general 
public might support these programs.  
 
Outline of This Report’s Approach 
I estimate the effects on the economic development goals of more jobs and higher real 
earnings for state residents of a permanent universal preschool program, and of a traditional 
economic development program, with both programs scaled to the same present value of costs 
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each year.  More jobs are measured as the increase in the employment rate of state residents.  
Higher real earnings of state residents occur through higher employment rates, or higher real 
wages per hour.1  All costs and real earnings are measured in year 2004 dollars. 
I emphasize that I only count the jobs and earnings created that raise employment rates 
and annual earnings of state residents, and not all the jobs and earnings generated by higher state 
growth.  If jobs in a state grow, but population expands sufficiently that employment rates and 
annual real earnings of state residents is unchanged, then these additional jobs and earnings are 
not counted.  Jobs growth and real earnings growth is only counted to the extent to which it 
improves the employment and earnings opportunities of individuals. 
These effects are analyzed over a 75-year period following enactment of the new 
permanent universal preschool education program, or alternatively following enactment of a new 
economic development program.  In comparing the present values of earnings effects with the 
present value of costs, both earnings effects and costs are projected into the indefinite future, 
beyond the 75-year time horizon.  Throughout the report, in all tables, the dating system used is 
that the initial year in which the new program is adopted, either the universal preschool program 
or the new economic development program, is dated as year 4, with the year number indicating 
the age of the first cohort that would potentially experience the universal preschool program. 
Both the traditional economic development program and the universal preschool program 
are assumed to be financed in the same way.  The easiest way to think of the financing is that 
both programs are assumed to be financed by some neutral tax that does not affect incentives to 
migrate, work, or produce for any household or business.  For example, it might be plausible that 
                                                 
1Higher weekly hours can also raise annual earnings, but I ignore this factor, as there is not good 
information on the effects of preschool on weekly hours, and effects of traditional economic development programs 
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a land tax would not significantly affect incentives.  The tax financing, however, could 
potentially affect demand for goods and services in the state, by affecting after-tax income of 
state residents. 
In the real world, of course, the actual mix of taxes to finance these programs might 
affect incentives for households to migrate or work, and incentives for businesses to expand or 
contract. However, the substitution of what economists call “distortionary taxes” (because they 
distort incentives) for a neutral tax such as a land tax will alter effects in the same way for both 
economic development programs and preschool education.  We can think of the enactment of the 
proposed programs as taking place in two stages: first, the economic development program or 
preschool program is expanded and financed by a neutral tax; second, some distortionary tax is 
substituted for the neutral tax.  The report shows the effects of each program under the first type 
of financing.  The second stage substitution of a new financing method will change the absolute 
effects of the two types of policies, but will leave their relative effects unchanged.  Therefore, 
this report’s discussion of the relative effects of traditional economic development programs 
versus preschool education will be unaffected by the use of a wide variety of imperfect, 
distortionary sources of financing.      
Most of this report analyzes all costs and effects from the perspective of the state 
carrying out the program. Chapter 5 considers how these effects are altered from a national 
perspective. 
Some of the assumptions made in modeling are outlined in Table 2.  The characteristics 
of the universal preschool program being considered are closely modeled after the program 
considered in the comprehensive recent study by Karoly and Bigelow (2005).  It is assumed that 
                                                                                                                                                             
on weekly hours appear to be quite small (Bartik 1991). 
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the free universal preschool program is aimed at only 4-year-olds, and enrolls 70% of all 4-year-
olds.  The gross costs per 4-year-old participant are derived from Karoly and Bigelow, as is the 
net cost after allowing for current publicly subsidized preschool costs, although I make some 
slight modifications to their estimates of net costs.2  The state economy in which these programs 
operate is assumed, based on CBO projections, which in turn are slight variations of Social 
Security Administration assumptions, to have average employment and population growth over 
the next 75 years of 0.3% annually.  Average real wage rates per hour are assumed to grow at 
1.2% annually.  The cost of the universal preschool program are assumed to grow proportionally 
both with the rate of population growth and average real wage rates, given that most preschool 
education costs are personnel costs, or the costs are assumed to grow at 1.5% per year (to be 
exact, 1.5036%, as 1.015036 = 1.012 H 1.003).  The number of graduates from this hypothetical 
preschool program grows proportionately with the population, or at 0.3% per year.  
Some of the effects of these programs are calculated for a hypothetical state in which the 
universal preschool program would start out at a cost of $1 billion per year, and then grow with 
the population and economy.  Based on the assumption that 70% of all 4-year-olds are served, 
and national ratios of employment and population to the number of 4-year-olds, this hypothetical 
state would have employment and population as outlined in Table 2. 
For this hypothetical $1 billion per year program (in initial costs), effects are calculated 
in terms of jobs created for state residents, and additional real earnings created for state 
residents.  In addition, I calculate the effects of these programs in terms of job creation effects as 
                                                 
2Karoly and Bigelow’s estimates of net preschool costs are based on data for California.  However, as will 
be explored further in Chapter 3, so are their estimates of net benefits of preschool education.  In general, net costs 
and net benefits of moving to universal preschool education will both go down to the extent to which the state 
already has a greater proportion of state residents in preschool education.  Therefore, the net effects per dollar of 
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a percentage of total state employment, and earnings creation effects as a percentage of total 
state earnings.  These percentage calculations would apply to a state of any size with similar 
characteristics, not just this hypothetical state. 
I also calculate the present value of the earnings effects of the traditional economic 
development programs, and the preschool education program, per present value dollar of costs.  I 
do this using a real social discount rate of 3% annually to convert future flows of earnings 
benefits or program costs equivalent to today=s dollars in present value terms.  This 3% social 
discount rate is a commonly used real discount rate in benefit-cost analysis.  
For each state, I also estimate the long-run effects of traditional economic development 
programs and universal preschool education programs of the same annual costs on each state’s 
employment and earnings of residents, gross state product increases associated with increased 
earnings of state residents, and increases of state and local tax revenue associated with this 
increase in gross state product.  These estimates are calibrated to each state, and reflect a number 
of state-specific factors, such as the size of the state in terms of total employment, average wage 
rates in the state, the labor share of gross state product, the share of state and local government 
revenue in the state economy, and the propensity of state residents to leave the state over time.  
As outlined in Table 2, the costs of this “universal” preschool program in each state, or 
traditional economic development program of the same costs, is calibrated to each state’s size 
based on each state’s wage and salary earnings.3   
                                                                                                                                                             
incremental new preschool spending should be similar in different states with different preexisting preschool 
programs.  
3How exactly to define the net incremental costs of a “universal” preschool program is somewhat arbitrary. 
 One could just consider the number of 4-year-olds, but this ignores the numbers currently being served, and ignores 
cost differences in different states.  The definition used in this report has the virtues of simplicity, and of controlling 
for earnings, which is one highly relevant factor in determining the costs of and demands for universal preschool.  
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For both traditional economic development programs and preschool education programs, 
the programs considered in the baseline simulations are reasonably well-run from the perspective 
of having effects on employment rates and wages, but not necessarily ideally run. Chapter 4 
considers policy alternatives that can either magnify or shrink the effectiveness of these 
programs in creating more and better jobs for local residents. 
Most of this analysis considers effects from an individual state’s perspective. Chapter 5 
analyzes how effects on jobs, earnings, gross product, and tax revenue change from a national 
perspective.  To what extent does one state’s decision to devote more resources to traditional 
economic development programs or preschool education cause either spillover benefits or 





TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
 
 
Methodology of Estimating Effects 
To analyze how traditional economic development programs affect jobs and earnings for 
state residents, we need to consider all the many links in the chain of causation between 
expending state and local resources on economic development and the ultimate effect on state 
residents’ employment rates and earnings.  Some of these links augment the effect of traditional 
economic development programs on employment rates and earnings, but most of these links 
diminish the effects. 
The traditional economic development subsidy analyzed is assumed to be a financial 
subsidy for business location or expansion, as such financial subsidies comprise the bulk of the 
resources devoted to economic development.  Based on my knowledge of typical economic 
development programs, the subsidy is assumed to be paid out over a 10-year period.  This 
reduces the cost-effectiveness of the subsidy compared to a 100% up-front subsidy, as businesses 
apply a relatively high discount rate to future costs, profits, and subsidies, but has some 
advantages for state and local government officials.  One advantage is that delaying some of the 
subsidies reduces potential problems with the business receiving the subsidy but later reversing 
its location decision.  An alternative is to give more subsidies up-front, but negotiate “clawback” 
agreements allowing most or the entire up-front subsidy to be recovered if the business relocates, 
but such clawback agreements have enforcement costs.  In addition, delaying some of the 
subsidies has the political advantage of postponing some of the costs of the subsidy program to 
the next Governor.  
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For these baseline estimates, the business being subsidized is assumed to be an “export-
base” business, which means that the good or service produced by the business is either supplied 
to markets outside the state, or supplied to a local buyer who otherwise would have purchased 
this good or service from outside the state.  If a subsidized business was not an export-base 
business, then its goods or services are being sold to local buyers who customarily buy from 
other local suppliers, and consequently any increased business activity of the subsidized business 
reduces activity in other local businesses one-for-one.  The need to focus subsidies on export-
base businesses is conventional wisdom in the economic development profession.  Although 
such an export-base focus is not always followed in practice, there are many state and local 
economic development programs that do focus subsidies on export-base businesses.  For 
example, many property tax abatement programs only allow property abatements for 
manufacturing companies, which are mostly export-base businesses.  The later section of this 
report on policy alternatives considers subsidies to non-export base businesses, such as subsidies 
for sports stadiums, whose effects on job creation for state residents would be far less. 
The subsidy modeled is based on data on average economic development subsidies.  
Based on Peters and Fisher’s research, this average subsidy is assumed to be $1,047 per job per 
year in 2004 dollars, for ten years.4  Therefore this subsidy is about 50 cents per hour of labor.  
The probability that such a subsidy will prove decisive in positively affecting the location 
                                                 
4This figure is derived from Table 3.7 in Peters and Fisher (2002, pp. 74–75) that gives the average present 
value of state and local economic development subsidies, across 75 cities in 13 leading industrial states, and 
including enterprise zone incentives, at $5,048 in 1994 dollars, where they calculate present value using a 10% 
discount rate.  This present value and discount rate corresponds to annual subsidies of $1,047 over 10 years in 2004 
dollars.  Note that I am not assuming that a 10% discount rate is a valid discount rate; in fact, in later calculations, I 
assume that 3% is the appropriate social discount rate, while 12% is the discount rate actually used by corporate 
decisionmakers.  Rather, I use the 10% discount rate actually used by Peters and Fisher to translate their present 
values into corresponding annual flows, as their present values were actually calculated using the 10% discount rate 
for annual flows; I am merely reversing the process.  My calculation of annual flows will not depend on the discount 
 16
decision is estimated at 3.7%, based on business location research.  In other words, in only 3.7% 
of the cases is the subsidy needed, and in the other 96.3% of cases, the subsidy simply benefits 
the subsidized business with no economic development benefits for the state economy.  
The essential assumption to derive this estimate is that subsidies to business location will 
be no more effective on average than general business tax cuts in inducing business location 
decisions.  Hence, the net cost of creating a job should be similar in general business tax cuts and 
economic development subsidies.  Although state and local governments may seek to be more 
selective and choose to give subsidies only when needed to induce a location decision, in 
practice government officials lack sufficient knowledge of a business’s relative profitability at 
different locations to be able to offer the optimal subsidy to just tip the location decision.  It is 
also politically difficult to restrict subsidies to just a few eligible companies without definitive 
rules outlining which companies are eligible and ineligible based on objective criteria.  In 
economic development, this problem of refusing to give out subsidies to eligible firms is referred 
to, after an old TV ad, as the “reverse potato chip rule”: you can’t give out just one. 
What is the cost of creating a job through state and local business tax cuts that is implied 
by previous research?  The research literature on state and local business taxes and business 
activity has been reviewed by Wasylenko (1997), who concludes that a plausible elasticity of 
state and local business activity with respect to state and local business taxes is !0.2, that is a 
10% reduction in all state and local business taxes will increase a state or metropolitan area’s 
business activity by 2%.  This is a little below the !0.25 or !0.3 elasticity suggested in research 
reviews by Bartik (1991, 1992).  Annual state and local business tax revenue per job seems to 
                                                                                                                                                             
rate used by Peters and Fisher to the extent to which typical economic development subsidies in fact are flat annual 
subsidies lasting around 10 years. 
 17
average about $3,889 per job in 2004 dollars, based on Peters and Fisher’s research (2002, p. 
106).  The Wasylenko elasticity figures implies that if we offered a group of firms a 10% 
business tax cut, of $388.90 per job, then if we would have attracted x jobs without the business 
tax cut, now we will attract x times 1.02 jobs, for example if we would have attracted 100 
identical firms each employing x workers, now we will attract 102 identical firms each 
employing x workers.  We sacrifice 388.90 times x workers per firm times 100 firms in tax 
revenue to gain in jobs x workers per firm times two firms.  The annual cost per job gained is 
equal to (388.90 times x times 100/2 times x) = $19,445 in annual foregone business tax revenue 
per job gained.  More formally, a little algebra shows that the cost in foregone tax revenue in 
creating jobs through business tax cuts is equal to the annual business tax revenue per job 
divided by the elasticity of business activity with respect to taxes, or $3,889 / (0.2) = 19,445, 
based on Peters and Fisher and Wasylenko.5  Note that we do not count the revenue gained on 
the attracted firms, as the fiscal effect of new firms will also include any impacts on public 
service and infrastructure needs due to the new employment and the population it attracts, along 
with the tax impact of the new population.  The intuition is that the cost per job created goes 
down if we think that businesses are very responsive to a percentage cut in state and local 
business taxes in making business location decisions, and goes up if state and local business 
taxes are higher, which causes a given percentage tax cut to be more costly. 
                                                 
5I have used similar cost per job calculations in various refereed papers, most recently in Bartik (2005), 
which references other published papers with similar calculations over the last 15 years.  This is not a new type of 
calculation that I have invented out of nowhere for the present report, but rather a calculation that has at least gained 
some credence in the scholarly literature.  Note that the elasticities here are long-run elasticities of state and local 
business activity, but that such elasticities should be the relevant one for evaluating the immediate elasticity of new 
business location decisions, under arguments outlined in Bartik (1991, pp. 235–236).  Also note that this elasticity is 
derived from a mix of studies that look at corporate location decisions and studies that look at general 
responsiveness of overall state or local employment or other business activity measures to state and local business 
taxes. 
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To determine what effects subsidies of different lengths will have, we have to make some 
assumptions about how firms discount future cash flows.  Research on firm’s discount rates 
suggests that corporate decisionmakers use a real annual discount rate of about 12% (Summers 
and Poterba 1994).  Using this discount rate, the present value of a permanent tax cut of $19,445 
per year is $181,487, or the implication is that just giving firms a lump sum of cash up-front 
would have a cost per job created of $181,487.  A lump sum of $181,487 corresponds to a 10-
year subsidy, using a 12% discount rate, of $28,679 per job per year.  If the average economic 
development subsidy of $1,047 per job per year is to result in the same cost per job created, the 
subsidy would have to be decisive in 3.7% of subsidized firms, as 3.7% = 1,047 / 28,679.  
Given that I am assuming that the effect of an economic development subsidy on the 
probability of inducing a positive location decision is proportional to the size of the subsidy, the 
cost of creating a job through incentives does not depend on the annual subsidy considered.  It is 
easier to get some intuition if we consider a larger subsidy.  Also, such large subsidies more 
closely resemble the subsidies given in the high-profile cases that receive the most media 
attention.  According to Peters and Fisher, the largest subsidies commonly encountered amount 
to about $4,704 per job per year (in 2004 dollars) for ten years, or about a little over $2.35 per 
hour of work.6  This subsidy of a little over 4 times the average subsidy would be expected to 
have effects a little over 4 times as great, or affect the probability of choosing that state by about 
16%. 
These assumed effects of different-sized subsidies are based on the business location 
literature.  However, perhaps that is not particularly convincing unless the reader is prepared to 
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accept this on authority.  But we can ask whether this effectiveness of subsidies seems intuitively 
plausible, even if we had no reliable knowledge from the business location literature.  
Everyone’s intuition varies, but I would argue that these numbers seem at least somewhat 
intuitively plausible.  If average real wages per hour in 2004 were $17.67 (author’s calculations 
using data from the Current Population Survey), then surely an economic development subsidy 
that essentially made labor free for ten years would be decisive in influencing location decisions 
in many, although perhaps not all cases.  It is then perhaps somewhat intuitively plausible that a 
subsidy of $2.35 per hour might be decisive in tipping location decisions 16% of the time.   
If the subsidy induces the subsidized business to make a positive location decision, and 
the business is 100% an export base business, then the business location decision will have some 
positive “multiplier” effects by increasing local demand for other goods and services.  
Specifically, the subsidized business’s induced new activity will increase demand for local 
suppliers, who will as a result expand their employment.  In addition, the additional wage and 
salary income for the subsidized business=s additional employees, and the additional employees 
at local suppliers, will increase demand for goods and service at local retail industries, which as 
a result will also expand employment.  Multipliers can vary widely, and will increase for 
businesses with stronger local supplier links and businesses that pay their workers higher wages. 
 We assume an average multiplier of 1.80, based on data on multipliers calculated by the 
University of Michigan for Michigan’s MEGA economic development subsidy program.7 
                                                                                                                                                             
6This is based on Peter and Fisher’s figures for the highest average state and local economic development 
subsidy provided in the 75 cities they consider, which has a present value at a 10% discount rate of $22,678 per job 
(Peters and Fisher 2002, Table 3.7, pp. 74–75). 
7This calculation is based on data on MEGA that was used by the author and colleagues in previous work 
on Michigan’s economic development programs (Bartik, Erickcek, and Eisinger 2003).  The median multiplier that 
is reported by the MEGA program for its subsidized firms is 1.98.  This is calculated by the University of Michigan 
using the well-respected REMI model (Treyz 1993).  Therefore, I suspect the multiplier figures are reasonable.  
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These assumptions together determine the average cost per job created in a state or local 
area by this typical economic development subsidy program.  A later section will consider 
variations based on different policy choices.  For the baseline simulation, the present value, at a 
3% discount rate, of the $28,679 in annual subsidies over 10 years that would be needed to 
create one export-base job, is $251,975.8  Including multiplier effects, the present value of the 
subsidies needed to create one job is $139,986 (= 251,975 / 1.8).  A subsidy program that lasted 
for one year, that cost $1 billion in present value, and offered 10-year subsidies to firms willing 
to locate or expand in a state, would be estimated to create 7,144 permanent jobs in the state 
(7,144 = $1 billion / $139,986).  That is, the level of jobs in the state would be permanently 
higher that it otherwise would be by 7,144 jobs.  The one-time subsidy program of $1 billion in 
present value therefore is estimated to cause a permanent shock to the level of state jobs, but 
only a one-time shock to the growth rate of state jobs.9  However, if the subsidy program is 
ongoing in future years, it would also increase jobs in future years, and therefore have a 
                                                                                                                                                             
However, the MEGA program is much more selective than the typical economic development program, and in 
particular is one of the few programs I know of that has a professionally done impact analysis done before the 
subsidy is awarded.  In addition, Michigan may have higher multipliers for export-base businesses than the average 
state, as Michigan has particularly dense networks of industrial suppliers.  So, I suspect that MEGA multipliers are 
higher than average for economic development subsidies.  For the analysis in this report, the assumed multiplier of 
1.80 is equal to the 40th percentile of the multipliers reported for MEGA subsidies.  The reader might also wonder 
about displacement effects of shocks to employment.  In the preschool chapter, I take account of displacement 
effects of shocks to a state’s labor supply.  Analysis should also take account of displacement effects of shocks to a 
state’s labor demand.  Displacement effects of labor demand shocks occur because the initial shock to employment 
affects state wages, land prices, and other prices, thereby affecting household migration and firm location decisions.  
The REMI-calculated multipliers already take account of such effects, as well as effects of agglomeration economies 
due to increasing overall employment density or  increasing concentration in the state of a particular industry. 
8251,975 = 1.03 H (28,679 / 0.03) H (1 !1 / (1.03)10). 
9It may seem strange that a one-time subsidy causes a permanent increase in the level of state jobs, but this 
is consistent with research on how local economies behave.  The economic development of state and local 
economies seems to behave according to a random walk, in which shocks to local economic activity from a variety 
of causes tend to persist indefinitely.  One rationale for this behavior is that although the initial causes of the shock 
may not persist, the agglomeration of economic activity in a local activity tends to encourage further economic 
activity.  The net effects of regression to the mean of the initial cause of the shock, and agglomeration, appears to be 
that local economic shocks persist in terms of levels.  
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permanent effect on state job growth corresponding to the permanent nature of the subsidy 
program. 
But how many of these new jobs will go to state residents? Ultimately, the new jobs 
created in the subsidized business, and any jobs created in suppliers and retailers as a result of 
the multiplier, must ultimately either go to non-employed state residents or to individuals who 
otherwise would have lived in another state, that is the job increase must be divided among 
increasing the employment rate of state residents or increasing the state population.10  Of course, 
some of the newly created jobs go directly to other state workers who already were employed.  
But this hiring of current state workers results in vacancies that either are filled by state residents 
who otherwise would be nonemployed, persons who otherwise would have lived outside this 
state, or state residents who otherwise would be employed.  The chain of created vacancies goes 
on until eventually each new job either goes to a new resident or a newly employed state 
resident. 
There is extensive research on how local job growth is typically apportioned among new 
jobs for local residents vs. local population growth (for a review, see Bartik 1993).  This research 
suggests that in the short run, after a year or two, between 50 and 80% of the new jobs go to 
increasing the employment rates of local residents, and the rest go to persons who otherwise 
would have lived elsewhere, such as in-migrants.  The proportion going to in-migrants increases 
over time, but even after 17 years, perhaps 2 of 10 new jobs are still reflected in higher 
employment rates for local residents.  All of this extra local employment is due to higher local 
                                                 
10More formally, the percentage increase in state jobs is approximately equal to the percentage increase in 
the state=s employment to population ratio and the percentage increase in the state=s population.  This approximate 
equality is exact if we use logarithmic percentage growth, or dlnE = dln(E / Pop) + dln(Pop), where d is some 
change in the variable over time, ln is the natural logarithm of the variable to the right, E is state employment, and 
Pop is state population. 
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labor force participation rates; effects of local job growth on local unemployment rates dissipate 
after 4 to 8 years. 
Why does local job growth have such persistent effects in increasing local residents’ 
employment rates?  After all, over a typical four-year period, over 13 percent of the population 
moves between metropolitan areas (Marston 1985).  Individuals switch jobs frequently, with 
between 20 and 30% of all employed workers having been at their current job for less than 18 
months (Jaeger and Stevens 1999).  If local residents are no more competitive in the labor market 
after the job growth than they were before, then as individuals move in and out of jobs, we 
would expect this competition from in-migrants to quickly dissipate any temporary gains in 
employment rates. 
One theory offered to explain these highly persistent effects on local employment rates is 
that the short-run increases in employment rates for local residents due to job growth lead to 
permanent advantages for a few local residents in the labor market.  Due to the short-run job 
growth, local employers hire some local residents who otherwise they would have avoided 
hiring. As a result, these local residents gain valuable job skills, self-confidence, and a stronger 
reputation with that employer and other employers.  These changes in worker skills, confidence, 
and reputation allow these local residents to more easily be hired in the future, and allow them to 
maintain their higher employment rates even after more in-migrants are able to enter the local 
labor market.  Some of the evidence for this theory is further reviewed in Bartik (2001) and 
Bartik (1991). 
If this is the cause of persistent effects of job growth on local residents’ employment 
rates, then these effects will dissipate as the local residents who experienced the initial job 
growth either die or relocate to other local areas.  Therefore, the effects of a one-time local job 
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growth shock on local employment rates are not permanent, but are extremely persistent, and 
gradually fade over about a 50-year period. 
To simulate these likely persistent but gradually decaying effects on state employment 
rates, I assume initial effects on unemployment rates that fade over five years, consistent with 
the empirical literature (Bartik 1993, 1991; Blanchard and Katz 1992).  Effects on local labor 
force participation rates fade based on assumed patterns of out-migration from the state and 
mortality rates.  This fading is based on dividing the initial employment shock as an equal 
increase in employment rates among all workers ages 16–79 in the state=s workforce.  Table 3 
shows the pattern of change over time in assumed employment rates and labor force participation 
rates, which closely matches direct evidence for the effects of a growth shock during the first 20 
years after the shock, but after that is a plausible extrapolation of what we know.11 
In addition to persistent effects on local employment rates, job growth seems to have 
persistent effects on local real hourly wage rates (Bartik 1991).  These effects seem to be due 
mainly to individuals with given credentials being successful in moving up to higher paying 
occupations; the real wage for a given occupation seems to not increase much if at all due to job 
growth.  
A plausible explanation for these persistent real wage effects via higher occupational 
attainment is that some currently employed workers are also successful in gaining extra job 
skills, self-confidence and employer reputation due to the one-time shock to job growth.  As a 
                                                 
11Note that the assumed pattern of only gradual decay in labor force participation rates over 20 years is 
consistent with Bartik (1991, 1993), but not the widely discussed article by Blanchard and Katz (1992).  Bartik 
(1993) argues that Blanchard and Katz=s model is misspecified.  Bartik reestimates a more flexibly estimated model 
using Blanchard and Katz=s data, and finds much more persistent effects of state job growth shocks on labor force 
participation rates for at least 17 years.  More recently, Rowthorn and Glyn (2003) have made a similar argument 
that Blanchard and Katz’s estimates find less persistent effects of job growth on employment rates due to problems 
caused by measurement error. 
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result of the job growth, in the short-run some local residents are hired by employers for higher 
paying occupations that they otherwise would have been able to attain.  These higher wage 
effects of economic development programs reflect the considerable job churning as numerous 
job vacancies open up due to the new jobs created by economic development; estimates suggest 
that for every job created in a local area, in many cases at least 3.5 vacancies are created (Persky, 
Felsenstein, and Carlson 2004).  Some of these short-run promotions result in persistent 
advantages for those promoted, who continue in the future to attain higher-paying occupations 
than would otherwise have been expected. 
If this explanation is accurate, then the persistent effects of local job growth on local 
occupational attainment and hence real wages should also eventually fade due to worker 
mortality and out-migration.  In the simulation, I assume that real wage gains fade in a similar 
pattern to the fading of effects on labor force participation.  The level of worker real wage gains 
is set so that it matches empirical estimates for worker real wage gains during the 10 years after 
the job shock; the remaining 65 years of real wage effects is a plausible extrapolation. 
 
Simulated Effects for Typical State 
To help clarify the time pattern of effects, I first show the jobs and earnings over time 
created for local residents, for $1 billion in present value of economic development subsidies 
committed to during the initial year of the simulation.  This $1 billion is economic development 
subsidies is promised to various businesses during the initial year, although the actual subsidies 
are paid out over 10 years, as described above.  In this first simulation, to isolate the effects of 
this $1 billion in subsidies, I assume that after this initial year, no further economic development 
subsidies are promised, although the initially subsidized businesses continue to receive their 10-
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year promise of subsidies.  Figure 1 and Table 4 shows jobs generated for state residents per $1 
billion in present value of resources devoted to economic development, which can be scaled up 
or down to show absolute numbers of jobs generated for state residents for an economic 
development subsidy program in a given year of any present value.  The jobs for state residents 
that are counted in this figure and table are only those that increase the employment rate of state 
residents. 
As previously mentioned, $1 billion in economic development subsidies offered in a 
given year would be predicted, based on the business location research literature, to create about 
7,144 in total jobs.  Of course, the number of jobs in businesses that received subsidies would 
probably be much larger than that.  The 7,144 in total jobs only counts jobs that were induced to 
be created in the state because of the subsidies.  Many businesses that receive subsidies would 
have located in the state or expanded similarly without the subsidy, and the jobs in these 
subsidized businesses whose behavior is unaltered are excluded from the 7,144 jobs that are 
counted.  Because of this job growth of 7,144 jobs, the employment rates of state residents 
initially increase by about 4,300 jobs, with the other job held by migrants.  The 4,300 jobs 
created for local residents gradually declines over time, but is still over 2,000 jobs after 5 years, 
and over 1,000 jobs after 25 years.  
For this same one-time use of $1 billion in present value of financial subsidies for 
economic development in one year, I also show the effects on the real earnings of state residents, 
in Figure 2 and Table 4.  These effects on real earnings are due in part to the increased 
employment of local residents.  The effects on real earnings are also due in part to the increased 
wage rates of local residents who move up to higher paying occupations.  In addition, the real 
earnings of everyone increases by 1.2% per year with the general real wage growth.  As this 
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figure shows, the initial effect is to increase earnings by about $216 million per year, an amount 
that quickly declines to $145 million in extra earnings per year, and then much more gradually 
declines to zero over the next 60 years.  After 25 years, the annual earnings increment is just 
under $100 million per year.  Again, all these real earnings increments are only for the increase 
in annual real earnings per person of the original state residents, ignoring effects on in-migrants. 
Table 4 also shows the proportion of these earnings effects due to increased employment 
rates of the original state residents.  The remaining proportion is due to the increased wage rates 
from occupational upgrading of the original state residents.  With the initial reduction in 
unemployment rates, over 70% of the boost to earnings is due to increased employment rates.  
But as unemployment rates decline back to their previous level, in the long-run about 55% of the 
earnings effects is due to higher labor force participation rates, and about 45% due to higher 
occupational attainment. 
These effects, however, only reflect the initial economic development subsidies provided 
for one year, whereas what we are considering is the effects of a permanent economic 
development program equal in present value to a proposed permanent universal preschool 
program.  This program would devote $1 billion in present value of resources to subsidies the 
first year, and the annual present value of subsidies devoted to this program would henceforth 
grow at 1.5% per year, equal to what would be required for the universal preschool program with 
population growth of 0.3% and real earnings growth of 1.2%.  I assume that the cost of creating 
a job due to economic development subsidies also grows proportionately with real wage growth, 
or by 1.2% per year, as labor costs are the majority of locally based costs, and it makes some 
sense that the effectiveness of economic development subsidies should depend upon their 
relationship to total business costs.  Hence, the jobs created by this subsidy program each year 
 27
will eventually grow by 0.3% per year.  With real earnings growth, the real earnings of state 
residents created by these economic development subsidies will eventually grow by 1.5% per 
year.  
Table 5 shows the job creation and earnings generation effects of this ongoing economic 
development subsidy program in this hypothetical state economy.  The table also shows the job 
creation and earnings generation effects as a percentage of total state jobs and total state 
earnings, respectively.  These percentage effects would apply to the typical state that adopted a 
permanent economic development program of this relative size compared to the state economy, 
regardless of the state’s size.  These percentage effects are shown in Figure 3.  Absolute job 
creation and earnings generation is not shown because much of the job creation and earnings 
generation effects are due to the overall growth of the state economy.  I emphasize that the job 
creation and earnings generation numbers and percentage effects are the cumulative numbers of 
jobs and additional dollars of earnings generated from this ongoing subsidy program at various 
lengths of time after the program is implemented.  These figures do not reflect the job growth 
and earnings growth compared to the preceding year, but rather the cumulative effect by that 
year relative to the baseline.  This effect compares a simulated world in which the state has an 
ongoing subsidy program versus a world in which the state does not have such a program. 
As Table 5 shows, jobs created for the original state residents are about 19,000 after 5 
years, about 30,000 after 10 years, about 54,000 after 25 years, about 72,000 jobs after 50 years, 
and eventually the cumulative number of jobs created due to the ongoing economic development 
subsidy program grows at 0.3% per year, the same as the state economy.  To aid in 
interpretation, the 72,000 jobs after 50 years does not mean that there are 72,000 more jobs for 
state residents in year 54 of the simulation than in year 53, but rather that the number of jobs for 
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state residents in year 54 of the simulation are higher by 72,000 in the simulation with an 
ongoing economic development subsidy program, compared to what would happened during 
year 54 in the baseline without an ongoing economic development subsidy program.  As the 
figure and table show, the program eventually creates jobs for state residents due to higher 
employment rates equal to 0.61% of the baseline employment in the state economy, which is a 
significant boost.  Real earnings increase by $1.1 billion after 5 years, $2.0 billion after 10 years, 
$4.5 billion after 25 years, and $8.0 billion after 50 years.  As a reminder, the $8.0 billion 
increase after 50 years, or year 54 of the simulation, compares the earnings for state residents in 
year 54 in a world with an ongoing economic development subsidy in this state, versus earnings 
in the state in year 54 is a world where the state had no such program.  The $8.0 billion does not 
reflect growth from year 53 to year 54 of the simulation.  As a percentage of the state economy, 
the cumulative real earnings effects for state residents due to higher real earnings per capita 
eventually amount to a little less than a 1.2% boost to total real wage and salary earnings.  This 
is about twice the percentage effect of the economic development subsidy program on 
employment, which reflects the finding that about half the effects of economic development 
subsidies on increased earnings come from increased employment, and about half come from 
increased real hourly wage rates from occupational advancement. 
Using a 3% social discount rate, we can calculate the discounted present value of future 
real earnings associated with this economic development subsidy.  Per dollar of present value of 
economic development subsidies, the resulting increase in present value of real earnings of local 
residents is $3.14.  This of course does not mean that the “benefit-cost” ratio of these traditional 
economic development subsidies is 3.14.  A complete benefit-cost analysis would have to 
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consider many other factors, such as the opportunity cost of the extra time spent working after 
economic development subsidies, environmental and congestion effects, fiscal effects, etc.12  
 
State-by-State Effects 
Table 6 reports estimated long-run effects of economic development subsidies on each 
state.  These estimates allow policymakers and observers in any state to measure these effects 
using a variety of metrics, including jobs, earnings, GSP, and tax revenues.  
The estimated effects are for a permanent economic development subsidy program.  This 
program’s annual size in each state is equal to the assumed costs in that state of a universal 
preschool program.  This sizing allows a comparison in each state of the effects of the economic 
development subsidies with the effects of the same size universal preschool program, which will 
be reported in Chapter 3.   
For many states, these assumed annual costs of a preschool program happen to be of 
similar magnitude to current annual resources devoted to traditional economic development 
                                                 
12 One question that might occur to readers after reading the preschool chapter is why there are no demand 
effects of the tax financing of the traditional economic development subsidies.  Essentially, my implicit assumption 
is that the mix of traditional economic development programs is such that there are no net demand effects.  The 
neutral tax financing has negative demand effects.  If the economic development subsidies were delivered 100% in 
the form of services, such as small business services and manufacturing extensions services, then these added 
services would have a positive demand effect.  As argued in the chapter on preschool education, it is well accepted 
that the net demand effects of such a balanced budget increases in services will be positive.  However, in the 
preschool chapter, I find that this demand effect is small, only $0.04 in present value of earnings created per dollar 
spent.  The net balanced budget multiplier effects from increasing taxes to expand economic development services 
should be similar in magnitude to the balanced budget multiplier effects of increasing taxes to spend more on 
preschool education.  Alternatively, at the other extreme, the economic development subsidies could be delivered 
totally through tax subsidies to businesses.  We would expect the net demand effects of this to be negative, as it is 
likely that most of the subsidies largely affect flow to business owners who live out of state.  However, even if none 
of the tax subsidies to business have any positive effect on demand for this state’s goods and services, the negative 
effect of the increase in some neutral state tax will be modest.  Because demand effects of traditional economic 
development subsidies are likely to vary with what type of economic development program is expanded, and 
because these demand effects are likely to be modest, for simplicity I assume that the mix of economic development 
programs among business tax breaks and public services to business is such that net demand effects of the higher 
neutral tax to finance more economic development program activity is zero.  
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subsidies.  (There is no logical necessity for this to be so, but it turns that in many cases the costs 
are of similar magnitude.)  For example, in Table 6 we examine for Michigan the effects of an 
economic development subsidy program of $490.9 million per year, based on the assumed costs 
of a universal preschool program for Michigan.  However, it also turns out that as of 2003, 
annual resources devoted to traditional economic development programs in Michigan were 
around $706 million a year (Bartik, Erickcek, and Eisinger 2003).  Of that $706 million, $531 
million was the annual cost of various tax breaks, of which $330 million was in the form of 
property tax abatements.  So the figure in Table 6 is roughly equivalent to the resources 
Michigan currently devotes to tax subsidies for economic development. 
The estimates reported in Table 6 of effects of economic development subsidies on job 
creation, real earnings, GSP, and state and local tax revenues, are all long-run effects.  These are 
meant to be annual effects on the state economy as of 75 years after the economic development 
subsidy program was created.  However, the effects are calculated based on the size of the state 
economy in 2004.  Therefore, the numbers are best interpreted as the long-run effects that would 
have occurred in 2004 if a permanent economic development subsidy program had been initiated 
75 years previously.  The long-run effects 75 years from now would be larger, reflecting the 
growth in the state economy. 
The Table 6 estimates are based on the effects reported in previous tables for a typical 
state.  However, they are adjusted based on differences across states in residents’ propensity to 
migrate outside the state.  This is only a minor factor in evaluating the effects of economic 
development programs, but is much more important in evaluating the effects of preschool 
education programs.  For economic development programs, much of the effects of economic 
development on employment rates and earnings occur immediately.  However, these effects 
 31
decay over time in part due to residents leaving the state.  For a state or jurisdiction with more 
out-migration—the District of Columbia, for example—the economic development effects on 
residents decay faster, because more of the residents who benefited from the jobs attracted by 
economic development leave for other states.  The table notes describe the exact adjustments 
used.  Differences in out-migration across states are further considered when preschool 
education’s effects across states are discussed in Chapter 3. 
As can be seen in Table 6, economic development’s effects on jobs, earnings, gross state 
product, and state and local tax revenues are sizable.  In many states, these effects to tens of 
thousands of jobs, and hundreds of millions of dollars in earnings, GSP, and tax revenue.  In the 
typical state, effects on real earnings and GSP are many multiples of the annual spending on 
economic development.  The annual state and local tax revenue generated tends to be a bit less 
than the annual state subsidies for economic development, but not much less for most states.  
A final note:  The table reports effects for the United States as a whole.  These are not the 
actual effects for the U.S. as a whole, but rather the sum of the effects that each state perceives 
for itself.  As will be explored in Chapter 5, attracting jobs to one state through economic 
development subsidies to some extent takes jobs away from other states.  This “zero sum game” 









As mentioned, the preschool education program=s estimated costs come from Karoly and 
Bigelow, and these gross costs are estimated to be $5,856 per child participant in the program, 
before allowing for offsets from reduced current public spending for preschool.  As in Karoly 
and Bigelow, I assume that such costs are sufficient to buy a program whose benefits for 
disadvantaged 4-year-olds, relative to no preschool, are similar to those achieved in the Chicago 
Child Parent Center (CPC) preschool program.  This is certainly plausible because the CPC 
program spent only $5,099 per participant per year in 2004 dollars, and the ultimate CPC effects 
on educational attainment did not vary statistically significantly with whether the child 
participated for one or two years (Reynolds et al. 2002).13  In the policy alternatives section, I 
consider whether a truly high quality preschool with lasting impacts may require greater 
resources. 
I adopt Karoly and Bigelow=s assumptions about how the universal preschool program=s 
slots are distributed among high risk (family income less than $30,000), medium risk (family 
income between $30,000 and $50,000), and low-risk 4-year-olds.14  I also adopt Karoly and 
Bigelow=s assumptions about what the 4-year-olds in each risk group would have been doing 
without the universal preschool program, that is what proportion would have been participating 
                                                 
13The two-year participants seemed to have somewhat higher achievement effects in early elementary 
school, but did not do significantly better than one-year participants in later elementary school, avoiding juvenile 
crime, or educational attainment (Reynolds et al. 2002, p. 278; Karoly and Bigelow 2005, pp. 34–35). 
14These divisions implicitly use the year 2003 dollar divisions of family income of Karoly and Bigelow.  
Depending on how family income did relative to inflation from 2003 to 2004, year 2004 divisions might be 
somewhat different. 
 33
in a current public preschool program, a private preschool program, or no preschool at all.  I use 
Karoly and Bigelow’s fairly conservative assumptions about what percentage of the benefits of 
the CPC-quality program for high-risk participants, relative to no preschool, would be realized 
by different sub-group of participants.  The assumption is that high-risk participants benefit 
significantly more than medium and low-risk participants, and that benefits of the new preschool 
program are greatest for participants who otherwise would have attended no preschool, and 
greater for those who otherwise would have attended current public preschool programs than for 
those who would have attended a private preschool.  Table 7 summarizes these assumptions. 
These assumptions lead to the conclusion that the net effect of the program for the average 
participant is only 23% of the effects the program would have on high risk participants who 
otherwise would have had no preschool.15  
Karoly and Bigelow’s estimates are based on detailed data from California.  Why, then, 
do I use these estimates for all states?  States no doubt differ in the extent to which 4-year-olds 
are currently in preschool.  However, variations across states in current enrollment of 4-year-olds 
in preschool should change the costs and benefits of universal preschool in the same direction.  
For example, in a state with a greater percentage of 4-year-olds in preschool, the costs of moving 
to universal preschool will be lower, but so will the benefits.  The ratio of benefits to costs of 
moving to universal preschool should be similar.  Ideally, one might want detailed data for each 
state on current spending on preschool and the percentage of 4-year-olds in preschool, along 
with detailed data on the how enrollment in preschool varies with family income.  But such 
detailed data for each state are unavailable.  
                                                 
15This 23% is derived by weighting the percentage benefits for 4-year-olds in each cell of Table 6 by the 
percentage of participants in universal preschool who fall into each cell.  The calculation is: 
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In addition, the estimated effects are sensitive to assumptions about who will sign up for 
universal preschool, and how the benefits for different groups from a high quality universal 
preschool program compare to the benefits estimated in experimental studies.  Karoly and 
Bigelow provide these assumptions.  I prefer using someone else’s assumptions about these key 
parameters.  By using someone else’s assumptions, I avoid the accusation that I have created 
arbitrary assumptions to manipulate my results.  In Chapter 4, I consider how the estimates vary 
with alternative assumptions. 
 
Types of Economic Development Effects  
The potential economic development effects of a universal preschool program, on 
increasing employment rates and earnings of state residents, fall into five categories: 
1. Effects due simply to the program spending money on public services, financed by local 
taxes.  These are effects that would also occur from any public spending, regardless of its 
usefulness, for example it would occur from hiring people to dig holes and fill them up 
again.  
 
2. Effects due to the free child care provided by the program, and the resulting effects upon 
labor supply.  These effects would occur regardless of whether preschool education had 
any long-run effects upon its child participants, as long as parents perceived the 
preschool to provide high quality free child care for part of the year. 
 
3. Effects that occur because participants in the program are more likely in the long-run to 
have higher educational attainment and be more employable. 
 
4. Effects that occur because participants in the program have positive effects on their peers 
during K-12 education, and those peers in turn have higher educational attainment and 
become more employable. 
 
5. Effects that occur because the higher average educational attainment in the state=s labor 
force, as a result of effects on the educational attainment of participants and their peers, 
increases the productivity of the state’s workforce beyond what would be expected based 
on the effects of educational attainment on individual wages.  This increase in 
                                                                                                                                                             
23% = (5 H 100 + 3 H 50 + 7 H 25 + 12 H 50 + 8 H 25) / 70.  
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productivity from higher average education increases the profitability of the state for 
businesses, which attracts additional employment, raising employment rates and 
occupational attainment. 
 
Each of these avenues by which preschool education may affect state economic 
development is considered in turn. 
 
Balanced Budget Multiplier Effects 
First, there is some stimulative effect of public spending on the economy, even if it is 
financed by increased taxes.  This is a standard notion taught in most introductory 
macroeconomics course that is referred to as the “balanced budget multiplier.” 
The basic idea of the balanced budget multiplier is that spending money stimulates the 
economy by increasing spending on goods and services and hence on the workers needed to 
produce those goods and services.  In the context of a state or local economy, the stimulus occurs 
because it increases spending on locally produced goods and services and local workers.  Of 
course, the increased taxes to pay for this spending also reduce demand for local workers and 
local goods and services.  But this reduction in demand is only a portion of the increased taxes, 
as some of the funds taken away in higher taxes would not have been spent on local workers and 
local goods and services:  the funds would have been saved, or would have been spent on goods 
and services from outside the state.  In addition, the increased spending on local goods and 
services generates income for the workers hired and other factors of production.  This income, 
which is equal to the tax increase, would also be expected to in part be respent on local goods 
and services, and in part respent on goods and services from outside the state or saved.  In the 
simplest models in introductory economics courses, the stimulative effect of the respending on 
local goods and services generated by the initial spending on local goods and services exactly 
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offsets the economically depressing effect of the reduced spending caused by the higher taxes.  
In these simplest models, the stimulus to local production is exactly equal to the initial spending, 
and the employment effect is exactly equal to the workers initially hired to produce the public 
good or service.  In more complex models, we recognize that the taxpayers paying higher taxes 
may not spend and save money in the same way as the individuals respending the income 
generated by the initial boost to spending; in particular, in the regional context, some of these 
individuals may live outside the state, which dramatically affects the likelihood that the 
respending will be on goods and services produced within the state.   
To ascertain the size of the balanced budget multiplier for preschool education, my 
colleague, George Erickcek at the Upjohn Institute and I simulated the job creation effects of a 
universal preschool education program in the state of Michigan.  We used a model developed by 
REMI (Regional Economic Models Incorporated) for the Upjohn Institute. REMI regional 
models are some of the most widely used and respected regional econometric models, and are 
documented and explained extensively in scholarly work (Treyz 1993; Treyz et al. 1992; 
Greenwood et al. 1991; Treyz et al 1993).  In estimating this model, we also allowed for the 
public spending on universal preschool in part replacing previous public spending on preschool, 
and in part replacing private spending on private preschool.16 
                                                 
16The number of estimated universal preschool participants in Michigan, assuming 70% of preschoolers 
participate, as in Table 7, is 93,148.  I assume that universal preschool spending is $5,856 per participant, as 
assumed by Karoly and Bigelow (2005) or gross public spending of $545.5 million.  But we assume that for 47.1% 
of the participants (47.1% = 33% / 70% from Table 6), the universal preschool program replaces other public 
preschool programs that would have spent $3,441 per participant (a figure derived from Karoly and Bigelow 2005), 
so there is a reduction in spending on current public preschool programs of $151.0 million.  Therefore, the net new 
public spending is $394.4 million (= $545.5 million − 151.0 with correction for rounding error).  In addition, 31.4% 
of participants (31.4% = 22% / 70% from Table 7) would otherwise have enrolled in private preschool.  I assume 
that these participants’ families would have spent $1,995 per participant on private preschool, so the reduced private 
spending on preschool from the universal preschool program is $58.4 million.  Therefore, the net additional new 
spending in the state is $336.1 million.  The impact of this net $394.5 million in additional public spending on public 
preschool is simulated using the Upjohn Institute’s REMI model for Michigan, and yields a job creation figure for 
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Although these estimates are for Michigan, similar effects should apply in other states.  
States will of course differ in the proportion of income typically spent in-state and out-of-state.  
However, these differences will have similarly-sized effects on the magnitude of the depressing 
effects caused by increased taxes and the stimulative effects caused by increased respending.  
For example, in a state where a higher proportion of income is typically spent in state, both the 
depressing effects of increased taxes and the stimulative effects of respending will be higher, and 
these two effects will tend to offset each other. 
The resulting estimates conclude that one-time spending of $1 billion on preschool 
education produces an immediate “balanced budget multiplier” of creating 5,708 jobs.  This 
might appear to be comparable to economic development subsidies, which create about 7,100 
jobs from one-time spending.  However, in the case of economic development subsidies, the 
subsidy induces, in some percentage of the subsidized firms, a particular location decision, and 
thus has a permanent or at least persistent effect on local jobs.  In the case of the balanced budget 
multiplier effects of preschool education, the 5,708 jobs only exist while the money is being 
spent, so one-time spending on preschool of $1 billion during a given year will only create the 
5,708 jobs for one year. 
Of course, we are considering a permanent universal preschool program in an economy 
with population and employment growth of 0.3% and real wage growth of 1.2%.  Preschool 
                                                                                                                                                             
the state of 2,742 jobs in terms of total employment.  But the estimated ratio of wage and salary employment to total 
employment from the Regional Economic Information System (REIS) for 2003 is 137.3 million / 167.2 million = 
0.821.  Therefore, projecting from Michigan, $1 billion in net new public spending on universal public preschool 
will have job creation effects on wage and salary employment of ($1 billion / $394.4 million) H (0.821) H 2,742 = 
5,708 wage and salary jobs, which is what is used in this report.  Note that the estimated public spending on 
universal preschool education in this calculation of $394.4 million is not the same as the $490.9 million used in other 
tables.  The former is derived using direct data on 4-year-olds and various assumptions about costs, the latter simply 
as a percentage of Michigan wage and salary earnings.  Both are similar in magnitude, and which is more accurate is 
unclear.  In any event, the balanced budget effects of preschool spending per dollar spent should not vary much 
using either figure. 
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spending will grow by 1.5% per year, and will provide 0.3% more slots for 4-year-olds each 
year. So the number of jobs created will grow next year by 0.3%.  However, the only increase in 
jobs is this additional 0.3%, as the initial 5,708 of the jobs created next year only maintain the 
same 5,708 jobs created last year. 
The resulting impact on the employment rates and wage rates of state residents is similar 
to an economic development program that initially permanently creates 5,708 jobs, and in all 
years after that only creates very small additional numbers of jobs.  Table 8 and Figure 4 show 
the job generating and earnings generation effects on state residents of a universal preschool 
program, via this avenue of “balanced budget multiplier” effects of spending extra public 
monies. The short-run balanced budget multiplier effects are just a little below the short-run 
effects of a permanent economic development program of the same costs.  For example, 
comparing Tables 5 and 8, the effects in the first year of program implementation, year 4, are 
initially 0.04% of state employment for the balanced budget multiplier effects, and 0.05% of 
state employment for the effects of the economic development program.  But the balanced 
budget multiplier effects die out over time, whereas the effects of a permanent economic 
development program continue to increase.  Eventually, the balanced budget multiplier effects 
on jobs or real earnings are close to zero, while the long-run effects of a permanent economic 
development program of the same costs is to increase employment for state residents by about 
0.6% of baseline, and earnings for state residents by about 1.2% of baseline, which are both over 
15 times the balanced budget multiplier effects for any year.  In addition, a calculation of the 
present value of the balanced budget multiplier effects on earnings of a preschool education 
program is only about $0.04 for every dollar of present value spending, whereas economic 
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development subsidies yield $3.14 in extra present value of earnings for each present value 
dollar of costs. 
It is useful to understand why the balanced budget multiplier effects on jobs and earnings 
of spending more on preschool is so much smaller than the effects on jobs and earnings of 
devoting resources to economic development programs.  In both cases, jobs are being created by 
government activity, but they differ in what percentage of the cost of creating those jobs is being 
paid for by government.  Under the balanced budget multiplier, essentially the new jobs and 
earnings that are created cost, to a rough approximation, about one dollar of extra spending for 
each dollar of real earnings created in the short-run, and then, as previously discussed, in the 
long-run only a portion of this short-run increase in jobs and earnings goes to increased jobs and 
earnings of state residents.  In the case of economic development programs, the inducements 
needed to create a job generally are considerably less than the earnings associated with the 
subsidized jobs, even allowing for the likelihood that many subsidies have no effect on location 
decisions.  If you can get away with it, spending a small amount of money to leverage a much 
larger behavioral change is the preferable way to achieve some policy goal. 
Much larger estimates of the job creation and earnings generation effects of spending 
more money on preschool can be obtained if we count all jobs and earnings in the state; this 
report only counts the increased jobs and earnings that increase employment rates and annual 
earnings per person of state residents.  But counting all jobs and earnings abandons a focus on 
jobs and earnings generation that is truly associated with higher individual economic well-being. 
If we count all jobs and earnings, we implicitly are valuing growth of any kind, regardless of the 
effect on individuals. Furthermore, if we did choose to count all jobs and earnings growth, 
regardless of whether it increased employment rates and earnings rates, we would have to also 
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do the same when analyzing traditional economic development programs.  These traditional 
economic development programs have much larger effects on overall labor demand and overall 
state growth than the balanced budget multiplier effects of preschool programs.  Traditional 
economic development programs by their nature are designed to directly boost labor demand. 
Preschool programs are unlikely to win the contest for the best way to boost labor demand, 
because preschool programs are not primarily designed to do so, and have such labor demand 
effects only as a side effect of their main purpose of providing services to children.  
We could also obtain larger total job effects and total earnings effects from the balanced 
budget multiplier effects of an early childhood program that went beyond universal preschool to 
also fund a wide variety of child care and other developmental services to children younger than 
age 5.  More taxes and more spending yield a larger total balanced budget multiplier effect.  
However, even with a much larger early childhood program, the present value of the earnings 
effects per dollar spent due to balanced budget multiplier effects is probably much the same, at 
about $0.04 per dollar spent. 
However, even if balanced budget multiplier effects of preschool education are modest, 
there are other avenues of effects of preschool education programs on jobs and earnings of state 
residents that we must also consider. 
 
Child Care Effects and Parental Labor Supply 
Another economic development impact of universal preschool is the economic effects of 
the offering of free, high quality child care on the parents of the child participants.  In this report, 
I try to measure the effects on state residents’ jobs and earnings due to the effects of lower cost 
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child care on the labor supply choices of the parents of participants, and the effects on this 
enlarged labor supply on job creation and earnings generation in state labor markets. 
The preschool education program being considered operates for 525 hours during the 
year (Karoly and Bigelow 2005).  If we assume that full-time work year is 2,000 hours of work 
(50 weeks of work H 40 hours per week), and then add in annual commute time of 192 hours 
(192 hours = 50 weeks H 10 commutes per week H average commute of 23 minutes),17 then the 
offer of free child care for 525 hours a year reduces child care costs by 24%.  
However, under the assumptions outlined in Table 7 for the preschool program, 47% (= 
33 / 70) of participants in the universal preschool program already are in an existing free public 
preschool program, and therefore experience no reduction in child care costs.  Therefore, child 
care costs for the average participant only decline by 24% H 0.53 = 12.7%.  
In addition, calculations suggest that only 60.7% of all 4-year-olds are the youngest child 
in the family (author’s calculations using March 2004 Current Population Survey).  I assume that 
child care costs for the youngest child are the “marginal costs” that really drive labor supply 
decisions.  Therefore, effective child care costs for the average participant are reduced by only 
12.7 H 0.607 = 7.7%. 
The best estimates from the child care research literature suggest that the percentage 
point increase in the labor supply for a given reduction in child care costs might be around one-
fifth of the reduction in child care costs.18  This suggests that a 7.7% reduction in average child 
                                                 
17Commuting figure comes from Bartik (2001, p. 62), based on the U.S. Census. 
18Blau (2001) and Blau and Hagy (1998) estimate an elasticity of employment with respect to the price of 
child care of !0.20.  Given that this elasticity refers to the percentage change in the employment rate, and the 
average employment rate in Blau and Hagy’s sample appears to be 56.4%, the elasticity in rate points would be 
!0.11.  However, the Blau estimates are towards the bottom end of other estimates in the literature; as pointed out by 
Blau and Hagy (1998, footnote 17 on p. 124), there are other estimates with about twice as large an elasticity, which 
would imply an elasticity in rate points close to !0.20.  In addition, the careful work by Anderson and Levine (2000) 
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care costs will increase overall labor force participation rates by 1.54% (= 0.2 H 7.7).  In the case 
of the universal preschool program in our hypothetical state, with an initial cost of $1 billion, the 
program enrolls 236,183 4-year-olds, so the lower child care costs would be expected to increase 
labor supply by 3,637 additional labor force participants (3,637 = 1.54% H 236,183). 
A crucial issue for analyzing the jobs and earnings generating effects of this labor supply 
increase is how local labor markets respond to labor supply shocks.  This issue is also crucial for 
analyzing the jobs and earnings effects of the eventual labor supply increase of preschool 
participants when they grow up, which is analyzed below.  It should be understood that an 
increase in the number of persons who are able and willing to work at particular types of jobs 
does nothing directly to create any jobs.  What does create jobs is that employers have incentives 
for increasing the number of workers demanded in response to a labor supply shock.  These 
incentives occur because a labor supply shock results in higher unemployment rates, as well as 
perhaps some reductions in wage rates, which makes it considerably cheaper and easier for 
employers to hire workers in this particular local labor market.  On the other hand, any increase 
in unemployment rates and reduction of wages will discourage labor force participation of 
residents of the local labor market, and discourage in-migration.  In general, we would expect a 
shock to local labor supply to result in some combination of an expansion to the number of 
workers demanded, as well as some “displacement” of some other labor supply.19   
                                                                                                                                                             
suggest that the elasticity with respect to child care price is higher for the poor and near-poor, and higher for women 
with children under 6 than for women with older children.  Anderson and Levine, for example, find an elasticity in 
rate points of !0.28 for all women with children under age 6 (Table 10.8), and an elasticity in rate points of !0.15 
for poor and near-poor women with children under age 13 (Table 10.9).  Of course, not all the parents affected by 
the changes in child care prices due to universal preschool will be poor or near-poor.  Overall, an elasticity in the 
range of !0.20 in rate points seems reasonable for this sample.  As will be clear in the analysis, even tripling or 
quadrupling these elasticities, which seems implausible, would not dramatically affect the overall results. 
19What about multiplier effects of the increase in employment brought about by the labor supply shock?  
As least as a first approximation, there will not be any multiplier effects.  In the case of economic development 
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I assume, based on evidence reviewed in much more detail in Bartik (2001), that the net 
effects of these “displacement” effects is that the labor demand response to a labor supply shock 
is about two-thirds, that is the jobs created will be about two-thirds of the increase in labor 
supply.  I also assume that the resulting adjustments to a new local labor market equilibrium 
involve relatively small changes in wages, which I ignore; this is consistent with the evidence, 
also reviewed in Bartik (2001), that relative wages at the local level are quite resistant to change. 
Most economic analysis would get somewhat larger effects of a labor supply shock 
because the analysis implicitly assumes no long-run displacement, that is a labor supply shock 
will be fully accommodated in the long run by increased labor demand.  However, some 
displacement is more likely at the state level, where additional labor supply adjustments are 
possible through migration.  Furthermore, the empirical evidence seems to support some 
displacement. 
Therefore, the labor supply shock of 3,637 will result in an increase in state jobs of 2,425. 
It is likely that most of the new labor force participants are female and of relatively modest pay.  
I assume that these additional workers are paid at the 40th percentile of women’s earnings, 
which in 2004 dollars is $10.84 per hour (data from the Current Population Survey for 2003, 
available from the Economic Policy Institute at 
                                                                                                                                                             
subsidies, these subsidies have typically targeted export-base employment, which will then have multiplier effects on 
non-export-base employment.  With labor supply shocks, any induced expansion will occur in both export base and 
non-export base employment.  One way of looking at what occurs is that as a first approximation, the expansion of 
the non-export base will be the multiplier of the export-base.  Another way to look at it is that with imports (to the 
local economy) equal to the local economy=s exports, the expansion of local demand due to the extra local 
production will be exactly equal to the expansion of locally oriented production: the income generated will be spend 
on imports and local goods, and the production will go to exports and local goods, and if imports and exports are 
equal, the additional local production will just equal the additional local demand.  Of course, in the real world it may 
not be the case that the induced employment expansion due to a labor supply shock will proportionately expand both 
the export-base and non-export base of the local economy; this would be an interesting area of study.  
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http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/datazone_dznational).  Multiplying by 2,000 hours per year and 
2,425 yields an increase in local earnings from this extra labor supply of $52.6 million. 
For permanent universal preschool programs, these jobs creation and earnings generation 
impacts will each increase with the economy, the job creation at 0.3% per year, and the earnings 
impact at 1.5% per year.  Table 9 shows the effects over time.  In addition, the present value of 
the increased earnings from the labor supply induced by lower child care costs is about $0.05 for 
every $1 in present value of costs for a universal preschool program. 
These estimates do not attempt to capture all the potential effects on jobs and earnings of 
the child care provided by a universal preschool program.  For example, there is some evidence 
that high quality child care may increase employee productivity, which may encourage job 
expansion and increase wages (Baughman et al. 2002; Shellenback 2004).  In addition, the extra 
labor market experience gained because of the induced labor supply may increase future 
employment and wages of the additional labor force participants.  Although these effects are 
potentially important, I did not add them in because our knowledge of the magnitude of these 
effects is so fragile that I think any such estimates would be highly speculative.20 
                                                 
20Not allowing for labor market experience effects of increased employment of parents from lower price 
child care may seem to contradict allowing economic development programs to have long-run effects by increasing 
the labor market experience of state residents.  However, there is very strong evidence that shocks to local labor 
demand do have long-run effects on employment rates and wages.  In addition, the case of a once-and-for-all shock 
to labor demand is quite different from a one-time shock to labor supply which later reverses.  In the case of the job 
growth brought about by economic development subsidies or other demand shocks, we have a permanent change in 
labor demand.  Individuals who previously could not be hired for a particular quality of job are able to be hired due 
to the demand shock.  We are asking whether the individuals who gain employment that they would otherwise be 
unable to obtain due to that change are able to maintain their new status in the labor market, given that labor demand 
stays at this new higher level.  In the case of lower price child care, we are considering a temporary lowering of child 
care costs for one year.  Persons choose to participate in the labor force due to this lower-priced child care, 
presumably taking jobs they could have obtained previously with their qualifications.  The next year, the lower price 
of child care disappears.  With relative prices reverting to their previous levels, the most natural assumption is that 
observed behavior will revert to its old pattern. 
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In addition, these estimates do not capture other benefits of high-quality free child care 
that do not increase jobs or wages.  For example, a household whose labor force participation is 
unchanged because of the free preschool will still perceive significant benefits from the free 
child care provided by the preschool program.  In many analyses of the benefits and costs of 
preschool, the provision of free child care is a key component of the benefits.  For example, in 
Karoly and Bigelow (2005, Table 3.2, pp. 94B95), the value of free child care from preschool is 
about equal by itself to the costs of universal preschool.  However, in this report I am only 
looking at the benefits of high quality free child care that are reflected in increased employment 
and earnings. 
As Table 9 in comparison with Table 8 shows, the child care effects I have measured are 
similar in magnitude to the balanced budget multiplier effect of universal preschool, but have a 
different time pattern of effects.  The demand side effects of the balanced budget multiplier tend 
to occur immediately and then die out over time, whereas the effects of child care occur fairly 
uniformly over time.  
Both child care effects and balanced budget multiplier effects are quite modest compared 
to effects of an equal cost program of traditional economic development subsidies.  I already 
explained the lower balanced budget multiplier effects as due to the government in the balanced 
budget multiplier case paying 100% of the costs of a job, whereas in the economic development 
case the government is using leverage by paying considerably less than 100% of the costs of a 
job.  In the child care case, in theory one could imagine that very small changes in costs could 
leverage much larger changes in earnings.  However, in practice, child care is expensive, in 
many cases amounting to a sizable percentage of the earnings of the parent, and many of those 
offered free child care already participate in the labor market, so this limits the scope of the 
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effects on labor force participation.  Furthermore, the type of high quality preschool offered here 
largely replaces other lower-quality public preschool programs that also offer free child care, 
which also reduces the effects of the program.  Finally, the high-quality preschool program that 
is modeled here is not optimized to provide child care benefits, and is definitely not a universal 
child care program, as it does nothing to deal with problems of child care for younger children, 
problems in child care for sick children, or problems in child care for non-day shift workers.  
Programs optimized to deal with these child care problems could probably deliver more parental 
labor supply effects per dollar spent. 
 
Effects on Preschool Participants and Their Peers    
 
I now turn to considering effects of preschool on state employment rates and real 
earnings that occur due to effects of preschool education on participants’ long-run success in the 
labor market.  I also consider effects of preschool on employment rates and real earnings that 
occur due to effects of preschool participants on their peers in K-12 education.  I consider these 
two types of effects of preschool together because peer effects end up being modeled as some 
multiple of direct effects on participants. 
Evaluations of the Perry Preschool program and the CPC program suggest that high-
quality preschool education has significant effects on the long-run educational attainment and 
employability of the children participating in the preschool.  These increases in educational 
attainment and employability represent increases in both the quantity and quality of labor supply 
of these participants.  I attempt to trace these labor supply increases over the entire working life 
of the average preschool participant.  Such labor supply increases would be expected to affect 
the economic development goals of the number and quality of jobs created for local residents.  
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As mentioned above, I assume with Karoly and Bigelow (2005) that the effects of this 
model universal preschool program on participants should be modeled as being in the proportion 
0.23 of the effects on the participants observed in the CPC; the participants observed in the CPC 
were high-risk children who otherwise would not have been in preschool, and a real-world 
universal program would have many lower-risk child participants, and many participants who 
otherwise would have been in some sort of preschool , albeit in many cases of lower quality.  
However, there are many other calculations that must be made to simulate the lifetime effects of 
a universal preschool program on the local employment and earnings of CPC-type participants. 
First, the CPC data only reports educational attainment data at ages 20–21.  We know 
from the Perry Preschool program data that educational attainment continues to increase beyond 
this time, both in individuals getting some sort of high school diploma or GED, and in 
individuals going on to get an associate’s degree or bachelor’s degree (Schweinhart et al. 2005, 
Table 3.1, p. 52).  However, the effects at later ages, up to age 40, that are observed in the Perry 
program cannot be used without some alteration because we know that at age 19, the effects of 
Perry Preschool on educational attainment are twice as great as for the CPC program.  Therefore, 
as outlined in Table 10, I assume that the effects of a CPC style program on the most high-risk 
participants will over time follow a pattern similar to that of Perry Preschool, but with only about 
half as much of a program effect on high school graduation.  I also assume that the proportion 
going on to a postsecondary degree out of those who get a high school degree will at later ages in 
the CPC program group be the same as in the Perry Preschool program, and similarly for the 
CPC control group.  Estimates of educational attainment effects for years other than those 
directly observed are interpolated or extrapolated.  Extrapolation beyond age 40 assumes 
educational attainment does not change past age 40. 
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Second, the research on the CPC program provides no direct estimates of the 
employment and wage rate effects of the program on participants.  Previous studies have 
essentially projected employment and wage effects based on educational attainment effects on 
employment and wages for various ages obtained from the Current Population Survey or U.S. 
Census (Reynolds et al. 2002; Karoly and Bigelow 2005).  But there is strong evidence from the 
Perry Preschool program that the program=s employment rate effects are considerably greater 
than what would have been predicted based on educational attainment.  As shown in Table 11, 
most of these “unpredicted” employment rate effects occur because the Perry control group tends 
to underperform what one would expect based on its educational attainment.  This presumably 
reflects the disadvantaged status of this control group, which is not fully captured by educational 
attainment data.  The program appears to move the program group up to employment rates that 
are close to what would be expected based on educational attainment.  Therefore, in projecting 
the employment rate effects of a CPC style program, I assume that there is a “bonus” effect of 
the program beyond that predicted by its effects on educational attainment, but only half as much 
as the bonus effect observed for Perry Preschool.  The logic here is that the CPC program 
appears to have half as large an effect on educational attainment as Perry Preschool, and it seems 
a reasonable supposition that the bonus effects of the CPC on employment rates should also be 
half as large. 
Third, in calculating effects on state and local economic development, which I interpret 
as meaning effects on the employment rates and earnings of state residents, we need to worry 
about migration.  From a state’s perspective, we don=t want to count any extra jobs and wages 
generated by preschool participants who move outside the state.  I work with two sources of data 
to make reasonable estimates of what proportion of 4-year-old preschool participants would be 
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expected at various ages to live in the same state they attended preschool in.  First, from the 
Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, I obtain data that provides direct information on what 
proportion of 4-year-olds at later ages live in the same state they lived in at age 4, for different 
education groups.  The PSID data have a reasonable sample size up to age 30, and provide some 
information up to age 39.  Second, from the 2000 Census PUMS data, we obtain data on the 
proportion of individuals at all ages from 16 to 79 who live in the same state they were born in, 
for different educational groups.  These data do not follow people over time, as the data are cross 
sectional, but if the mobility behavior of different cohorts does not change too much, it may give 
a reasonable guess about the pattern of mobility.  Furthermore, these data by implication show 
out-migration since birth, which we expect would be greater than out-migration since age 4.  But 
the sample sizes are huge, and the data cover the entire working life of the population. 
Table 12 shows some of the results of these calculations.  For both the PSID and PUMS 
data, we summarize for each age, based on the educational mix at that age of the preschool 
participants, the average expected percentage of persons expected to live either in the same state 
as they did at age 4 (the PSID) and their birth state (PUMS).  A comparison shows that during 
the overlap of these two data sets, they follow roughly similar patterns of a gradually declining 
percentage of persons staying in the same state.  As expected, the PSID percentages living in the 
age-4 state are somewhat greater on average than the PUMS percentages living in the birth state, 
by about a ratio of 1.08 to 1.  To provide a reasonable simulation of the number of 4-year-old 
preschoolers who would live in their age-4 state at different ages, we multiply the PUMS 
percentages by this average ratio.  The results are presented in the table. 
These estimates of the percentages living in their age-4 state may be surprisingly large 
for many academic researchers and policy analysts, starting out at 85% at age 16 but only 
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gradually declining to 63% at age 79.  The implication is that states can expect much of the 
benefits resulting from the long-run changed behavior of preschool participants to accrue to the 
state.  Several points should be noted.  First, these results are perhaps surprising because the 
average academic or policy researcher attended elite higher educational institutions and was far 
more active in national labor markets than is typical of average college graduates, who tend to 
stay closer to home both in college and thereafter.  Second, preschool education=s main effect on 
educational attainment is to raise high school graduation, not college graduation.  Therefore, the 
typical preschool participant is considerably less mobile than the average college graduate.  
Third, these surprising estimates do appear consistent with the only known direct evidence, and 
may be conservative estimates of the propensity to stay in the home state.  Schweinhart et al. 
(2005, p. 40) report that at age 40, 82% of Perry Preschool participants were still living in 
Michigan.  The predicted percentage from the table is 72%.  Finally, these estimates are for a 
typical state. Out-migration obviously varies across states.  I will consider such variations in a 
later section that will produce state-by-state estimates of preschool’s effects on economic 
development. 
Fourth, I allow for the mortality of preschool participants.  I use mortality tables for 
blacks from the National Center for Health Statistics to project the percentage of 4-year-old 
preschoolers who will be alive at various ages from 16 to 79. 
Fifth, as with the labor supply effects of lower cost child care on parents, I allow for 
displacement.  The effects of preschool are merely to raise the quantity and quality of labor 
supply.  The actual change in job quantity and quality depends on how employers respond to this 
labor supply increase.  Although the CPC studies and Perry Preschool studies do an excellent job 
of estimating the effects of these programs on preschool participants versus non-participants, 
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they cannot by their very design show whether some of the jobs and earnings gained by 
participants come at the expense of displacing non-participants from jobs and earnings.  Such 
displacement will inevitably occur if the net increase in the state economy’s overall jobs and 
earnings are less than the employment and earnings that is estimated to be gained by participants. 
I assume based on estimates from Bartik (2001) that the net increase in overall employment and 
earnings is two-thirds of the estimated gross increase in employment and earnings for 
participants.  In other words, one-third of the gross increase in employment and earnings for 
preschool participants is offset by reduced employment and earnings for other workers. 
Finally, the effects of preschool education for the average high-risk participant who 
otherwise would not have participated in any preschool are translated into effects for the average 
participant in a universal preschool program by multiplying by 0.23. 
These calculations can be summarized in the following equation.  This equation is 
calculated for each year of the working life for an average universal preschool participant: 





(CPC effect on employment or earnings via effects on educational attainment, 
calculated using CPC data on educational attainment extrapolated to higher ages 
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(a multiplier factor of 2/3rds to account for the displacement effects of the extra 
employment and earnings of preschool participants in reducing the employment 




(a multiplier factor of 0.23 to account for preschool education having less effect 
on the average universal program participant vs. the average CPC participant). 
 
 
This calculation is done separately for each age from 16 to 79.  These effects on the 
employment and earnings of the average preschool participant, when multiplied by the number 
of participants, gives total effects on jobs and earnings, and allows for calculations of the ratios 
of these effects to dollars spent on preschool education, total state employment, or total state 
earnings. 
In addition to these direct social effects of preschool on participants’ later education and 
earnings, there are social spillovers on the employment and earnings of others. Some of these are 
“in-school peer effects” that occur during K-12 education; others are “social productivity effects 
of higher average education in the labor market” that occur during individuals’ working lives.  I 
consider the spillover effects in the labor market during participants’ working careers in a later 
section; here I consider peer effects during K-12 education.  
“In-school peer effects” may occur if the increase in the educational achievement of 
participants, and their changes in behavior and motivation, increase the educational achievement 
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and improve the behavior of non-participants.  In addition, the interactions among preschool 
participants in school may have peer effects on each other that may further improve participants’ 
educational achievement, behavior, and motivation.  The economic development effects of such 
peer effects occur if these improvements in peer educational achievement and behavior and 
motivation result in later increases in educational attainment, as well as effects on employability 
that go beyond what are measured by improved educational attainment. 
Peer effects in school may occur by students learning from others, or serving as role 
models for others and influencing their behavior.  Peer effects may also occur by students 
affecting the classroom atmosphere, for example, the degree to which learning is interrupted by 
disruptive students.  Peer effects may also occur if higher average student achievement levels 
allows teachers to increase the level at which instruction occurs (the mechanisms for peer effects 
are further discussed by Hoxby 2000, and Hanushek et al. 2003, and these discussions have 
influenced some of my ideas on peer effects). 
Both Hanushek et al. (2003) and Hoxby (2000) have found evidence of significant peer 
effects on test score gains in grades 3–6.  These peer effects seem to be at least as strong as 0.15, 
which means that, holding constant the characteristics of an individual student, an increase of 1% 
in prior average achievement levels in a class is associated with an individual student having test 
score gains of 0.15 of 1% more during a school year.  A equivalent way of expressing the 
magnitude of these peer effects is that if an individual student increases his or her achievement 
level by 1%, the aggregate gain in test scores for his or her class will be 0.15% greater during the 
next school year.  An individual student with a higher achievement level of 1% greater increases 
average prior student achievement levels by 1%/N, where N is class size, and average student 
achievement gains during the next school year will then go up by 0.15%/N during the next year.  
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Aggregating over all N students in the class, total test score gains go up by the N students H the 
average gain of 0.15%/N, or by 0.15%.  Whatever beneficial effects higher average test scores 
have on later employment and earnings will increase due to peer effects during that single year 
by a factor of 1.15.    
I assume that in fact such peer effects on test scores are reflected proportionately in later 
employment and earnings.  There is no direct evidence for this assumption, but it seems 
reasonable, and certainly more reasonable than ignoring possible implications of in-school peer 
effects for later employment and earnings. 
A tough issue is what to assume about the overall magnitude of peer effects from the 
evidence of Hanushek et al. and Hoxby for peer effects during a particular school year.  The 
effects estimated by these researchers occur during a typical school year from grades 3 to 6.  If 
we assume peer effects accumulate across years for these 4 years, then we get a cumulative peer 
effect of 0.60.  Of course, in the real world peer effects may diminish beyond a certain point, so 
that the cumulative peer effect of these four years alone may be less than 0.6.  In addition, it is 
possible that peer effects on test score gains may be greater than peer effects on the non-
cognitive behavioral and motivational characteristics that may be at least as important in 
determining future educational attainment and employability.  On the other hand, peer effects 
may occur throughout a student’s K-12 experience, not just in grades 3–6. Overall, I think it is a 
conservative assumption to assume that the ultimate peer effect of preschool education on later 
employment and earnings is at least 0.6. 
Because not all preschool participants survive to enter elementary school, and not all 
preschool participants stay in the same state, I adjust the 0.6 peer effects by a factor of 0.904 to 
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reflect both mortality and out-migration, yielding a final peer effect of 0.54.21  The employment 
and earnings effects of preschool that occur directly for participants are then multiplied by 0.54 
to yield estimates of effects on the eventual employment and earnings of peers.  Total effects of 
preschool on the employment and earnings of both participants and peers are then 1.54 times the 
originally calculated figures. 
To help clarify the time pattern by which labor market effects occur for preschool 
participants, I first examine the effects of a one-time expenditure of $1 billion for preschool 
programs.  This analysis includes both direct effects on participants and peer effects.  
Table 13 and Figure 5 show the job creation effects over time for state residents through 
effects on preschool participants (and their peers) of a one-year expenditure of $1 billion for a 
universal preschool program in a hypothetical state.  For comparison, the table and figures also 
show the job creation effects for state residents of devoting the same present value of resources 
to a one-time program of economic development subsidies.  As can be seen in the figure and 
tables, and as one would expect, economic development subsidies create considerably more jobs 
for local residents than preschool programs create for their participants and peers during the 
years that these preschool participants are growing up to working age.  However, as early as 
when preschool participants are 17-years-olds, preschool programs create more jobs in a state for 
preschool participants and their peers than the remaining job creation effects of a one-time 
economic development program.  Preschool programs’ job creation effects continue to increase 
as the preschool cohort ages and attains additional educational credentials and enters peak job-
holding years.  In contrast, economic development programs from their beginning affect adults at 
                                                 
210.904 = average for ages 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the product of black survival rate from age 4 to ages 8, 9, 10, 
and 11, which is close to one at 99.8% to 99.9%, and the percentage staying in the state, which declines from 91.7% 
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all ages, and their effects—as these adults age, out-migrate, and die—have nowhere to go but 
down.  Of course, eventually the job creation effects of a one-time universal preschool program 
for one cohort also depreciate as this cohort ages, out-migrates, and dies.  
Table 14 and Figure 6 show the real earnings creation over time for state residents 
through effects on preschool participants (and their peers) of a one-year expenditure of $1 billion 
for a universal preschool program in our hypothetical state.  The effects of an economic 
development subsidy program are shown for comparison.  Although the time pattern of earnings 
effects is similar to the time pattern of job effects, the annual real earnings effects of preschool 
do not exceed the annual real earnings effects of economic development programs until the 
preschool cohort is 24 years old. 
Why does economic development do somewhat better relative to preschool when using a 
real earnings metric rather than a jobs metric?  For two reasons.  First, as shown in Figure 7, a 
higher percentage of earnings effects are due to effects on employment rates, versus increased 
wage rates for individuals, for preschool programs than for economic development programs.  
As discussed previously, the evidence suggests that preschool programs produce a large 
employment rate boost for participants, above what would be expected based on educational 
attainment, while the effects on wage rates via higher educational attainment are more modest.  
In most years, over 70% of the real earnings effects of preschool are due to effects in increasing 
employment rates.  In contrast, close to half the earnings effects of economic development 
programs are due to individuals moving up to higher-paying occupations.  These higher wage 
effects of economic development programs reflect the considerable job churning as numerous 
job vacancies open up due to the new jobs created by economic development; estimates suggest 
                                                                                                                                                             
at age 8 to 89.5% at age 11.  
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that for every job created in a local area, in many cases at least 3.5 vacancies are created (Persky 
et al. 2004).  In contrast, the job-upgrading opportunities from preschool are more limited to 
those participating in the programs, with some limited spillover effects on peers. 
Second, as shown in Figure 8, the average real wages of jobs created via economic 
development programs are considerably higher for many years than the average real wages of 
jobs generated by preschool programs.22  In the simulation, the average real wages of jobs 
created by economic development programs are assumed to equal the average real wage in the 
current economy, and then to evolve based on the changing age distribution of the individuals 
who initially benefited from this job growth shock (assume to be initially a random cross section 
of all ages, but this cohort then ages over time), as well as growing 1.2% per year with the 
economy-wide growth in real wages.  In contrast, the real wages of jobs generated by preschool 
programs are initially quite low.  This is in part because the preschool participant cohort is 
initially quite young, and I use actual figures from the Current Population Survey on wages at 
different ages.  Of course, as this preschool participant cohort ages, their wages increase, and 
eventually catch up and surpass the wages of the older individuals (on average) who are affected 
by the new jobs attracted by traditional economic development subsidies.  But this catch-up 
takes some time to occur.  In addition, even with the preschool program, the educational 
attainment of preschool participants is below the population-wide average, which further 
depresses their wages.  Although the nature of the two programs means that preschool programs 
are assumed, for some time and on average, to generate lower wage jobs than economic 
development programs, in large part this is a function of which groups are gaining jobs due to 
                                                 
22This statement refers to average wages.  In the real world, there is a range of wages of every group, and 
many individuals in the preschool group will probably earn good wages at good jobs. 
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the program.  Preschool programs’ benefits, even with a universal program, are targeted on a 
disadvantaged group that tends to get low wages, and economic development programs’ benefits 
are typically not strongly targeted on the disadvantaged.  There is research, which is ignored for 
simplicity in these economic development simulations, that suggests that market forces tend to 
make the effects of economic development modestly progressive, but the research suggests that 
this progressivity is far short of what can be achieved by social welfare programs that explicitly 
target a disadvantaged group (Bartik 1994). 
But all these are the effects of a one-year universal preschool program, and we want to 
know the effects of a permanent universal preschool program.  In our hypothetical state, this 
program would cost $1 billion in its first year and serve 70% (236,183 participants) of all 4-year-
olds.  In this model economy, population grows by 0.3% per year, so the number of preschool 
participants grows by that rate as well.  Real wages grow by 1.2% per year, and the cost of the 
universal preschool program per preschool participant is projected to grow by 1.2% annually as 
well, meaning that total expenditures on the universal preschool program grow by about 1.5% 
per year.  Because each successive cohort of 4-year-olds is 0.3% greater per year, the number of 
jobs created for preschool participants and their peers in each cohort also grows by 0.3% per 
year.  Furthermore, because the wages of each succeeding cohort grow by 1.2% per year, the real 
earnings effect of preschool on each cohort grows by about 1.5% per year.  Therefore, the costs 
and benefits associated with each succeeding cohort grow proportionately. 
Table 15 and Figure 9 show the job creation effects of this permanent universal preschool 
program, compared to a permanent economic development subsidy program with the same 
annual present value of costs.  For a permanent universal program with an initial cost of $1 
billion per year, the number of jobs created is zero for the first 12 years, about 46,000 after 25 
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years, and about 120,000 jobs after 50 years.  These figures could be scaled up or down to a 
preschool program of any size, assuming the same program design and modeling assumptions as 
are used in this report.  The table and figure also show the job creation effects as a percentage of 
total employment without the program, a calculation that would be valid for a universal 
preschool program of this design in a typical state of any size.  As the table shows, after creating 
no jobs for 12 years, the program creates jobs equal to 0.45% of total employment after 25 years, 
and 1.09% after 50 years, before finally slowing down and topping off after about 65–75 years at 
1.29% of total employment.  This is about twice the long-run equilibrium level of job creation 
for state residents of traditional economic development subsidies. 
Table 16 and Figure 10 show the real earnings effects of this permanent universal 
preschool program, compared to a permanent economic development subsidy program with the 
same annual present value of costs.  For this program with initial costs of $ 1 billion per year, the 
cumulative increase in annual real earnings for state residents is zero for the first 12 years, $1.5 
billion per year after 25 years, and $7.7 billion per year after 50 years.  The real earnings effects 
eventually increase with the real earnings growth in this model economy, which is 1.5% 
annually.  These real earnings effects could be scaled up or down for a preschool program of any 
size, assuming the same program design.  The real earnings effects of a universal preschool 
program as a percentage of baseline state earnings are zero for the first 12 years, a 0.30% boost 
in real earnings after 25 years, and a 1.10% boost after 50 years, before the increase eventually 
tops out at 1.34% after 70 or 75 years.  This long-run permanent boost to real earnings but 
slightly exceeds the boost to jobs from preschool programs of 1.29%, and is modestly greater 
than the long-run boost to real earnings from a permanent economic development program with 
the same present value, which would be 1.15%. 
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It is apparent that although a permanent universal preschool program has larger long-run 
effects than traditional economic development programs on both job creation and real earnings 
creation, the advantage is less for real earnings than for jobs.  As mentioned before, this occurs 
because a greater percentage of preschool’s effects on earnings are due to effects on employment 
rates, not increased wage rates, compared to traditional economic development programs.  In 
addition, many of the jobs created by preschool programs are low-wage jobs, particularly when 
participants are in the early part of their career, given the still relatively low educational 
attainment of program participants.  In addition, it may be initially somewhat surprising that the 
long-run percentage effects of a permanent universal preschool program on jobs and real 
earnings are quite similar, even though I estimate that in the long run, about one-quarter of the 
real earnings increase due to a preschool program is due to increases in wages.  Although from 
an individual perspective, preschool programs only increase wage rates, by increasing 
educational attainment for program participants, from an aggregate state perspective, preschool 
programs have a counterpoising tendency to reduce average wage rates by increasing 
employment rates for persons with low educational attainment.  This reducing effect on average 
state wages does not harm any individual worker, but does mean that on net, even with increased 
wages for program participants, a universal preschool program has little net effect on average 
economy-wide real wages, so percentage effects on employment and real earnings are similar. 
Another trend that is apparent from perusing these figures for a permanent preschool 
program, versus a one-time program, is that it takes more years in the permanent case for 
preschool’s effects on jobs and real earnings to exceed that of economic development programs. 
 For a one-time program for one cohort, the effects of preschool on jobs exceeds that of 
economic development programs after 13 years (when the original cohort is 17), whereas for 
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permanent programs, the effects of preschool on job creation exceeds that of economic 
development programs only after 28 years.  For real earnings, for one-time programs, the effects 
of preschool on real earnings exceeds that of economic development programs after 20 years, 
whereas for permanent programs, the effects of preschool on real earnings generation exceeds 
that of economic development programs after 52 years.  
Why does this difference occur?  The one-time program’s “long-term” shows effects for 
one cohort.  A permanent program’s effects at any point in time are a mixture of long-term, 
medium term, and short-term effects from different cohorts.  Economic development programs 
have an advantage over preschool programs, at least insofar as we focus on effects on the 
participants (not their parents or the program=s employees), of having much greater short-run 
effects on employment and earnings, whereas preschool programs have essentially no 
employment and earnings effects via participants for at least 12 years.  For permanent programs, 
these short-run advantages of economic development programs for a single cohort are averaged 
into the long-run effects of the permanent programs along with the long-run advantages of 
preschool programs for a single cohort.  John Maynard Keynes famously said that “in the long 
run we are all dead,” as an argument to encourage economists and policymakers to think more 
about how to deal with the short-run.  It is perhaps more accurate to say that for any permanent 
policy, we have to pay attention to its short-run and long-run consequences for specific 
individuals, as its long-run effects on the overall population are a mixture of both short-run and 
long-run forces for specific individuals. 
Finally, with these estimated effects of a permanent universal program on real earnings, I 
can calculate the discounted present value, at a 3% discount rate, of the effects on real earnings 
per one dollar of present value of costs.  The real earnings effects on participants and peers 
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amount to $2.65.  For comparison, the present value of the real earnings effects of traditional 
economic development subsidies per present value dollar of costs are $3.14.   
 
Effects of Group Education on Labor Productivity 
In addition to spillover effects of preschool participants that occur due to peer effects 
during K-12 education, there may be spillover effects that occur in the labor market.  There may 
be effects on productivity and wages that occur in the labor market beyond the increase in 
productivity and wages that occurs for the individual.  In other words, the productivity, 
employability, and wage rates of an individual may depend not only on their educational 
attainment level, but also on the average educational attainment of others in the labor market. 
Labor productivity levels or productivity growth rates may depend on average 
educational attainment for several reasons.  The productivity level of an individual may depend 
on others’ educational attainment if workers learn from each other about how to be more 
productive.  In addition, if the average worker is more productive, employers may find it easier 
to hire and retain skilled workers, and as a result may find it more feasible to use more advanced 
technologies, more capital intensive production techniques, and forms of workplace organization 
that have higher productivity levels.  In addition, productivity growth rates may depend on 
average educational attainment if workers get ideas from each other not only about current 
technologies and production techniques, but about how to improve such technologies and 
techniques more rapidly.  Productivity growth rates may also increase with average educational 
 63
attainment if employers find they can more rapidly introduce new capital, technologies and 
workplace organization systems with a workforce with higher average education.23 
Assuming that higher productivity is translated into higher wages, in either case we 
would expect that an individual’s wages, holding their individual=s characteristics constant, 
including holding the individual’s education constant, would be positively affected by the 
average educational level of the local workforce.  We might also expect that if local wages do 
not instantly adjust upwards to reflect higher overall productivity, then an increase in average 
educational levels would tend to encourage local employment growth. 
On the other hand, the observed gains to wages of individuals from education may 
overstate the true productivity effects of education to the extent to which education does not 
truly improve productivity, but merely serves as a signaling device for productivity differentials 
that are not altered by small marginal differences in education.  An individual who gets a little 
more education than average could receive more wages because employers infer from the greater 
education that the individual is more productive than average, even if that small increase in the 
individual=s education does not truly affect his or her productivity.  But if everyone gets more 
education, then productivity may not increase, and in fact everyone will have to go to school 
more to get the same wages as before.  In this case, increases in the average education levels of 
others will tend to decrease an individual=s wages, holding individual characteristics constant. 
The whole issue of the social productivity effects of education—what society gains in 
economic output from higher average educational levels—and how it differs from the individual 
productivity effects of education, what an individual gains from an increase in their own 
                                                 
23Some of my ideas expressed here of possible reasons for a social return to education in the labor market 
are influenced by writings on this subject by Moretti (2003) and Glaeser and Saiz (2003).  
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education, is a controversial one.  As of right now, the available empirical evidence seems to 
support some “extra” positive social productivity effects of education, beyond the effects on the 
individual, although the amount is in dispute.  Average educational levels in a metropolitan area 
appears to have some causal effects on higher real wages in the metropolitan area (beyond what 
would be expected based on the effects of each individual’s education on wages) and on higher 
growth in the metropolitan area (Moretti 2003, 2004; Glaeser and Saiz 2003).  These positive 
effects of average educational attainment seem to be mainly associated with the percentage of 
college graduates in the labor market, not the percentage of high school graduates (Moretti 2003, 
2004; Acemoglu and Angrist 2000; Glaeser and Saiz, 2003).  Whether a higher percentage of 
college graduates have more effects through affecting productivity levels or productivity growth 
is harder to sort out, as either mechanism could result in some estimated effects of increases in 
average local educational levels on wages and growth.  For the purposes of this report, I adopt 
the more conservative assumption that the percentage level of college graduates in a state has 
effects on an individual’s labor productivity level, rather than the more radical assumption that 
this affects productivity growth rates.  With the power of compounding increased growth rates 
over time, assuming effects on productivity growth rates could result in huge measured earnings 
effects as we follow a state economy into the long-term future, and there is no definitive 
evidence of such productivity growth effects. 
In simulating how preschool education=s effects on average graduation rates might affect 
a state’s overall wages and earnings, we must think carefully about how a presumed effect of the 
college graduation percentage on productivity is likely to affect a state economy.  The fact that 
productivity goes up has immediate effects in increasing business profitability, but need not 
immediately increase wages.  Wages will not increase until employers are attracted by the higher 
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labor productivity environment, thereby increasing labor demand relative to labor supply.  This 
will drive up local employment rates and allow individuals to move up to higher paying 
occupations, in other words, this is a labor demand shock similar to that brought about by 
economic development programs.  As individuals migrate into the state, attracted by the greater 
employment opportunities, the initial effects on employment rates are moderated somewhat, and 
housing prices and other local prices will increase.  However, some of the original local residents 
who gained greater employment experience or moved up into higher paying jobs will be able to 
use their greater labor market experience, better reputation with employers, and greater 
motivation, to keep their new jobs.  As these individuals age, move out of the state, and die, 
these persistent effects on local employment rates and wage rates gradually die out.  In the very 
long run (after 50 years or so), the effects of the shock to the productivity level on local real 
wages and employment rates die out.  Local prices and nominal wages will have risen enough 
with in-migration to just offset the profitability effects of the higher productivity level.  The local 
employment level is permanently higher, as is local productivity, but local prices and nominal 
wages will have risen enough with in-migration to just offset the profitability effects of the 
higher productivity level.24 
The available estimates of how the percentage of college graduates affects wages and 
growth are not completely consistent.  Moretti’s (2004) estimates imply that a 1-point increase in 
                                                 
24I do not think this issue has been adequately attended to in the research literature on how average 
educational levels affect real wages and employment growth.  We need to think carefully of how with free migration 
we would ever observe effects of higher local educational levels on local real wages, as individuals from other areas 
can migrate in and get the benefits of the social productivity effects of education.  My suggestion is that there is a 
very long-run adjustment to this new equilibrium.  Both financial and psychological moving costs prevent instant 
adjustment to the new equilibrium.  The lack of instant adjustment allows the original residents of the local area to 
gain new and better jobs because of the jobs attracted by the higher social productivity.  These initial advantages 
allow the original residents to gain some permanent advantages in their human capital.  As a result, the adjustment to 
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the percentage of college graduates in a local area is causally associated with nominal wages that 
are 0.6 to 1.2% greater.  If all of these higher wages were due to the medium-run effects of a 
shock to labor demand, this would imply that a 1-percentage point increase in college graduates 
increases the employment level by perhaps 1.5% to 3%.25  On the other hand, Glaeser and Saiz 
(2003) directly estimate that a 1% increase in the percentage of college graduates increases the 
10-year population growth rate by perhaps 0.5%.  In general, we expect a demand shock to the 
local economy to increase local employment in the long run by somewhat more than local 
population (in some models, by roughly a factor of 5 to 4, see Bartik 1993).  In addition, if there 
is some lagged adjustment of employment, the 10-year effect on growth will be below the long-
run effect.  Under some plausible assumptions from the research on how local business activity 
gradually adjust to shocks, Glaeser and Saiz’s results imply that in the long-run, a 1-point 
increase in the local area’s percent of college graduates will increase the long-run equilibrium 
local employment level by 1%.26 
To be conservative, I use the lower estimate that a 1-point increase in the college 
graduate percentage will increase the long-run employment level by 1%.  However, this growth 
shock will only occur gradually.  Results from Helms’s (1985) influential paper on the 
determinants of state employment levels suggests that state employment adjusts to its long-run 
                                                                                                                                                             
the new long-run equilibrium takes a very long time.  In the interim, we can observe effects of average local 
educational levels on real wages and growth. 
25Bartik’s (1991) findings suggest that a shock to local employment growth affects nominal wages about 
twice as much as real wages, and that a 1% growth shock increases nominal wages by 0.4% and real wages by about 
0.2%.  Dividing Moretti’s estimated effects of 1% more college graduates on nominal wages by 0.4% yields the 
estimated effects on desired employment growth that are cited in the text. 
26Glaeser and Saiz’s results are consistent with an effect of a one point increase in college graduates on the 
10-year growth of local employment of perhaps 0.6% (= their effect of 0.5% H the ratio of employment to population 
growth of 5 to 4).  Helms’s (1985) widely cited paper on the determinants of state employment levels implies that 
state employment adjusts to its long-run equilibrium level by 8.9% per year.  The long-run equilibrium effect of any 
shock to local employment will be related to the effect after 10 years by the following equation:  Long-run effect = 
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equilibrium level by 8.9% per year, and I use this figure in the simulations.  I simulate an 
increase in the percentage of college graduates as affecting the long-run equilibrium employment 
level, and then the actual employment level will gradually adjust to this higher equilibrium 
employment level.  These growth shocks then have effects on local employment rates, wage 
rates and earnings similar to those of an economic development program, or indeed, of any factor 
that makes an area more attractive for expanding labor demand.  
Part of this calculation involves simulating how a permanent universal preschool 
program will affect the percentage of college graduates in a state=s economy.  I simulate this 
using the information on how the college graduation proportion of preschool participants varies 
with age, and how this would be expected to alter the college graduation proportion as 
successive cohorts that have participated in universal preschool enter the labor market.  This 
calculation of course allows for outmigration, mortality rates, and population growth, as well as 
for nonparticipants in universal preschool.  In addition, based on research by Bound et al. (2004), 
it appears that there is some displacement of college graduates from a state’s labor market.  
Bound et al. estimate that the number of college graduates in a state’s labor market is on average 
equal to only 0.30 of the flow of college graduates in the state from 5 to 24 years previously.  
This proportion is significantly less than the proportion one would expect simply on the basis of 
the outmigration of preschool participants; based on the migration figures used earlier in the 
paper, of the 21-year-old college graduates in a state, we would expect 83% to still be in the state 
five years later, declining to 74% still in the state 24 years later, and averaging 78% over all 
                                                                                                                                                             
(10-year effect) / (1 !(0.910410)).  Applying this equation to a 10-year effect of 0.6% suggests that the long run 
effect is around 1%.   
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these different time periods considered in the Bound et al. estimates.27  Presumably, there is 
some differential in- and out-migration of college graduates due to effects of the flow of college 
graduates on the employment prospects of college graduates. I multiply the projected proportions 
of college graduates at different ages by (0.30/0.78) to simulate the actual expected change in 
college graduates in the labor market.  
The resulting calculation is shown in Table 17.  This table shows how the percentage 
comprised by college graduates in a state=s economy would be expected to evolve over the first 
75 years after a universal preschool program is instituted.  As the table shows, the effects of 
universal preschool education on the proportion of college graduates is quite modest.  This is 
because, first of all, the effect of universal preschool on college graduation rates even for the 
high risk groups that would otherwise have had no preschool is modest, only 3%, and takes some 
time to occur, with much of the effect occurring when former preschool participants are in their 
late 20s and 30s. Second, the effects are reduced by out-migration of college graduates over 
time.  Third, the presumed effects on the overall preschool population is much less than the 
effects on the high-risk group that benefits the most from preschool, and under the assumptions 
used here the effects on college graduation for the average preschool participant in universal 
preschool are only 23% of the effects for the highest-risk group.  Fourth, only 70% of any given 
cohort participates in universal preschool.  Finally, the Bound results suggest that some 
additional differential in-migration and out-migration of college graduates will further dilute 
                                                 
27This is based on using the PSID-corrected PUMS data on percentage in the same state as at age 4 for age 
21, compared to the same statistic for later years.  This is not exactly the migration data we want, but it may 
approximate the pattern of college graduates leaving the state.  In any event, if I am underestimating how many 
college graduates move out of state, the use of the Bound et al. figures should correct for that underestimation as 
well as for any displacement. 
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effects on the state=s college graduation percentage.  As a result, one would expect any economic 
development benefits from extra social productivity effects of preschool to be modest. 
These modest effects are found when I estimate preschool=s effects on job creation and 
real earnings growth through the “social productivity” return from increasing the average college 
graduation percentage in the state economy.  As Table 18 and Figure 11 shows, a permanent 
universal preschool program in our hypothetical state, which spends $1 billion and then expands 
in costs by 1.5% per year forever, takes a long time to have much in the way of job creation 
effects via the social productivity effects of education.  Eventually the social productivity effects 
max out in total job creation effects at only a little more than 2,000 jobs after 70 years.  The 
increase in college graduates does eventually increase the desired employment level by a little 
more than 10,000 jobs after 70 years.  This increase in employment takes place through a series 
of small annual “demand shocks” to the number of jobs in the state, typically about 200 or 300 
jobs per years.  Each one of these shocks is equivalent in its effects to the effects of a demand 
shock brought about by economic development programs, but are much smaller: recall that 
devoting $1 billion per year to economic development subsidies is thought to create over 7,000 
jobs per year.  The actual effects on employment rates of state residents are reduced by in-
migrants getting the jobs, as well as out-migration of some state residents who originally 
obtained the jobs.  
The effects on job creation on the employment rates of state residents of 2,000 after 70 
years are minuscule compared to either traditional economic development subsidies or direct 
effects of preschool education on the employment of participants and their peers.  After 70 years, 
traditional economic development programs in our hypothetical state increase the employment 
rates of state residents by over 71,000 jobs.  After 70 years, the direct effects of preschool 
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programs on participants and their peers are over 150,000 jobs.  These minuscule effects via the 
social productivity effects of education are mostly attributable to preschool education not having 
a huge aggregate effect on the percentage of college graduates in the state.  Similar small “social 
productivity effects” are found on real earnings, and when the job or earnings effects are 
expressed as a percentage of the state economy. 
Finally, we can calculate the present value of the real earnings associated with the social 
productivity effects of preschool, per dollar of present value costs of preschool.  The present 
value of these “social productivity” real earnings effects amount to only $0.04 per dollar of 
costs. 
 
Adding Up the Effects 
The total effects of universal preschool education on job creation and real earnings 
generation for state residents of course reflect the sum of all the effects I have discussed: 
balanced budget multiplier effects, child care effects on the labor supply of parents, effects on 
participants’ and their peers’ employability and real wage rates, and effects on the state 
economy’s productivity.  Table 19 shows the sum of all these preschool effects, with economic 
development effects for comparison, for each year of the 75 years after the initial cohort of 
preschool participants is 4 years old, for job creation and real earnings generation, both for the 
hypothetical state and as a percentage of a state’s baseline employment and real earnings. 
I could also produce figures showing the sum of all preschool effects compared to 
economic development effects.  However, on the scale that must necessarily be used for such 
figures, such figures would be almost indistinguishable from the figures that previously showed 
effects on participants and their peers.  Such effects are by far the overwhelming proportion of 
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preschool’s total job creation and earnings generation effects.  In terms of present value, for each 
one dollar of present value resources devoted to preschool, the total effect of preschool is to 
generate real earnings whose present value is $2.78, of which $2.65 is due to effects on 
participants and their peers. 
The one significant change from adding other preschool effects to participant and peer 
effects is that preschool has immediate effects on job creation and earnings creation; during the 
year the original cohort is 4 years old that slightly exceed the effects of traditional economic 
development subsidies.  However, the economic development program’s effects by even the next 
year begin to exceed the effects of preschool, and this advantage continues to expand until the 
original cohort is in its late teens, and in real earnings until the original cohort is in its early 20s. 
At that point, preschool education programs begin to catch up to economic development 
programs. In the long run, preschool’s effects are significantly greater than economic 
development programs for both job creation and real earnings generation. 
 
Comparing Preschool with Traditional Economic Development Programs 
 
One bottom-line interpretation of these simulations is that universal preschool yields real 
earnings effects whose present value is $2.78 per dollar of resources used, whereas traditional 
economic development programs yield real earnings effects whose present value is $3.14 per 
dollar of resources used.  Given the many uncertainties and policy variables involved in these 
calculations, it is probably unwise to focus too much on the modest difference between these two 
present values of real earnings effects.  A more appropriate interpretation is that both preschool 
and economic development yield real earnings effects whose present value is of similar 
magnitude. 
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Is there some underlying reason for this similarity in present value effects of preschool 
and traditional economic development programs?  Or is this similarity just a coincidence, just as 
it is a strange coincidence that the sun and moon happen to have almost exactly the same 
apparent size as viewed from earth?  Although the similar present value earnings effects of 
preschool and traditional economic development programs are in some sense just a coincidence, 
there is some reason to think there will be some rough similarity in successful but politically 
disputed programs that seek through investments today to have permanent effects in generating 
economic activity in a state.  Such programs will always seek to leverage some investment, 
whether in the skills of preschoolers, or in enticing firms to locate or expand, that will yield 
permanent effects on employment and earnings.  If such programs are successful, a modest 
investment will have significant long-run earnings effects, whose magnitude in many cases will 
have a larger present value than the investment.  On the other hand, if such a program had real 
earnings effects whose present value was 100 times of the cost of the program, it is doubtful that 
there would be any discussion of whether the program was successful, or any demand for 
analyzing the economic development effects of the program.  The program would simply be 
accepted as a necessary part of what government does. 
Although these present value calculations in some sense reflect the average social 
valuation of effects at different time periods, policymakers and the public may also care about 
the details of the dynamic effects of traditional economic development programs and preschool 
education, not just the bottom-line present value figure.  Consider the typical performance 
expectations for an economic developer.  If a job applicant for an economic developer position 
told his or her various constituency groups that only small results could be expected for the first 
15 years, the probability of being hired would be small.  Although the rhetoric of traditional 
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economic development programs is that economic development is a long-term endeavor, most 
economic development constituency groups expect some substantial results within a 5 to 10 year 
period.  A universal preschool education program would not meet the need for job creation and 
earnings generation within that time frame. 
This is not only my judgment.  I mentioned this project to a researcher I know who 
frequently works closely with economic developers and their organizations.  His comments were 
as follows:  “The timing issue is key.  Economic development efforts are directed toward today’s 
problems—high unemployment, poor jobs and blighted areas.  It would be a tough sell to any 
economic development organization that its resources should be used to help improve the state's 
workforce 15 to 20 years from now.” 
On the other hand, an economic developer might be very pleased that 15 or more years 
ago, some previous policymakers in the state or metropolitan area had instituted a universal 
preschool education program.  This program would help provide more employable and better 
educated workers who would help attract jobs to the area, thereby making it more likely that the 
economic developer can claim success. 
Therefore, from the perspective of achieving economic development goals, it is probably 
most appropriate to view traditional economic development programs and universal preschool 
education as complements.  Both can have significant effects in increasing job creation and real 
earnings generation in a state.  Traditional economic development programs have the advantage 
in generating jobs and earnings over a 5 to 15 year time horizon.  Universal preschool education 
has the advantage of generating jobs and earnings over a 30-year or more time horizon.  Because 
both time horizons are relevant to policymakers, various interest groups, and the public in 
general, both types of programs are needed.  This is true even if there is no direct interaction 
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between the programs in which the presence or success of one influences the success of the 
other. In Chapter 4, I will consider alternative estimates of the effects of preschool and 
traditional economic development subsidies that allow for the possibility of such interactions.   
 
State-by-State Effects 
I now turn from effects in a hypothetical, typical state to effects in each actual state.  In 
each state, I estimate effects of universal preschool education on a variety of economic 
development metrics, including jobs, earnings, gross state product, and state and local tax 
revenue.  These estimates provide a variety of ways to understand the magnitude of the 
economic development effects of preschool. 
The magnitude of preschool’s effects on economic development in each state depends 
greatly on out-migration from the state.  Preschool education’s costs are incurred at age 4, 
whereas most of the economic development effects do not begin until at least age 16.  This lapse 
of time allows considerable out-migration of preschool participants from the state.  In contrast, 
much of the effects of traditional economic development programs occur almost immediately. 
For example, simulations suggest that the ratio of the present value of earnings effects of 
universal preschool to its costs will be 3.79 if a state had no out-migration, whereas this ratio is 
2.78 for a state with a typical out-migration rate.  For such a typical state, out-migration reduces 
the earnings benefits for the state’s residents by 27% (= (3.79 − 2.78) / 3.79).28 
The prevalence of out-migration varies significantly across the states.  As shown in Table 
20, of U.S. residents born in a particular state, on average 68% were living in their birth state in 
                                                 
28This leakage of benefits to out-migration suggest that the national effects of preschool education will be 
greater than the effects perceived by each individual state.  This suggestion is explored in Chapter 5. 
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the year 2000.  This percentage is much lower for smaller states with less diverse economies.  
For example, this percentage is 43% for Wyoming, and 45% for North Dakota.  In contrast, this 
percentage is much larger for larger, faster growing states.  Eighty percent of those born in Texas 
are still living in the state as of 2000, whereas this percentage for California is 77%. 
At the extreme, out-migration is extremely large for a city, particularly smaller cities and 
cities with low economic growth.  For example, of those born in the District of Columbia, only 
17% were still living in DC in 2000.  Because of this high out-migration, most cities are unlikely 
to find that investments in preschool education lead to significantly more jobs and earnings later 
on for city residents.  
The incremental costs of a universal preschool program in each state are estimated by 
assuming that a universal preschool program will have net costs of 0.299% of the state’s wage 
and salary earnings.  Although this is a rough estimate that does not directly take into account 
many factors affecting the cost of universal preschool programs, for example the size of the 
preschool population, this rough estimate is surprisingly close to state-by-state estimates that do 
take into account more detailed data.  Table 21 includes a column giving rough estimates of the 
state-by-state costs of moving to a universal preschool program.  The California estimate of 
$1,904 million in Table 21 is quite close to the Karoly and Bigelow estimate using more detailed 
California data of $1,716 (in 2004 dollars).  Table 21 includes estimated costs of universal 
preschool for Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and Ohio of $436 million, $270 million, and $548 
million, respectively; Belfield (2005), using more detailed data for these three states, estimated 
incremental costs of a universal preschool program of $593 million, $213 million, and $496 
million. 
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For each state, Table 21 presents estimates, for the assumed size of the preschool 
program in the state, and the state’s tendency for out-migration, of the long-run effects of 
universal preschool programs on jobs, earnings, gross state product, and state and local tax 
revenue.  As the table shows, these estimated effects are clearly large enough to be politically 
significant in the states.  Long-run job creation effects are often in the tens of thousands in a 
state, and universal preschool education is usually estimated to increase earnings, gross state 
product, and state and local tax revenue by hundreds of millions of dollars per year.  The long-
run increase in the flow of state and local tax revenue is frequently close to the long-run annual 







Given the many assumptions made in creating these complex simulation models of the 
effects of economic development programs and preschool education on state job creation and 
real earnings generation, it is possible to imagine almost an infinite number of variant 
simulations that tweak one or more assumptions.  I focus here on seven alternative approaches to 
doing the simulations that tweak assumptions relevant to important policy issues relevant to 
these programs.  Three alternative types of simulations explore policy options relevant to 
economic development programs: (1) subsidizing non-export base businesses; (2) making 
incentives more up-front and in-kind; (3) targeting jobs more to current residents vs. in-migrants. 
 Four alternative types of simulations explore policy options relevant to preschool education 
programs: (1) the magnitude of incremental benefits of universal preschool for participants who 
otherwise would have been in some type of preschool; (2) the optimal quality and expenditure 
per participant of preschool programs; (3) targeting preschool education more at at-risk children; 
(4) lessening displacement effects of preschool education. 
 
Subsidizing Non-Export-Base Businesses 
The economic development simulations assumed the subsidized businesses were export-
base businesses, in which 100% of the sales of the businesses represented income that otherwise 
would not have been received by residents of the state.  Furthermore, I assumed that this 
business paid sufficiently high wages and had sufficiently strong local supplier links that we 
could reasonably assume a multiplier effect of 1.8 for jobs directly created. 
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Focusing on export-base businesses with reasonably large multipliers is conventional 
wisdom in the economic development profession.  However, this focus is not always 
successfully practiced, in at least two major types of economic development subsidies: subsidies 
for sports teams; subsidies for retail businesses. 
One significant type of economic development subsidy is a subsidy for sports teams and 
sports stadiums.  The average subsidy from a host city to a typical major league sports team now 
exceeds $10 million per year (Noll and Zimbalist 1997, p. 494).  In the case of sports stadiums, 
only a portion of the revenue gained is truly new outside the state revenue for local employees, 
for several reasons.  First, many of the fans attending the games are local residents who would 
have otherwise spent their money on some other in-state activity.  Second, much of the revenue 
from sports goes to athletes who largely spend their money outside the state.  Counterbalancing 
this is that to some extent the sports stadiums may attract outside visitors who otherwise would 
not have visited, and who spend money in the state on activities other than the sports itself.  
However, careful analyses suggests that this additional spending on non-sports activities by 
visitors does not come close to offsetting the fact that much of the operation of stadiums 
displaces local fan spending from other activities, and that an unusually high proportion of the 
revenue from these sports activities immediately flows outside the state (Blair and Swindell 
1997). 
In addition, most visitor spending supports relatively low-wage employees working 
concessions or working in local hotels.  The resulting multiplier effects are likely to be modest. 
Another significant type of economic development subsidy is subsidizing retail 
businesses that largely sell to a local market.  Such subsidies are more common in the 31 states 
in which local governments are to some extent financed by local sales taxes (Cline and Neubig 
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1999).  Local governments in these states often engage in incentive wars to attract retailers, in 
order to raise their local sales tax base.  For example, I know from personal conversations with 
economic developers and local news media that such incentive wars over retail businesses are 
common in Alabama and Arizona. 
Even for “big box” retailers or specialty retailers that offer some unique product or 
pricing, most of the new sales for such subsidized retailers will come from state residents who 
would otherwise have spent money at some other retailer in the state.  Therefore, a sizable 
portion of the new jobs at the subsidized retailers are offset by displacement of state jobs at other 
state retailers who lose sales. 
Furthermore, the new jobs at retailers frequently are relatively low pay.  This reduces the 
size of the multiplier effect of any new retail jobs that are directly created due to attracting out-
of-state spending, as the new employees’ increased expenditures on state consumer goods are 
necessarily modest. 
To simulate how these changes in assumptions about the export base and the multiplier 
can alter the effectiveness of economic development subsidies, I consider the effects of 
economic development subsidies that are identical to what was previously assumed, except that 
only 30% of the subsidized jobs are assumed to be truly new activity in the state.  The other 70% 
of the subsidized jobs are assumed to displace other spending and jobs that would have taken 
place in the state.  This assumption about outside spending has some intuitive plausibility, and 
also seems to be roughly consistent with some of the analyses of sports stadiums.29  In addition, I 
assume a lower multiplier of 1.5. 
                                                 
29For example, in the study of Cincinnati sports stadiums by Blair and Swindell (1997), about 50% of the 
fans attending Reds and Bengals games come from outside the Cincinnati area.  But 20% of those fans said they 
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Under these assumptions, economic development subsidies to retailers or sports teams 
will only generate $0.79 in present value earnings per dollar of costs.  Under the baseline 
assumptions, economic development subsidies to high-paying export-base firms generated $3.14 
in present value earnings per dollar of costs.  The 30% export-base assumption means that even 
if the new business activity is induced by the subsidy, only 30% of this new activity is truly net 
new activity to the state.  As a result, the effectiveness of the subsidy is decreased by 70%.  The 
lower multiplier of 1.5 vs. 1.8 further decreases the effectiveness of the subsidy in creating jobs 
by another 17% (17% = (1.8 ! 1.5) / 1.8). 
 
Up-front and In-kind Incentives 
The estimated effectiveness of the economic development subsidies in the baseline 
simulation relies on the assumption that the economic development subsidies are paid out over a 
10-year period.  This reflects customary practice.  Economic development subsidies are paid out 
over a number of years in part because this allows some costs to be postponed, which is 
politically preferable.  In addition, this allows costs to be credited against tax payments rather 
than paid out explicitly in cash.  Finally, postponing some payments lessens potential problems 
caused by subsidized firms leaving after a few years.  If a firm leaves, state and local economic 
developers would like if possible to “claw back” all or part of the subsidy given to induce the 
location decision.  This can be done through legal clawback agreements, but such agreements 
                                                                                                                                                             
would have visited the area anyway, so not all this spending can be counted.  In addition, for the 50% of the fans 
who are local, the effectiveness of their concessions spending in creating local jobs is probably less than their 
alternative uses of their spending in the local area, given the high profit margins on concessions which largely go to 
player salaries that are spent out of state.  Furthermore, although there is some local spending by visitors outside the 
stadium, it appears to generally be considerably less than spending at the stadium. 
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can sometimes be difficult to enforce.  But if part of the subsidy has only been agreed to, and not 
yet paid, then there is no problem in not paying the remaining subsidy if the firm leaves town. 
However, we know that firms apply relatively high real discount rates to future flows of 
profits in making corporate decisions.  Studies suggest that the real discount rate used by 
corporate executives in making decisions averages about 12% (Summers and Poterba 1994).  If 
the social discount rate is 3%, this means that we can affect corporate location decisions more, at 
the same present value using the social discount rate, by paying a higher proportion of the 
economic development subsidy upfront. 
Paying more of the subsidy upfront worsens potential issues of whether the subsidy can 
be in practice recovered if the subsidized firm leaves.  One way to make upfront subsidies more 
recoverable is to pay more of them in the form of worker training, or infrastructure such as 
access road improvements and utility provision (e.g., this was suggested in Bartik 2005).  This 
assistance is valuable to firms, but is largely recoverable if the firm leaves.  If the firm leaves, 
the access roads and utility infrastructure will still be there, and most of the trained workers may 
also stay.  This physical capital and human capital will help the area attract a replacement firm. 
In addition, paying the subsidy in the form of services also provides an immediate boost 
to the economy in the form of the balanced budget multiplier.  The economic stimulus of hiring 
workers to provide the training, or build the infrastructure, will exceed the depressing effect of 
the added taxes to pay for the training and infrastructure. 
Resimulating the model with these upfront, in-kind subsidies results in a present value of 
earnings generated from economic development subsidies, per dollar of present value costs, of 
$4.40, compared to $3.14 under the baseline assumptions.  Of that $4.40, $4.36 occurs because 
these up-front incentives are more cost-effective in creating jobs.  The other $0.04 is due to the 
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balanced budget multiplier effects of spending government money on job training and 
infrastructure. 
 
Targeting Jobs to Residents 
The effectiveness of economic development subsidies in helping state residents is 
reduced because such a significant proportion of induced jobs go to in-migrants.  In the baseline 
simulations, I assume, based on previous studies, that in the short run, 6 out of 10 jobs go to state 
residents, and the others 4 to in-migrants, with 3 of the 6 jobs to state residents going to the 
unemployed, and the other 3 to state residents who previously were out of the labor force.  The 
effects of job creation on state residents’ unemployment are assumed to quickly fade.  The 
effects on state labor force participation are assumed to slowly fade with out-migration and 
mortality of the original state residents.  In addition, more jobs going to in-migrants reduces the 
possibilities of state residents getting promotions to better paying occupations.   
As discussed before, the assumption is that the gains to in-migrants from this job creation 
will be minimal, as in-migrants could have otherwise moved to some other area with similar 
economic opportunities.  Only current residents with strong ties to this state get special benefits 
from state job creation. 
Increasing the proportion of jobs that go to state residents can have considerable effects 
on the jobs and earnings generated for state residents.  Suppose we increased the proportion of 
new jobs going to state residents from 6 out of 10 to 8 out of 10.  I assume that this is evenly 
divided between more jobs for the unemployed and more jobs for state residents who are out of 
the labor force.  The pattern of “fading” of effects over time is assumed to be similar.  But 
because the initial effect is that more state residents get job experience, with its attendant effects 
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on job skills, self-confidence, and reputation with employers, the effects on future employment 
rates of state residents are always higher than under the baseline assumptions.  In addition, I 
assume that effects on occupational upgrading are blown up proportionately with the effects on 
labor force participation.  With fewer in-migrants being hired, more job vacancies will got to 
already employed state residents as well as to non-employed state residents, which provides 
more opportunities for occupational upgrading.  
Under these alternative assumptions, the present value of real earnings generated, per $1 
of present value of economic development subsidies, is $4.19.  This is one-third higher than 
under the baseline assumptions. 
Presumably, the share of jobs that go to in-migrants depends on the availability of state 
residents with suitable skills for the job opportunities created by economic development 
programs.  The in-migrant share may also depend on the ease with which employers and local 
job-seekers can get information about possible suitable job matches.  Programs that provide 
carrots or sticks to encourage local residents to be hired for the jobs created by economic 
development programs may be helpful.  For example, some local areas, such as Berkeley CA and 
Portland Oregon, have used “First Source” programs under which firms receiving economic 
development subsidies are required to consider local job-seekers who are screened and referred 
via the local job training and placement system.30 
In addition, the sheer availability of suitably skilled state residents may also increase the 
share of jobs that go to state residents.  For example, any program that improves the 
employability and job skills of state residents may increase the proportion of the jobs created by 
                                                 
30For more information on Portland=s programs, see Bartik 2001, pp. 256–258, and for more information on 
Berkeley’s programs see Bartik 2004b, p. 363.  For more information on both, see Molina 1998. 
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economic development that will go to state residents.  One such program could be preschool 
education. 
Preschool education may then be complementary to economic development programs in 
a different sense.  I argued above that preschool education and economic development programs 
may be complementary in that they provide jobs at different time frames, which may meet the 
needs of different groups.  But the argument here is that better and more universal preschool 
education in the past may make today=s economic development programs more cost-effective in 
creating jobs for local residents.  This is a more direct complementarity. 
 
Different Assumptions about Preschool Benefits  
The baseline model for universal preschool effects in this report relies on good evidence 
on the benefits for high quality preschool for high-risk children who otherwise would not be in 
preschool.  This good evidence comes from studies of the Perry Preschool program and the 
Chicago Child Parent Center program.  On the other hand, we know less about the benefits of 
high-quality preschool for high-risk children who otherwise would have been in some type of 
preschool, or benefits for lower-risk children from moving to high-quality preschool.  The 
baseline simulations used moderately conservative assumptions, originally made in Karoly and 
Bigelow (2005), and detailed in Table 7, about how effects for these other groups compared to 
effects for high-risk children who moved from no preschool to high quality preschool.  These 
assumptions were used in this report because they appeared reasonable, and appeared likely to if 
anything understate the effects of universal preschool. 
However, even though these assumptions are reasonable and moderately conservative, 
these assumptions are also arbitrary.  Therefore, it seems wise to consider alternative 
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assumptions about how the benefits of moving to universal preschool for various groups 
compare with preschool’s benefits for the high-risk group who otherwise would not have been in 
any preschool. 
I consider the alternative assumptions about benefits for various groups proposed by 
Karoly and Bigelow (2005, Table 3.5 on p. 107).  These assumptions are used because the range 
of assumptions is so extreme that it is likely to encompass the possible range of effects of 
universal preschool that we should sensibly consider. 
Table 22 summarizes the results when these alternative assumptions are plugged into this 
report’s simulation model.  Across the various alternative assumptions, the ratio of PV earnings 
effects to costs ranges from 1.97 for the most conservative assumptions to 4.85 for the most 
generous. 
For those readers who are interested, these alternative assumptions can easily be used to 
generate any of the previous tables on preschool effects.  The estimates for effects for preschool 
participants and their peers for jobs or earnings for any particular year just need to be multiplied 
by the ratio of the average benefits per universal preschool participant under a particular set of 
assumptions, to the 23% assumed in the baseline preschool model.  
 
Different Assumptions about Preschool Design and Benefits 
The baseline assumptions used in this report for costing out the preschool program come 
from Karoly and Bigelow (2005).  These assumptions seem a reasonable attempt to come up 
with a design for a preschool program that will make the program affordable for a universal 
preschool program, and yet be of sufficient quality to have significant effects on participants.  
The program modeled has some quality features in that each class is assumed to have a college-
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educated teacher with an early childhood education certification, and a student to staff ratio of no 
more than 10 to 1, with 20 students in a class for a teacher and a teacher aide.  Preschool class 
sizes of no more than 20 and ratios of no more than 10 students per teacher are the maximum 
allowed for accreditation purposes for preschool programs for 4-year-olds by the National 
Association for the Education of Young Children (see 
http://www.naeyc.org/accreditation/performance_criteria/ teacher_child_ratios.html).  On the 
other hand, the modeled program tries to control costs by having one staff position be a teacher=s 
aide, as was done in the Chicago CPC preschool program. Costs are also controlled by assuming 
the program is only a half-day program.  Finally, costs are controlled by assuming that results 
similar to the CPC program can be achieved with a program that only offers services to children 
for one year.  The one-year program design is rationalized by findings from studies of the CPC 
program that the second year seemed to have limited additional benefits over the first year. 
However, we should recognize limits of what we know about the benefits of preschool.  
We presume, but do not know for certain, that there is some threshold of quality of preschool 
programs below which the program has few benefits.  We presume that at some much higher 
quality level the marginal return to additional quality diminishes.  To maximize benefits relative 
to costs, we would like to design a preschool program that will definitely have a quality 
significantly above the minimum threshold for significant benefits, but not go too much above 
the quality at which the marginal benefits to increased quality rapidly diminish.  But we don=t 
know exactly the quality levels that define that range of desirable quality for maximizing the 
benefit/cost ratio for preschool programs.  Given our uncertainty, we might want to err on the 
side of making sure we do have a significant impact, as long as we still have benefits greater 
than costs. In the future, as our knowledge about the implications of different quality levels 
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improves, we may be able to identify significant cost-savings with little impact on results.  The 
danger of choosing too little quality for a universal preschool program is that the program’s 
failure could discredit the concept of universal preschool. 
For example, it could be argued that to be assured of getting benefits of a magnitude 
similar to the CPC program, we should more closely mimic some of the features of the CPC 
program in our design of a universal preschool program.  The average participant in the CPC 
program participated for 1.5 years, so for many participants it was a two-year program (Reynolds 
et al. 2002).  So, let us assume that to assure ourselves of the CPC level of benefits, we will 
design our universal preschool program as a 2-year program for both 3- and 4-year-olds.  In 
addition, the student to teacher ratio in the CPC program was 17 to 2 rather than the 20 to 2 ratio 
assumed in the baseline simulation, following Karoly and Bigelow (2005).  Therefore, let us 
further assume that we decide to aim for a 17 to 2 ratio in our universal preschool program.  
These changes provide greater assurance that we will have the CPC level of benefits that we 
want to claim. 
Under these alternative assumptions, the annual per participant costs of a universal 
preschool program increase from $5,856 under the baseline simulation to $6,889 under this 
alternative simulation, due to the lower 17 to 2 student to teacher ratio.  With the program lasting 
for two years for each participant, and allowing for offsets in reduced spending for existing 
programs for 3-year-olds as well as 4-year-olds, the present value of costs per participant for this 
universal program will be 2.70 times as much as was assumed for the baseline simulation.31  The 
                                                 
31The original program had an offset from reduced spending of $1,622 per participant, for a net cost per 
participant of $4,234 = $5,856 !$1,622.  The new program’s costs for 4-year-olds will have the same offset, so will 
have net costs of 5,267 = 6,889 ! 1,622.  The 3rd grade program will have costs that we will assume to be 1.2% 
lower due to lower wages a year ago, but inflated by 3% to be in PV dollars of year 4, so will have present value 
costs of 7,012.  I assume the offset is only half as much, based on information from Karoly and Bigelow (2005, pp. 
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earnings effects on peers and participants are assumed to be at the level we would expect based 
on the evaluations of the CPC program, and so should still be the same as in the baseline 
simulation per participant, that is the present value of such earnings effects has a ratio of 2.65 to 
the original costs per participant.  Earnings effects via the social return to education from more 
college graduates should also be similar to the baseline simulation, at a ratio in present value 
terms of 0.04 to the original costs per participant.  The earnings effects via increased labor 
supply of the participants= parents should be roughly twice as great, because the program now 
provides free child care for two years rather than only one year, so the earnings effects of free 
child care increase from a present value of a 0.05 ratio to the original costs per participant under 
the baseline simulation to a 0.10 ratio under these alternative assumptions.  The earnings effects 
of the balanced budget multiplier effects of preschool per participant should go up roughly 
proportionately with costs per participant, so balanced budget multiplier effects increase from a 
ratio of 0.04 of original costs per participant under the baseline simulation to a ratio of 0.11 (0.11 
= 2.70 H 0.04) under these alternative assumptions.  Summing up all the avenues of earnings 
effects, the present value of all earnings effects of preschool increase from a ratio of 2.78 of the 
original costs in the baseline simulation to 2.90 of the original costs under these alternative 
assumptions.  Dividing these alternative earnings effects per participant by the alternative costs 
per participant leads to the result that the present value of earnings effects under these alternative 
assumptions will have a ratio of 1.07 to the present value of the costs per participant. 
                                                                                                                                                             
90–91) that about half as many 3-year-olds as 4-year-olds are enrolled in public programs.  So the 3-year-old offset 
is 811, but after adjusting for 1.2% lower costs a year ago and adjusting to year 4 present value, the offset is 825.  So 
the net costs of the 3-year-old program is 6,187 = 7,012 ! 625.  So the total present value at year 4 of program costs 
per participant is 5,267 + 6,187 = 11,454.  The cost of the original program per participant was 4,234, so the net cost 
ratio has increased by a ratio of 2.70 = 11,454 / 4,234. 
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Therefore, under this higher quality design of a CPC-like universal preschool program, 
we are clearly spending a lot more to get benefits that we expect to be only little greater than 
they were under the baseline simulation.  But the advantage is that we perhaps have more 
assurance that these earnings effects will actually occur.  Budgeting for a higher-cost, higher 
quality preschool program may have less downside risk of inadvertently falling below the 
threshold level of quality that is needed for preschool education to truly matter to the future of 
the children it serves. 
Consider a further alternative design of a universal preschool program.  Suppose we want 
to minimize the risk of being ineffective by mimicking the Perry Preschool program.  Perry 
Preschool was subjected to a somewhat more rigorous research design than the CPC program 
(random assignment for Perry vs. a quasi-experimental control group for the CPC program).  In 
addition, the Perry Preschool program model is higher in various elements of quality than the 
CPC program, which also reduces the risk of failing to meet a minimum quality threshold.  The 
Perry Preschool program at capacity was operated with a student to teacher ratio that averaged 
6.25 to 1, with class sizes of 12 to 2 or 13 to 2. Instead of a teacher and a teacher aide in each 
classroom, the Perry Preschool program used two teachers per class.  About 80% of the Perry 
Preschool students participated in the program for two years.  In addition to class time, the Perry 
Preschool program had teachers do weekly home visits.32 
It is unclear whether all these expenditures are needed to get the same results for children 
as were achieved by the Perry Preschool program.  For example, researchers associated with the 
Perry Preschool program believe that similar results could be obtained with student to teacher 
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ratios of 8 to 1 or even 10 to 1 (Schweinhart et al. 2005, pp. 33–34, p. 202).  However, to 
minimize the downside risk of achieving lower results than the original Perry Preschool 
program, suppose we design our “Perry-style” universal preschool program model to be as close 
as possible to the original design, with the very low original class sizes.  
Based on an examination of the original costs of the Perry Preschool program when it 
was operated during the 1960s, and considering changes since then in prices and real wages of 
teachers, the annual per participant costs today, in 2004 dollars, of a Perry-style universal 
preschool program would be estimated to be $10,399.33  If we further designed the program to be 
two years for each participant, and allowed for offsets and converted to present value costs per 
participant as of age 4, the present value of costs for a Perry-style universal preschool program 
per participant would be 4.38 times the baseline simulation=s costs per participant. 
The balanced budget multiplier effects per participant of a Perry-style program would 
roughly increase proportionately with costs per participant, so they would increase from a 
present value that is a ratio of 0.04 to the original costs per participant to 0.18 of original costs.  I 
again assume the earnings effects of a two-year preschool due to effects on the labor supply of 
the participants’ parents would be roughly twice those of the baseline one-year program, so these 
                                                                                                                                                             
32The Perry Preschool program is described in Schweinhart et al. (2005, pp. 33–37), although Barnett 
(1996, p. 25) is the source for the information that the capacity student to teacher ratio for Perry Preschool was 6.25 
to 1. 
33This calculation of annual costs per participant of $10,399 is based on some plausible extrapolations from 
the original costs of the program.  Barnett (1996, Table 4, p. 20, average of figures for 1964–1965 and 1965–1966)) 
reports average costs of the program on an annual basis, when the program was operating at capacity, of $8,666 per 
participant in year 2004 dollars.  But Barnett also reports that using current teacher salaries seems to increase costs 
by perhaps 20% (Barnett 1996, p. 26).  Multiplying $8,666 by 1.20 gives the figure of $10,399.  Heckman and 
Masterov (2004, p. 26) give a figure for Perry Preschool costing $9,785 per participant per year if implemented in 
2004; no source is given for this figure, but it gives at least some reassurance that I am not vastly underestimating 
how much Perry Preschool would cost today.  With an average offset from reduced public spending on current 
programs of $1,622, the net costs of Perry Preschool for 4-year-olds would be 8,777 = 10,399 ! 1622.  For 3-year-
olds, the net present value in year 4 dollars of costs would be 9,759 = (1.03 / 1.012) H (10,399 ! 811 offset).  So net 
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effects would increase from 0.05 of the original costs in the baseline to 0.10 of original costs.  I 
assume the earnings effects from the social return to more college graduates will remain 
unchanged from the baseline to a Perry-style program, at a ratio of 0.04 to the original costs.  
The Perry Preschool program’s effects on college graduation rates are only modestly greater than 
what was assumed for the baseline simulation (see Table 10).  As for the effects of a universal 
preschool program on the earnings of participants and their peers, using the Perry Preschool 
effects on educational attainment and employment rates, rather than the CPC-style effects 
assumed in the baseline, increases the present value of real earnings benefits per participant for 
participants and peers to a 4.96 ratio to the original costs per participant, whereas the baseline 
simulation had participant and peer effects whose present value was a ratio of 2.65 to original 
costs.  Therefore, the real earnings effects for participants and peers in this Perry-style preschool 
model are almost twice as great as in the CPC-style preschool model used in the baseline.  
Adding up all these avenues of effects, this alternative Perry-style universal preschool program 
has a total present value of earnings effects whose ratio to original costs is 5.28.  Dividing this by 
the 4.38 times greater costs, the Perry-style preschool program is estimated to have earnings 
effects whose present value is a ratio of 1.21 to the present value of the program’s costs. 
The bottom line in this Perry-style simulation is that by spending a great deal more per 
participant, we perhaps are lowering expected earnings effects per dollar spent.  But the rationale 
for considering doing so is that this will increase our assurance that we are spending more than 
the critical threshold needed to achieve results.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
present value at year 4 of two-year costs per participant is 18,536.  The baseline simulation had net costs per 
participant of 4,234, so the ratio is 4.38 (= 18,536 / 4,234). 
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Targeting Preschool at High-Risk Children 
If we believe that preschool education has much stronger benefits for high-risk children, 
usually used to refer to children from lower-income backgrounds, than for other children, then it 
makes some intuitive sense to target services towards high-risk children.  This can be done by 
focusing whatever preschool resources are assumed to be available on high-risk children, and 
excluding or discouraging other children from public preschool education.  This targeting would 
seem likely to raise the benefits per preschool participants.  Under the assumptions used in this 
report’s simulation model, assumptions which presume that high risk children benefit much more 
from preschool than other children, the average preschool participant from a universal program 
gets only 23% of the benefits that would be obtained from preschool by a high-risk child who 
otherwise would not have been in preschool. In addition to increasing benefits per participant, 
targeting lowers the net costs of universal preschool per participant by focusing the savings from 
replacing our current preschool programs on fewer participants. 
For example, Nobel prize-winning economist James Heckman argues in an interview that 
“[i]t is foolish to try to substitute for what the middle-class and upper-middle-class parents are 
already doing...[W]e can certainly deal with the major problems...by starting first with children 
from disadvantaged families. As an economist, I would argue, go where the returns are highest” 
(Clement 2005, interview with James Heckman, p. 24). 
One argument against targeting to high-risk children is that we don’t really know that the 
gains to middle class and upper-middle class children from preschool are that much less than the 
gains to lower-class children.  Most of the research on preschool education is on high-risk, lower 
income children, but the (relative) absence of evidence on middle class children, as the cliché 
goes, is not evidence of absence.  In addition, some researchers argue that “direct evidence has 
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been growing that all children can benefit from high-quality preschool, including the more 
economically advantaged” (Barnett, Brown and Shore 2004, p. 6).  Barnett and his colleagues do 
admit that on most indicators of effects of preschool, “effects are somewhat larger for 
disadvantaged children.”  However, the exact quantitative magnitudes of the relative effects on 
different groups make a big difference in any rigorous evaluation of the benefits and costs of 
preschool.  It is this precise quantitative evidence on relative effects for different income groups 
of children that is lacking. 
Another argument against targeting to high-risk children is political: programs for poor 
people tend to be poor programs, because they lack broad political support.  This argument has 
been most prominently made by Harvard sociologist Theda Skopcol, who points to the 
historically strong support for universal programs such as Social Security, as opposed to targeted 
programs such as welfare (Skocpol 1991).  This strong support for universal programs such as 
Social Security occurs even when there is some targeting of benefits within the framework of 
universal eligibility.  For example the Social Security benefit formula is deliberately designed to 
replace a higher percentage of earnings for lower-income workers. 
Weak political support for a targeted preschool education program may reduce funding 
both for the numbers of children served and the quality of service received.  Barnett and his 
colleagues argue that “[h]istory provides abundant evidence of weak political support for 
targeted preschool programs.  In four decades, Head Start has failed to achieve full funding for a 
quality program” (Barnett et al. 2004, p. 12).  The hope is that if preschool programs provide 
valuable services to all children, there will be political pressure to keep the quality up and 
provide adequate funding. 
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The counter-argument is that some conservatives may object to programs that provide 
free or highly subsidized services to more affluent families.  For example, Heckman suggests 
that proposals for universal preschool programs may “create...an opposition group saying, ‘Why 
should we subsidize affluent working women?’” (Clement 2005, p. 24).  My own judgment is 
that Heckman’s argument applies to a relatively small group of economics-influenced policy 
wonks.  In the real world, political support is usually stronger for programs that have some 
legitimate claim to providing universal services. 
The simulation model used in this paper is biased towards finding that preschool 
education programs should be targeted, as it incorporates the assumption that benefits from 
preschool are much stronger for lower-income children, as shown in Table 7.  So, in using this 
model to simulate the effects of different types of targeting, the reader should keep in mind that 
this is a “best case scenario” for targeting. 
First, I consider a strict targeting approach under which our new public preschool 
program, which replaces current public preschool spending, is strictly limited to high-risk and 
medium-risk children, of low to moderate income.  Low-risk children, whose families earn more 
than $50,000 per year, are strictly excluded from public preschool.  A considerable number of 
such children are currently served in public preschool programs.  In the numbers given in Table 
7, derived from research by Karoly and Bigelow (2005), 24% of low-risk 4-year-olds currently 
participate in public preschool programs (24% = 13 / 55), and these low-risk 4-year-olds 
constitute 39% of the current enrollment in public preschool programs (39% = 13 / 33).  
On the cost side, this reduces the net cost per participant by spreading the savings from 
replacing current preschool programs across fewer participants in the new program.  The 
baseline preschool program costs $5,856 per participant, and the savings from eliminating 
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current preschool programs amount to $1,622 per participant, assuming that 70% of all 4-year-
olds are served.  So the net costs in the baseline simulation of universal preschool are $4,234 per 
participant.  If we exclude all the low-risk children, the public preschool program now only 
serves high-risk and medium-risk children, and therefore only has 32% of all 4-year-olds as 
participants.  The savings per participant from eliminating current public preschool programs for 
4-year-olds now amount to $3,548 (= 1622 H 70 / 32).  Therefore, the net public cost per 
participant from operating this strictly targeted preschool program is $2,308.34  The ratio of the 
net government cost per participant of this strictly targeted preschool program to the baseline 
universal program is 0.545 = 2,308 / 4,234.  Even if benefits per participant were unchanged, 
such a strictly targeted program would close to double the real earnings effects per dollar of net 
government costs.35 
The original baseline preschool program has average benefits per participant that are 23% 
of the benefits received by a high-risk 4-year-old who otherwise would not have been in any 
preschool, based on the distribution of participants across different risk categories of child and 
different categories of what they would do without the program.  Doing the same calculation for 
this new strictly targeted program, the average benefits per participant increase to 45.3% of what 
                                                 
34This calculation of government costs ignores any cost of screening families for income eligibility.  Karoly 
and Bigelow (2005, p. 117) assume administrative costs of running a means-tested transfer program of $552 per 
participant.  While this is perhaps appropriate for a program of collecting fees based on income, it seems somewhat 
high for a program that simply does a one-time income screen for eligibility. 
35One could debate whether this is a complete description of costs by only looking at government costs.  
Later in this report, I argue that charging fees to some preschool participants should be looked on as an alternative 
way of financing universal preschool, not as a real cost reduction.  Similarly, it could be argued here that a proper 
cost accounting should consider the reduction in free public preschool services to the low-risk children who 
otherwise would have participated in a lower cost and lower quality current public preschool program.  However, it 
is somewhat more problematic to put an exact dollar value on this cost; it is presumably some value between zero 
and what it costs the government per participant to provide current public preschool services, which is assumed to be 
$3,441 in this report’s model.  In any event, as the report text discussion makes clear, whatever the economic costs 
are of excluding low-risk children from public preschool, in my opinion the political costs are more than sufficient to 
outweigh any greater earnings effects per dollar of economic costs.  
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would accrue to the high-risk 4-year-old who otherwise would not be in preschool.  This almost 
doubles the real earnings effects per participant on participants and peers, and the real earnings 
effects via effects on college graduation rates (45.3 / 23 = 1.9696).  In terms of the original costs 
per participant, the present value of real earnings effects on participants and peers increase from 
the baseline 2.65 to 5.22(= 2.65 H 1.9696).  The effects on real earnings by increasing the state 
college graduation rate increases from 0.04 to 0.08.36 
After some complicated but boring calculations, balanced budget multiplier effects per 
participant in this new strictly targeted program decline from the baseline simulation’s present 
value of 0.04 of baseline costs to 0.02, because of the larger cutbacks per participant in public 
spending on current preschool programs.37  The child care effects of the strictly targeted program 
are likely close to zero.  This strictly targeted program provides free child care for an additional 
12% of all 4-year-olds who otherwise would not have received free child care, but eliminates 
13% of all 4-year-olds in the low-risk category who currently receive free child care during 
preschool hours. 
                                                 
36It might initially appear that the effects via college graduates would decrease because of the fewer 
participants in preschool.  These effects on college graduates do tend to decline with the number of participants, but 
the effects per participant do not. 
37Under the baseline program, the spending per participant was $5,856 in public spending on the 15% of all 
4-year-olds who otherwise would not have enrolled in preschool plus ($5,856 in public spending on the new 
program minus $3,441 in current public spending) on the 33% of all 4-year-olds who otherwise would have been in 
the old public preschool program, plus ($5,856 in additional public spending on the new program minus the typical 
spending of 1995 on private preschool) for the 22% of all 4-year-olds who otherwise would have been in private 
preschool, divided by the 70% of all 4-year-olds, or $3,621 in additional spending per participant generated by the 
program.  The $1995 figure for private preschool is based on Table 7, p. 15 of the U.S. Census Bureau publication 
“Who’s Minding the Kids? Child Care Arrangements: Spring 1997” (Smith 2002), which reports an hourly charge 
for preschool which in 2004 dollars is $3.80 per hour, and multiplied by 525 hours is 1995.  Under the strictly 
targeted program, the net new spending per participant from the program compared to current policy is $5,856 H 8% 
of all 4-year-olds, + (5,856 ! 3,441) H 20% of all 4-year-olds, + (5,856 ! 1,995) H 4% of all 4-year-olds, ! $3,441 in 
current public spending on 13% of all 4-year-olds, all divided by 32% of all 4-year-olds.  This equals $2,058 in new 
spending compared to current policy from this strictly targeted program, which is a little more than half (2,058 / 
3,621) of the additional public spending from the baseline universal program. 
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The net effect is that in this strictly targeted preschool program, the present value of 
earnings effects per participant, per dollar of the original costs of the baseline preschool 
program, increase from $2.78 to $5.32.  Costs in present value terms are reduced to 0.545 of the 
original costs.  The net real earnings effects in present value terms from this strictly targeted 
program, per present value dollar of net costs of this strictly targeted program , increase to $9.76 
(= 5.32 / 0.545), compared to $2.78 in the baseline simulation.  
From a technocratic, policy wonk perspective, in which all policies are viewed as 
politically feasible, a policy that offers earnings benefits of $9.76 per dollar of net costs is 
preferable to one that offers benefits of $2.78 per dollar of net costs.  So the strictly targeted 
program would appear clearly superior. However, these greater benefits are to some extent based 
on assumptions that presume much greater effects of preschool on high-risk children.  The 
research to establish this presumption is sparse.  In addition, in my judgment, this strictly 
targeted program has very little political feasibility.  The program categorically excludes 55% of 
all 4-year-olds from any possible eligibility for program benefits.  Some of these “low risk” 4-
year-olds currently receive some public preschool benefits.  Therefore, the proposed policy 
involves taking away benefits from this group, not just denying new benefits.   
A more politically acceptable mechanism of targeting is to allow universal eligibility for 
preschool education, but to charge sliding scale fees for enrollment.  Enrollment would be free 
for low-income children, but higher income families would be charged some fees.  Fees per child 
would increase with family income.  Karoly and Bigelow (2005), for example, suggest a 
program under which the low-risk upper income families would pay half of the per participant 
program costs through fees, which amounts to fees of $5.58 per hour or $2,928 per year, and 
medium-risk moderate income families would pay one quarter of the per participant program 
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cost through fees, or $2.79 per hour or $1,464 per year.  As current private preschool hourly fees 
average $3.80 per hour (Smith 2002, and see previous footnote), and the proposed program is 
supposed to have considerably higher quality than the average preschool program, the proposed 
fees at least appear to be plausible. 
What would be the effects of such a sliding scale fee program on the net earnings benefits 
per dollar of costs of a preschool program?  On the cost side, this program certainly affects who 
pays the costs for preschool.  Costs are shifted from taxpayers to moderate income and higher 
families who use the program.  But this cost shift, while lowering government costs, does not 
really lower the social costs of the program, but merely rearranges its financing.  This 
rearrangement of financing may raise political support for the program among some taxpayers.  
The social costs of the program do tend to go down if there are fewer participants as moderate 
and upper families reduce their demand for the program.  This allows net costs per participant to 
go down as the savings from replacing current public preschool programs are spread over fewer 
participants in the new program.  On the other hand, social costs of the program tend to go up 
due to the administrative costs of running an income-base fee system. Karoly and Bigelow 
(2005, p. 117) assume that a fee-based system would cost about $552 per participant in 2004 
dollars.  This figure seems high to me, but there are no readily available alternative estimates. 
On the benefit side, this program would be expected to change the utilization of 
preschool so that fewer moderate income and upper income children will use the program, which 
will tend to raise net earnings benefits per participant.  From a political perspective, this reduced 
demand probably reduces political support for the program.  The political question is whether 
this reduced political support from moderate and upper income families is offset by the increased 
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political support from taxpayers who prefer that moderate and upper income families pay a 
greater share of the costs of the program.  
One extreme assumption is that fees have no effect on demand for this high-quality 
public preschool program.  In this case, the only effect of the fees on the economic cost-
effectiveness of the program is to increase its social costs by the administrative costs of the fees. 
 If Karoly and Bigelow are right about the magnitude of these administrative fees, then the net 
social costs of the program increase by $552 per participant, from a net cost of $4,234 per 
participant (equal to program cost of $5,856 minus savings from replacing existing programs of 
$1,622) to $4,786 per participant, or by a factor of 13.0%.  The net earnings benefits of the 
program will then decline to $2.46 in present value per dollar of costs (2.46 = original $2.78 per 
dollar of costs divided by 1.130).  The political question is whether the added political support 
from taxpayers who prefer that participant families pay fees is offset by reduced political support 
from participant families who resent paying fees.  
Another extreme assumption is that fees could reduce demand to zero among some 
income groups.  For example, if fees reduced demand for public preschool to zero among the 
low-risk group, then we get results for cost-effectiveness similar to the strict targeting approach. 
 We would also get similar political effects as under the strict targeting approach: dramatically 
reduced support for public preschool programs among middle income and above families.    
It is more reasonable to assume that a sliding-scale fee system will reduce demand 
somewhat among moderate income and above families, but not to zero.  Let us simulate possible 
effects of the fees assumed by Karoly and Bigelow (2005).  Blau and Hagy (1998) provide 
estimates of the effects of changes in hourly child care prices on the proportion of families using 
center based child care.  If we assume their estimates can be applied to determine the effects on 
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public preschool use of charging hourly fees, then the $5.58 per hour fee for “low-risk” families 
will reduce the number of low-risk children using public preschool by 17.1% compared to the 
baseline universal free preschool program (from 38% of all 4-year-olds to 31.5% of all 4-year-
olds).  The $2.79 per hour fee for “medium-risk” families will reduce the number of medium-risk 
children using public preschool by 8.6% compared to the baseline universal free preschool 
program (from 14% of all 4-year-old to 12.8% of all 4-year-olds).38  This extrapolates the 
relatively moderate price responses found in Blau and Hagy to somewhat larger hourly fee 
changes.  In addition, it assumes that a high-quality public preschool program is a distinct 
enough mode of early childhood care and education that such moderate demand responses would 
occur.  If private preschool and other modes of child care are assumed to be very close 
substitutes for a high quality public preschool program, then we would expect the demand 
response to be considerably higher.  
These sliding-scale fees and the resulting response have two effects on costs.  First, by 
reducing the total number of participants in preschool, they increase the offset savings per 
participant from eliminating current preschool programs.  These savings per participant from 
eliminating current preschool programs increase from $1,622 per participant with 70% of all 4-
year-olds participating, to $1,822 per participant with 62.3% of all 4-year-olds participating 
(1,822 = 1,622 H 70 / 62.3). 
                                                 
38Blau and Hagy (1998) estimate that the effect of changing the hourly child care fee, in 2004 dollars, from 
$2.22 per hour to zero is to increase use of center based child care by 4.7% of all families.  The estimates here rely 
on extrapolating these responses to changing fees from zero to $5.58 and zero to $2.79.  A fee increase from zero to 
5.58 would then be expected to reduce usage by 11.8% of all low-risk families (11.8 = 4.7% H 5.58 / 2.22), and since 
low-risk families are 55% of all families, the reduction would be about 6.5% of all families (6.5% = 0.55 H 11.8).  A 
fee increase from zero to 2.79 reduces usage by 5.9% of all medium-risk families, or by 1.2% of all families.  Of 
course, the use of their estimates rely on assuming that this high-quality public preschool is a distinct enough mode 
of care from private preschool that it will have such moderate price elasticities.  It also relies on extrapolating Blau 
and Hagy’s estimates to a somewhat different type of care than they originally considered. 
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Second, these fees reduce the government’s net cost of running the program, while 
increasing the costs to participating families of the program and to society of running the 
program.  Based on the assumptions outlined, the fees collected average $1,781 per participant 
(1781 = (31.5 H 2928 + 12.8 H 1464) / 62.3).  But there are some administrative costs involved 
with monitoring the income of all participant families, and collecting and processing the fees, 
and enforcing the fees.  Using Karoly and Bigelow=s assumption that such fees are $552 per 
participant, net government costs of running the program are reduced by $1,781.  The net costs 
to society from the fees go up by $552. 
Combining these two effects, from a governmental perspective, a sliding scale fee 
structure reduces the net costs per participant from $4,234 per participant (5,856 ! 1,622) to 
$2,805 per participant (5,856 ! 1822 ! 1229), or only 0.66 of the original cost per participant 
(0.66 = 2,805 / 4,234).  From a social perspective, a sliding scale fee increases the net costs to 
the government plus participants from $4,234 per participant to $4,586 (4,586 = 5,856 ! 1,822 + 
552).  This is 1.0831 H the original cost per participant (1.0831 = 4,586 / 4,234). 
The sliding scale fees also increase somewhat the benefits per participant.  With fewer 
low-risk and medium-risk children using the program, the effects on participants will be higher.  
Rather than being 23% of the benefits for a high-risk child who would otherwise have not been 
in any preschool, average benefits per participant increase to 25.1% of the benefits for a high-
risk child who would otherwise not have been in preschool.  This increases effects on 
participants and peers, and effects from increasing college graduation rates, by a factor of 24.9 / 
23 = 1.0913.  Effects on participants and peers increase from a present value of 2.65 as a ratio to 
costs under the baseline simulation to a present value ratio of 2.89 to the original costs (2.89 = 
2.65 H 1.0913).  Effects on college graduates still round off at 0.04.  Some lengthy and rather 
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boring calculations reveal that balanced budget multiplier benefits stay almost the same, at 0.04 
on the original cost basis, while child care benefits decline from 0.05 to 0.03.39 
The net result is that total benefits of the sliding-scale fee program, on the original cost 
basis, increase to 3.00 from the higher risk mix of participants.  If we divide this by the new net 
governmental costs, the resulting ratio of present value of earnings benefits to governmental 
costs is 4.55.  However, if we divide this by social costs, the present value of earnings benefits 
per $1 of present value of costs to the government plus participants is actually slightly lower at 
2.77, versus the original figure of 2.78. 
The latter analysis in terms of social costs seems more appropriate.  Charging fees to 
participants is really just an alternative to financing the program via taxes.  What this analysis 
reveals is that the modest benefits from shifting the participant mix to higher risk children via 
fees are probably offset by the administrative hassles of setting up and collecting fees. 
One could of course get somewhat more optimistic appraisals of a sliding fee system by 
assuming it will have larger effects in reducing usage by moderate and upper income families.  
But this then raises again the issue of whether the program will become politically unpopular if 
fewer middle income and above families use the program.  We also could get somewhat more 
                                                 
39For the balanced budget multiplier, the baseline simulation has net additional spending per participant of 
$3,607, equal to (5,856 H 15 + 2,415 H 33 + 3,861 H 22) / 70, where 2,415 is the difference between the new public 
program’s costs and the old public program’s costs, and 3,861 is the difference between the new public program’s 
costs and private preschool spending.  A similar calculation for the sliding scale fee program yields additional public 
spending per participant of $3,594, which equals (5,856 H 13.5 + 2,415 H 30.1 + 3,861 H 18.6) / 62.2.  So the 
balanced budget multiplier effects will remain unchanged at 0.4.  As for child care costs, in the baseline simulation, 
we had 37 out of 70 households experience a child care cost reduction of 100% for 24% of the time, which equals a 
12.7% reduction, and under the assumption that in only 60.7% of the cases the reduction “matters” because the 4-
year-old is the youngest child, the average effective price reduction is 7.7%.  In the fee simulation, the average child 
care cost reduction is 4.8%, which equals (0.607 H (6 persons with a 100% reduction 24% of the time + 5.4 persons 
with a 75% reduction 24% of the time + 20.7 persons with a 50% reduction 24% of the time) / 62.2 participants.  
Some households pay increased costs for public preschool, but I ignore this under the assumption that the quality 
increase offsets the increased costs.  Therefore the earnings effects of reduced child care costs are multiplied by 4.8 / 
7.7, which reduces these effects as a ratio to original costs from 0.05 to 0.03. 
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optimistic appraisals if the analysis incorporated the administrative costs and losses from paying 
taxes to support the program, which may also be considerable.  Finally, we would get a more 
optimistic appraisal if the costs of administering a fee-based system prove to be significantly less 
than assumed by Karoly and Bigelow.  
Overall, these results suggest that it is unclear whether there will be substantial 
effectiveness gains from a sliding scale fee system.  Gains in effectiveness from a sliding scale 
fee system depend crucially on such details as the demand responsiveness to fees and the 
administrative costs of fees.  These issues require further research.  From a political perspective, 
the main issue is whether it is politically better to finance all of the universal preschool system 
through taxes, or whether some of the system should be financed through user fees.  Will the 
financing through user fees help the program politically by reducing objections from the groups 
Heckman refers to, that object to subsidizing upper income families?  Or will the financing 
through user fees make the program more bureaucratic and administratively cumbersome, and 
politically less popular because middle class and upper class families perceive the program as 
providing fewer net benefits?  
 
Reducing Labor Market Displacement from Preschool 
One important assumption in the baseline simulation, an assumption that considerably 
reduces the real earnings effects of preschool, is that the increases in the quantity and quality of 
labor supply due to preschool education has considerable displacement effects in the labor 
market.  The displacement rate is one-third.  This means that for every additional job obtained by 
parents of participants, or participants and their peers, there is a loss of one job among other 
local residents. 
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Suppose we could use a magic wand and eliminate these displacement effects.  Then the 
present value of real earnings effects on the participants in preschool and their peers would 
increase from a ratio of 2.65 of present value program costs to 3.98 (3.98 = 2.65 H 3/2).  The 
present value of real earnings effects on the parents of participants due to the free child care 
provided would increase from 0.05 of costs to 0.08 (0.08 = 0.05 H 3/2).  Assuming balanced 
budget multiplier effects and effects via increased college graduation rates are unchanged, the 
total present value of real earnings effects from preschool education would increase from a ratio 
of 2.78 of costs to 4.14.40 
What might reduce displacement effects of preschool education?  Displacement effects of 
labor supply shocks can be reduced if labor demand is more responsive to the supply of labor of 
different types.  This might occur if labor market conditions can be restructured so that it is 
easier to set up or expand a business, or find and hire qualified new workers.  Therefore, policies 
such as reducing unnecessary red tape, or improving the quality of local labor market 
intermediaries might be helpful. 
In addition, policies that explicitly seek to increase labor demand may also be helpful in 
reducing displacement.  These could include economic development policies.  The idea is that as 
labor supply increases due to preschool education, if matching economic development policies 
are also expanded, then the labor demand will be there to ensure that all the new workers can be 
absorbed by the labor market without displacement. 
                                                 
40There is no real reason for balanced budget multiplier effects to increase as these estimates do not involve 
any supply-side displacement.  However, implicitly the college graduate effects may involve some displacement, as 
it could be argued that the use of Bound et al.’s (2004) estimates of how college graduate stocks compare to flows 
involves some displacement.  However, their estimates also involve normal in and out-migration, and it is somewhat 
difficult to separate out these different influences.  Any effects in increasing college graduation effects would not 
make a large difference to the total ratio of all preschool effects to costs. 
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This is another way in which preschool education programs and economic development 
programs may be directly complementary: effective economic development programs may 











So far, all this discussion has taken a state-level perspective on the earnings generated by 
traditional economic development programs and preschool education programs.  This state 
perspective just looks at increases in employment rates and real earnings of the state’s residents. 
 We might worry about whether these state policies of economic development or preschool 
education have spillover effects on businesses and residents in other states that should be taken 
into account.  These spillover effects would be taken into account from a national perspective.  
The national perspective would seem superior, as it is broader and considers more interests.  If 
there are spillover effects that are unpriced and hence ignored, then state policies on their own 
will not be optimal.  Some federal intervention to discourage state policies with negative 
spillovers, and encourage state policies with positive spillovers, would seem to be warranted. 
The most obvious spillover effects are due to household migration and employment 
relocation.  I first consider household migration and how it might lead to spillover effects.  Some 
of the state residents who get jobs or higher wages due to the policy intervention, whether it is 
universal preschool or an economic development subsidy program of the same costs, will end up 
moving to other states.  The increased jobs and earnings of these out-migrants in these other 
states will probably not be counted from the original state’s perspective.  In any event, the 
calculations this report has done up to now have not counted these benefits that occur after out-
migration. 
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Spillover benefits for other states and thus the nation due to out-migration are more 
significant for preschool education than for traditional economic development subsidies.  
Preschool education has a long lag between the policy intervention, at ages 3 or 4, and the 
eventual effects on participants’ employment and earnings.  In contrast, economic development 
subsidies have much of their effect on employment and earnings almost immediately.  The 
longer lag with which preschool education affects employment and earnings allows more time 
for state residents to move out.  Therefore, household out-migration is likely to result in a higher 
ratio of national to state benefits for preschool education than for traditional economic 
development subsidies. 
Spillover effects of economic development policy interventions may also result from 
employment reallocation.  If some of the employment expansion in this state results in less 
employment in other states than would otherwise be the case, this effect needs to be taken into 
account in moving the analysis from a state perspective to a national perspective.  
It is important to recognize that employment reallocation need not take place explicitly 
through employment relocation, the obvious case where a firm closes down one facility and 
replaces it with a facility in another state making the same product.  Employment is reallocated 
across states when a large firm chooses one state for a location, and if this had not occurred, the 
firm would have created the same number of jobs in some other state.  Employment is 
reallocated when a small business starts up or expands in one state, the small business’s sales are 
to a national market, and it is appropriate to assume that the size of that national market is fixed, 
so that the small business’ increased sales and employment result in reduced sales and 
employment of businesses in other states. 
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The argument that state employment growth results in employment reallocation across 
states, and not national employment growth, is most commonly applied to traditional economic 
development subsidies.  It is argued that this is a zero sum game: any benefit this state gains by 
expanding employment by some amount will be offset by losses in other states that are argued to 
lose employment by that same amount.  
This zero-sum game argument has been prominently made in papers promoting preschool 
education as an economic development program.  For example, Grunewald and Rolnick (2005) 
argue that “from a national perspective, jobs are not created [from traditional economic 
development programs]—they are only relocated; the public return is at most zero.”  Ehrlich and 
Kornblatt (2004, p. 4) argue that “[a]ny benefit derived from the relocation of jobs [due to 
traditional economic development programs] is experienced at the local level.  On a larger scale, 
the U.S., for example, derives no social benefit when jobs move from Missouri to Mississippi, 
and any tax dollars spent to fund such a move result in a net loss of social welfare.”  
One point countering this zero-sum game argument is that it is probably not true that 
lowering business costs and raising business profits has zero effect on national employment.  
Lowering business costs in one state through economic development subsidies does lower 
average national business costs slightly.  We would expect this to provide some stimulus to 
overall national business activity.  However, the immediate national effect of this stimulus will 
probably be less than the increased business activity that accrues to the state.  One would think 
that the decision about whether to expand business activity at all is a more fundamental decision 
that is less altered by modest changes in business costs than the decision about where to locate 
any desired expansion in business activity.  
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In addition, there may be social benefits from locating more employment in high 
unemployment areas.  It is reasonable to expect that in areas with higher unemployment, in 
which it is harder to get a job, the average unemployed person who gets a job is more desperate 
for a job and “needs” the job more than is true in a low unemployment area, in which jobs are 
plentiful.  As a result, the benefits of increased employment for the local unemployed are greater 
in high unemployment areas than in low unemployment areas.  These greater social benefits 
could result in a net national positive sum game from reallocating employment from low 
unemployment to high unemployment areas, even if there was zero net national employment 
growth.  On the other hand, reallocating employment from high unemployment to low 
unemployment areas may result in net social losses or a negative sum game, even if there is zero 
net national employment growth.  
Furthermore, increased net national employment gains may be feasible if employment is 
reallocated to high unemployment areas.  Suppose that national inflation results in part from 
inflationary pressures in each local economy.  Suppose further that local inflationary pressures 
from a one percent reduction in unemployment in a local area are greater if the local economy 
has low unemployment than if the local economy has high unemployment, which is supported by 
research on local wages and prices (Blanchflower and Oswald 1994; Bartik 2001).  Then it is 
possible to increase national employment, with the same national inflationary pressures, by 
reallocating employment from low to high unemployment areas.  However, this argument also 
implies that if employment is instead reallocated from high unemployment areas to low 
unemployment areas, then national employment must be reduced somewhat to prevent an 
increase in inflationary pressures on the national economy.  
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Another issue is whether the zero sum game argument also applies to employment 
reallocations associated with labor supply shocks, such as increases in the quantity and quality of 
labor due to preschool education.  The likely answer is that the zero sum game argument is not 
applicable in this case.  Preschool education, or other programs that enlarge the quality or 
quantity of labor, do enlarge the overall production capability of the national economy and 
therefore the size of the national market.  The analysis of this report has already allowed for the 
likelihood that not all of this increase in effective labor supply will result in an increase in labor 
demand, by assuming that the equilibrium increase in employment and earnings is only two-
thirds of the initial shock to labor supply.41 
 
Preschool Education 
To obtain the national effects of preschool education, I redo the simulation model 
assuming zero out-migration.  With this assumption, in the typical U.S. state, the present value of 
real earnings effects per present value dollar of preschool spending is 3.79.  This compares with 
the 2.78 ratio for the typical state with typical out-migration patterns.  Hence, on average the 
national earnings benefits from preschool are 36% greater than the earnings benefits for state 
residents that are perceived by the typical state. (36% = (3.79 − 2.78) / 2.78). 
I also can consider the national effects associated with each state’s investment in 
universal preschool education.  Table 23 shows long-run effects of a universal preschool 
education program on jobs, annual wage and salary earnings, and real GSP in each state.  The 
table includes previously reported figures (Table 21) for these effects from a state perspective, 
                                                 
41For the current report, I assume that the relevant national and state labor demand and supply curves are 
such that the relevant displacement effects of shocks to labor supply are similar at the state and national level.  I plan 
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and estimates of these effects from a national perspective.  The sum across states of these effects 
from a national perspective represents the true national effects of all states moving to a universal 
preschool education program. 
The table shows quite large differences between effects from a state vs. national 
perspective.  The true national effects of preschool are much greater than the effects perceived 
by each state.  This is particularly true for smaller states with less diverse and vibrant economies, 
such as Wyoming and North Dakota.  This is also true for cities such as the District of Columbia. 
For smaller states and cities, out-migration is much more extensive, so much of the national 
benefits from preschool education do not stay in the state or city.  
 
Traditional Economic Development Programs 
For traditional economic development programs, estimates of spillover effects and 
national effects require some additional assumptions.  First, for the estimates in this section, I 
ignore possible social benefits or reduced inflationary pressures from reallocating employment 
across states.  The effects of reallocating employment could be argued to be eliminated from a 
national perspective if all states equally engage in a fierce economic development competition.  
In this section, what I focus on estimating are the national effects that occur from 
economic development subsidies when considering that some of the state effects merely 
represent reallocations of jobs from other states.  However, even though there is some 
reallocation of employment due to state economic development subsidies, these subsidies do 
produce some national gains in jobs unless one assumes that national levels of business activities 
are completely insensitive to business costs and profitability. 
                                                                                                                                                             
to explore alternative hypotheses in future work. 
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To evaluate the national effects vs. the state effects of reductions in business costs, we 
need to have national estimates of the costs of creating a job by business subsidies.  For this 
report, I derive such estimates from a study by Jonathan Gruber and Joshua Rauh (2005) of the 
national elasticity of corporate investment with respect to the federal corporate tax rate.  Their 
estimates, when combined with estimates of corporate tax revenue per employee, imply that the 
cost of creating a job in the nation through federal corporate tax breaks is $141,714 in annual 
foregone revenue, ignoring the increase in the corporate tax base due to the expanded business 
activity.42  
In Chapter 2, I summarized the consensus from the economic development literature that 
the cost of creating a job in a state from subsidizing an export-base firm is $19,445 in annual 
foregone revenue, again ignoring the resulting increase in the state business tax base.  These 
estimated costs of national and state job creation imply that if we provide an annual subsidy of 
$19,445 to create one job in a state, the national job creation will only be a fraction of one job on 
                                                 
42In Gruber and Rauh’s Table 4, they estimate that the elasticity of corporate investment with respect to 
ln(1−ETR), where ETR is the effective corporate tax rate, is 0.115.  I interpret the elasticity of business investment as 
being a proxy for the elasticity of long-run business activity.  Their estimated 0.115 is not statistically significant at 
usual levels (standard error of 0.085).  But they do estimate statistically significant elasticities of corporate tax bases 
with respect to ln(1−ETR) of about 0.2, which should overstate the elasticities of business activity, as some of the 
effect of taxes is on the ratio of  reported corporate profits to business activity.  The elasticity I need to estimate the 
costs of creating jobs nationally through corporate tax cuts is the elasticity with respect to ETR. Some derivation 
shows that this will equal 0.115 H (−1) H ETR / (1−ETR).  The median ETR in their data is 0.177 across the 
industries considered, according to their Table 1 figures for the 1999–2003 period.  Therefore, dln(invest) / dlnETR = 
0.0247 = 0.115 H (−1) H (0.177) / 0.823.  According to the U.S. Office of Management of Budget, corporate income 
tax revenues in 2005 were $278.3 billion.  Total private sector employment, according to the BLS, was 111.7 million 
in 2005, and 103.1 million in 1997.  According to the last available statistics, from the 1997 Economic Census, 
Company Summary, in 1997 employment in C corporations was 71.0 million.  Assuming that the ratio of C 
corporation employment to total employment was unchanged from 1997 to 2005, the implied employment in C 
corporations was 76.9 million.  This implies that corporate income tax revenue per corporate employees was $3,619 
in 2005.  The cost per job of creating a job through a tax subsidy, ignoring the revenue gained from the expanded 
base, is given by the tax revenue per job divided by the elasticity with respect to the tax rate, or is here equal in 2005 
dollars to $3,619 / (0.0247) = $146,518.  Converting to 2004 dollars gives a cost per job created of $141,714. 
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average, specifically the fraction 19,445/141714= 0.137.43  So about seven-eighths of the export-
base jobs attracted by economic development subsidies represent reductions in export-base jobs 
for other states. 
These estimates aren’t a complete picture of national and state employment effects of 
subsidies, because jobs created in export-base businesses by economic development subsidies 
will result in multiplier effects that increase employment in other businesses.  We would expect 
national multiplier effects of a boost to export-base businesses to be greater than state multiplier 
effects.  National multipliers exceed state multipliers because some suppliers to export-base 
businesses will be located in other states, and some of the expansion in consumer demand will 
increase sales and production of firms located in other states.  
Because of multiplier effects, the costs of creating a job in a state through economic 
development subsidies is given by 19445/Ms, where Ms is the state multiplier.  The costs of 
creating a job nationally through economic development subsidies becomes $14,1714/Mn, where 
Mn is the national multiplier.  Therefore, the ratio of the jobs created in the state from economic 
development subsidies to the jobs created nationally becomes (19,445/Ms) / 141,714/Mn) = 
0.137 H Mn / Ms.  
Estimates from the REMI model for Michigan suggest that the average ratio of national 
to state multipliers (Mn / Ms) is 1.407, that is the national multiplier is 41% greater than the state 
multiplier.44  As a result, the ratio of the jobs created in the nation by the economic development 
                                                 
43The number of state export-base jobs created by an economic development subsidy of $S is Js = S/19,445. 
The number of jobs created nationally in export-base industries by this subsidy is Jn = S/141,714.  Therefore, Jn/Js = 
19,445/141,714. 
44The REMI model estimates average multiplier effects across all manufacturing industries of 2.95 for 
Michigan, and 4.15 for the U.S.  This average is a weighted average using national industry employment shares as 
weights.  The Michigan multiplier for manufacturing is higher than the average multiplier from MEGA subsidized 
businesses of 1.98 (Chapter 2) because MEGA also subsidizes service firms whose multiplier effect is lower because 
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subsidy, to jobs created in the state is equal to 0.193 (= 0.137 H 1.407).  Therefore, 
approximately four-fifths of the jobs created by economic development subsidies result in 
reduced jobs elsewhere, and only one-fifth represent a net increase in national jobs. 
However, the state effects estimated for economic development subsidies in Chapter 2 
only included effects for persons who stayed in the state.  Therefore, the Chapter 2 effects 
already disregarded some of the effects of a state’s new jobs from economic development 
subsidies.  From a national perspective, we don’t want to disregard the effects of new job 
creation on out-migrants.  Therefore, the true national effects of economic development 
subsidies should be calculated as 19.3%, or about one-fifth, of the effects that would have 
occurred in a state if there was no out-migration, which will be somewhat greater than one-fifth 
of the state effects that were estimated in Chapter 2. 
The resulting calculation of the national effects of economic development subsidies 
results in the estimate that the ratio of the present value of the national earnings effects to the 
present value of the economic development subsidies is 0.65.  This is considerably below the 
ratio from the typical state’s perspective, reported in Chapter 2, of 3.14.   
I also calculate for each state the long-run effects from a national perspective on jobs, 
real earnings, and GSP of economic development subsidies.  Table 24 shows these national 
perspective effects of economic development subsidies, along with the estimates previously 
presented in Chapter 2, Table 6, of the effects of economic development subsidies from a state 
                                                                                                                                                             
of less dense supplier networks and lower wages.  Ideally, all these state multipliers should be varied for each state 
rather than using multipliers from Michigan.  This is likely to result in more errors in estimating each state’s effects 
from economic development subsidies rather than in estimating the national effects from economic development 
subsides. 
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perspective.  As can be seen, the true national effects are only a modest proportion of the effects 
from each state’s perspective.45  
 
Comparison 
With these estimates of effects for each state from a national perspective, we can 
compare the national effects across all states of preschool education and economic development. 
 I report these estimates in Table 25, which simply takes the sum of the state by state estimated 
effects from a national perspective.  As this table clearly shows, the national effects of preschool 
on jobs, earnings, GSP, and total tax revenue are considerably greater than those of economic 
development subsidies.46  
 
                                                 
45This entire calculation essentially assumes a national economy that is demand driven.  That is, I use the 
Gruber and Rauh (2005) estimates of the costs of creating a job through national business tax cuts for each industry, 
and assume that this can be generalized to the aggregate national level.  However, in order for these national effects 
to fully occur as assumed in this report, additional supplies of capital and labor must be made available at the same 
prices.  It is perhaps not unreasonable to assume that additional supplies of capital might be made available at the 
same price (same profit rate), but one would generally think that additional supplies of labor might require higher 
wage rates.  However, there is some economic consensus that the aggregate labor supply of at least adult women, 
and probably teenagers and older workers as well, is at least somewhat responsive to higher wages (e.g., see for 
example the survey of labor economists by Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba (1998) for support for a positive labor 
supply elasticity for adult women).  In addition, the wage curve literature suggest that additional labor supply can be 
elicited, at some wage cost, through lower unemployment and higher labor force participation, as discussed in Bartik 
(2001).  If we allow for higher wages in response to demand shocks from economic development subsidies, this may 
reduce somewhat the national jobs effects of economic development subsidies.  On the other hand, it will increase 
somewhat the wage rate effects of economic development subsidies, which are assumed to be zero in the current 
report’s models.  I hope to explore these issues of national equilibrium responses to economic development subsidies 
more fully in future work.   
46The total tax revenue effects are calculated, from a national perspective, considering federal, state and 
local taxes, whereas from a state and local perspective I only consider state and local taxes in each state. 
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Employment Reallocation and Inflation 
The estimated national effects for economic development subsidies in this chapter have 
so far ignored any possible national benefits due to the reallocation of jobs.  Social benefits from 
the average unemployed person being more desperate for a job in a high unemployment area are 
hard to estimate.  Good estimates would require knowing how the value of the unemployed’s 
time differs in different local economies, about which we have little reliable knowledge.  
However, we do have some evidence on how the effects of unemployment on wages and 
prices vary with unemployment.  And this allows us to do some simple analysis of how the 
reallocation of jobs to a particular state might affect the net national employment level consistent 
with no acceleration of inflationary pressures. 
I do this in Table 26 for jobs.  The table presents two alternative calculations that differ in 
the assumed functional form for how local prices and wages are affected by local unemployment 
rates.  One calculation is based on research by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) that the 
logarithm of local wages is best modeled as a function of the logarithm of local unemployment.  
The other calculation is based on research by Bartik (2001) that suggests that the logarithm of 
local prices is best modeled as depending on one over the local unemployment rate.  Bartik’s 
estimates suggest that the effect of one point lower unemployment on inflation varies more 
dramatically with the local unemployment rate than is true of Blanchflower and Oswald’s 
estimates, and therefore suggests more national employment gains (losses) from reallocating 
employment to high unemployment (low unemployment) states.  
Each state’s calculation starts with the previously reported estimates of the net effects on 
jobs, from a national perspective, of the state’s economic development subsidies.  These 
previous estimates ignored possible gains from reallocating jobs across states.  I then calculate 
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the possible national jobs gains if the increased jobs in this state are required to be offset by 
reduced jobs elsewhere in the nation to keep national inflationary pressures constant.47  These 
estimates incorporating possible inflationary effects of job reallocation across states cannot be 
added across states.  Each state’s estimate assumes that the job increase in that state is offset with 
job reductions in other states, and it is therefore inconsistent to sum these effects across all 
states, which would imply that jobs were being increased in all states.  The true national benefits 
from reallocating jobs across states and thereby changing inflationary pressures would depend 
upon whatever pattern there was of adding jobs due to economic development subsidies across 
states, and would have to be calculated separately for different assumptions about economic 
development subsidies in each state. 
As this table shows, adding jobs in high unemployment states due to economic 
development subsidies can result in considerably higher job creation possibilities than in low 
unemployment areas.  In low unemployment areas, in many cases the net national effects of 
adding jobs in these areas is negative, as the model assumes that job creation in this state would 
have to be more than offset by more than one to one job reductions elsewhere.  On the other 
                                                 
47Suppose lnP = B((Js/J)f(Us) + (Jo/J)f(Uo)), where P is national price, Js is jobs in state s, J is national 
jobs, Jo is jobs in states other than s, and Us is the unemployment rate in state s, Uo is the unemployment rate in 
other states, and f is the functional form by which unemployment affects prices.  Then if we totally differentiate this 
expression with respect to Js and Jo, but assume that to maintain a viable price index the initial employment weights 
on each area are fixed, then we get dlnP = (B/J)[(df/dUs)(dUs/dlnJs) dJs + (df/dUo)(dUo/dlnJo) dJo].  We assume 
that percentage job growth has similar effects on unemployment rates in each state, which is supported by research 
(Bartik, 1991).  We then get dlnP = (B/J)(dU/dlnJ)[(df/dUs)dJs + (df/dUo)dJo].  For zero inflationary pressures to 
result from this change in Js and Jo, we must have the expression in brackets equal to zero.  Solving for Jo, we get 
dJo = −dJs[(df/dUs)/(df/dUo)].  The total change in national jobs that is consistent with zero inflationary pressures is 
given by dJ = dJs + dJo = dJs {1 − [(df/dUs)/(df/dUo)].  When f(U) = ln(U), which is Blanchflower and Oswald’s 
empirical estimate of the best function form for how unemployment affects wages, this expression in brackets is 
equal to Uo/Us.  When f(U) = −(1/U), which is what I find in Bartik (2001), then the expression in brackets is equal 
to Uo2 over Us2.  This expression gives the net national employment expansion possible by expanding employment 
in this state and offsetting it with contractions in other states.  I implement this for this study by assuming each state 
is small relative to the nation, substituting the national unemployment rate for Uo, and using 2005 state 
unemployment rates.  I assume that this effect from reallocation depends on the size of the initial gain in jobs in the 
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hand, in high unemployment areas, the national job creation effects of relocating jobs to that 
state can be one-half to two-thirds of the job creation effects that occur in that state.. 
 
Federal Intervention Issues 
Finally, one issue is whether these divergences between national effects and state effects 
justify some federal intervention.  The real issue here is whether these spillover effects that 
aren’t considered by states are optimally priced.  
In the case of preschool, there are very large spillover effects for other states and the 
nation from one state’s preschool investment.  On the other hand, there already are federal 
subsidies for preschool education.  The question is whether on the margin states perceive that 
additional spending will receive sufficient match from the federal government that they are 
sufficiently encouraged to expand their preschool investments.  Based on the analysis of the PV 
effects of preschool from a national vs. state perspective, we should want the average federal 
marginal subsidy for expanded state spending on preschool education to be about 36% (= (3.79 − 
2.78).  
For economic development subsidies, the issue is more complicated, because each state 
offers economic development subsidies.  In some theoretically perfect world, these subsidies 
offset the spillover effects.  The spillover effects really occur when firms make location 
decisions.  If each state provides the optimal subsidy that truly reflects the social benefits and 
costs of expanded employment in that state, then employment location decisions will be 
economically efficient even if no net national employment is created.  
                                                                                                                                                             
state, and that this effect is in addition to the national effects from the lower national business costs resulting from 
this one state’s economic development subsidy. 
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But several issues should be noted.  First, even if we have such a world of perfectly 
efficient economic development subsidies, the result is a significant redistribution of resources 
from the general public, that pays for the subsidies, to owners of capital.  This redistribution has 
a highly regressive effect on the income distribution.  Second, it is unclear whether states offer 
optimal economic development subsidies, equal to the true social benefits from expanded 
employment in that state.  It is disturbing that so many states with quite healthy growth and low 
unemployment also seem to engage heavily in the subsidy competition, even when the likely 
local as well as national gains from this are slight.  This suggests that in many states, economic 
development policy may have been captured by interests that favor more growth no matter the 





MAIN FINDINGS OF THIS REPORT 
 
 
In a lengthy report such as this, it is easy for readers to lose the forest for the trees.  Here 
are the main findings of the report that I think deserve special emphasis: 
$ Economic development subsidies and preschool both have about the same cost-
effectiveness in producing earnings benefits for state residents, both yielding about $3 in 
present value of earnings benefits for every dollar invested in these programs. 
 
$ In achieving economic development goals of more jobs and earnings for state residents, 
economic development programs and preschool programs should be viewed as 
complementary programs, rather than as potential substitutes for one another.  Economic 
development programs offer more immediate benefits than preschool programs over a 5- 
to 10-year-period.  Preschool programs offer more longer-term benefits than economic 
development programs.  In addition, simultaneously increasing labor demand, through 
economic development programs, and labor supply, through preschool programs, may 
make both programs more effective. 
 
$ Most of the earnings benefits of preschool are due to effects of high-quality preschool in 
increasing the future educational attainment and employability of participants in 
preschool, and their peers in K-12 education.  Other claimed economic development 
benefits of preschool education—such as the balanced budget multiplier effects of this 
spending on a state’s economy, the increase in parental labor supply from the free child 
care provided by preschool—are present but modest in size. 
 
$ The key issue in expanding preschool programs to a universal scale is what quality level 
or cost per participant is needed for these programs to truly be effective.  There is an 
immediate need for research projects that would seek a more systematic understanding of 
the relationship between preschool cost per participant, preschool quality, and participant 
outcomes.  In the interim, I think it would be wise to err on the side of spending “too 
much” per participant on universal preschool programs.  This avoids the political 
problems that would occur if a universal preschool program proved to be ineffectual. 
 
$ Targeting an expanded preschool program towards more high-risk children, who would 
presumably benefit more from preschool, raises some difficult issues of what creates 
political support for a public preschool program and whether a politically acceptable 
targeting system will actually increase net earnings benefits per dollar invested.  Simply 
restricting access to public preschool programs by middle income and upper income 
children may significantly raise the cost-effectiveness of public preschool, but requires 
taking away public preschool access from a majority of U.S. families.  The more 
politically acceptable approach of charging sliding scale fees based on family income has 
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uncertain effects on the cost-effectiveness of preschool in raising earnings.  More 
research is needed on the administrative costs of such fees and their effect on demand for 
public preschool by different groups.  There is a difficult tradeoff between increased cost 
effectiveness and reduced political support:  the greater the impact of fees on demand for 
public preschool by middle and upper income groups, the greater the increase in cost-
effectiveness of the programs, but this same reduction in demand probably leads to a 
reduction in political support for public preschool by middle and upper income families.  
Political opinions probably vary on whether overall public support would be greater for a 
totally tax-financed universal preschool system, or a universal preschool system financed 
in part with fees for higher income families. 
 
$ Taking a national perspective significantly changes our evaluation of the relative benefits 
of universal preschool and traditional economic development programs in achieving 
economic development goals.  From a national perspective, the economic development 
benefits of universal preschool significantly exceed the economic development benefits 
from an unchecked economic development war among the states.  In particular, for low 
unemployment states, the vigorous use of traditional economic development subsidies 
may actually have negative effects on the nation’s overall economic well-being.  Ideally, 
the use of traditional economic development subsidies should be targeted at high-
unemployment local economies.  Preschool education programs have benefits that go 
beyond state borders as preschool participants move to different states.  For cities, out-
migration of preschool participants is likely to be so large that local governments are 
unlikely to find preschool programs attractive as an investment in economic 
development. For states, the magnitude of the positive spillover effects of preschool 
education, due to out-migration of preschool participants, is large enough to justify a 
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Table 1  A Typology of State and Local Economic Development Programs 
1. PROGRAMS PREDOMINANTLY AIMED AT ENCOURAGING LOCATION OR EXPANSION OF FACILITIES OF LARGE 
CORPORATIONS 
Financial incentives 
 Property tax abatements 
 Tax credits, often refundable, tied to taxes paid by firm’s workers to state 
 Other tax relief, varying widely in whether “automatic” or “discretionary” 
 Industrial revenue bonds 
 Provision of land at below-market prices 
 Direct state loans 
Nonfinancial incentives to large corporations 
 Customized industrial training 
 Expedited provision of site-specific infrastructure or services 
 Help with regulatory permits: speeding up permits or relaxing regulations 
 Industrial parks 
 Tax-increment financing, allowing property taxes to be used for area-specific or firm-specific purposes 
Marketing area to new branch plants, corporate headquarters, or distribution facilities 
 Industrial development advertising 
 Marketing trips to corporate headquarters 
 Provision of site information to prospects 
2. PROGRAMS PREDOMINANTLY AIMED AT SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED BUSINESSES, EITHER EXISTING OR NEW 
Capital market programs 
 Predominantly government-financed loan or equity programs 
 Government support for predominantly privately financed loan or equity programs 
Information/education for small business 
 Small business ombudsman/information office 
 Community college classes in starting a business 
 Small business development centers 
 Entrepreneurial training programs 
 Small business incubators 
 Business visitation and surveying 
Research and high technology 
 Centers of excellence in business-related research at public universities 
 Research-oriented industrial parks 
 Applied research grants to faculty or businesses  
 Technology transfer programs/industrial extension services 
Export assistance 
 Information/training in exporting for businesses 
 Trade missions 
 Export financing 
Cluster programs/networking programs 
 Identifying local clusters as support for selective marketing and promotion, and overcoming barriers 
 Networks of small businesses working with local community colleges to design better training 
 Networks of small businesses doing cooperative marketing, shipping, and use of consultants 
3. PROGRAMS AIMED AT SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHIC AREAS, OFTEN CALLED ENTERPRISE ZONES, WITH SIZE AND 
NUMBER OF DESIGNATED ZONES VARYING WIDELY, AND WITH POTENTIALLY ALL TYPES OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS TARGETED FOR THOSE AREAS  
Tax breaks for firms locating or expanding in a designated area 
Enhanced services/ infrastructure in designated area, whether firm-specific or general 
Downtown and neighborhood business district development 
SOURCE: Adapted from Bartik (1991, 2001, 2004). 
  
Table 2 Outline of Assumptions Made in Comparing the Economic Development Effects of Traditional 
Economic Development Programs and High-Quality Preschool Programs 
 
$ Universal preschool education program compared with traditional economic development program providing 
subsidies to firms that has same present value of costs 
 
$ Universal preschool program has characteristics assumed by Karoly and Bigelow (2005) 
 
$ 70% of all 4 year olds served by this program 
$ Program provides one school-year of part-time services to all participants, which means a 3-hour per day 
program operating for 175 days per year, or 525 hours per year 
$ gross cost of program per 4 year old served is $5,856 in 2004 dollars  
$ net cost of program, after allowing for saved costs on current government preschool programs, is $4,234 
per participant in 2004 dollars.  (This slightly modifies Karoly and Bigelow assumptions; their calculations 
implicitly allowed one-third of current public preschool participants to have zero public costs, whereas I 
assume these participants had same average costs of $3,441 per participant as other public preschoolers. 
33% of all 4 year olds are assumed to already attend public preschool. $4,234 = $5,856 ! ((33/70) H 3,441)   
 
$ Without these programs, state economy has default employment and population growth rates over next 75 years 
averaging 0.3% per year, and real wage growth of 1.2% per year. (Source: Real wage growth projections come 
from the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (Holtz-Eakin, 2005); population growth projects come from the 
Board of Trustees of the Social Security program (OASDI Board of Trustees, 2005). 
 
$ Some calculations assume program that starts out with costs of $1 billion per year, and then grows with state’s 
population and economy. This hypothetical state economy would have the following initial characteristics: 
 
$ 236,183 4-year old participants in hypothetical universal preschool program (=$1 billion divided by 
$4,234) 
$ 337,404 total 4-year olds (= 236,183/0.7) 
$ 24.180 million total state population (= 337,404 times ratio of total population to 4-year olds from 2000 
U.S. Census) 
$ 9.464 million in wage and salary employment (= 337,404 times estimated ratio of non-farm employment to 
4-year olds from year 2000 Census, and ratio of wage and salary employment to non-farm employment 
from 2003 figures from Regional Economic Information System, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis) 
$ $334.5 billion in wage and salary earnings per year (= 9.464 million in wage and salary employment times 
2000 hours per year times average wage per hour of $17.67 per hour, calculated by author from 2004 
Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group data 
 
• Some calculations examine the effects of a “universal” preschool program in each state, or an economic 
development program of similar size. To scale a universal preschool program in each state, I assume that the net 
incremental costs of such a program are the same percentage in each state of wage and salary earnings in that 
state, based on the above hypothetical program. This assumes that each state is willing to pay the same 
proportion of  wage and salary earnings for a universal program as it would cost in the hypothetical state for a 
universal preschool program, or, using above calculations, 0.299% (=$1 billion/$334.5 billion). This avoids a 
great many complicated and questionable assumptions about what percentage of 4 year olds would be served in 
each state and how the wage of preschool workers varies with the state’s economy.   
  
Table 3 Assumed Changes in Unemployment Rates and Labor Force Participation Rates Over Time As 
Proportion of Job Growth Shock 
Year 
Unemployment 
rate change  
(as proportion 
of growth shock) 
Labor force participation 
rate change  
(as proportion of  
growth shock) Year 
Unemployment 
rate change  
(as proportion 
of growth shock) 
Labor force participation 
rate change  
(as proportion of  
growth shock) 
4 0.300 0.300 36 0.000 0.091 
5 0.240 0.299 37 0.000 0.085 
6 0.180 0.296 38 0.000 0.078 
7 0.120 0.293 39 0.000 0.072 
8 0.060 0.288 40 0.000 0.066 
9 0.000 0.283 41 0.000 0.061 
10 0.000 0.277 42 0.000 0.055 
11 0.000 0.271 43 0.000 0.050 
12 0.000 0.265 44 0.000 0.045 
13 0.000 0.258 45 0.000 0.040 
14 0.000 0.251 46 0.000 0.036 
15 0.000 0.244 47 0.000 0.031 
16 0.000 0.237 48 0.000 0.027 
17 0.000 0.230 49 0.000 0.024 
18 0.000 0.222 50 0.000 0.020 
19 0.000 0.215 51 0.000 0.017 
20 0.000 0.208 52 0.000 0.015 
21 0.000 0.200 53 0.000 0.013 
22 0.000 0.193 54 0.000 0.011 
23 0.000 0.185 55 0.000 0.009 
24 0.000 0.178 56 0.000 0.008 
25 0.000 0.170 57 0.000 0.006 
26 0.000 0.163 58 0.000 0.005 
27 0.000 0.155 59 0.000 0.004 
28 0.000 0.148 60 0.000 0.003 
29 0.000 0.140 61 0.000 0.003 
30 0.000 0.133 62 0.000 0.002 
31 0.000 0.126 63 0.000 0.002 
32 0.000 0.119 64 0.000 0.001 
33 0.000 0.112 65 0.000 0.001 
34 0.000 0.105 66 0.000 0.000 
35 0.000 0.098    
NOTES: Dating system used is that first year in which policy changes is year 4, dated after age of first cohort that might 
experience universal preschool.  The unemployment rate and labor force participation rate effects here are proportion of jobs 
created that go to lower unemployment and raise labor force participation of original state residents. The initial unemployment 
rate effects and fading over five years are calibrated to roughly match what is observed in research estimated by Bartik (1991), 
Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Bartik (1993), and reviewed by Bartik (1993). The initial labor force participation rate effect also 
matches this research. This effect is faded over time by multiplying initial effect by proportion over time of initial state residents 
in workforce estimated to survive and stay in state. This is calculated separately for each age of initial workforce, weighted by 
each age’s estimated share of total state employment. Predicted proportion for next year derived by using: U.S. year to year life 
survival tables from National Vital Statistics Report 53(6), November 10, 2004, Table 1; estimated proportion of each age in state 
one year that is not in state next year based on estimates derived from PUMS data and PSID, using information on proportion 
staying in birth state from PUMS and age-4 state from PSID, as explained later in this report; age-specific employment rates used 
to calculate overall surviving in-state employed population. The labor force participation rate fading that results is roughly 
consistent with empirical results showing that initial labor force participation rates only modestly decline after shock for at least 
first 17 years after shock (Bartik 1993), which would be year 21 in this dating system.  
  










millions of year 
2004 dollars) 
Percentage of real 
earnings effect 
due to effect on 
employment rates 










millions of year 
2004 dollars) 
Percentage of real 
earnings effect 
due to effect on 
employment rates 
(Remainder due 
to increased  
wage rates) 
3 0 0.0  41 432 47.6 54.6 
4 4286 216.0 70.6 42 393 43.4 54.6 
5 3849 203.5 68.4 43 356 39.5 54.6 
6 3403 190.3 65.9 44 322 35.7 54.6 
7 2949 176.3 62.9 45 288 31.9 54.6 
8 2488 161.4 59.2 46 256 28.3 54.6 
9 2022 145.4 54.6 47 225 24.8 54.6 
10 1982 145.6 54.6 48 196 21.5 54.6 
11 1938 145.5 54.6 49 169 18.5 54.6 
12 1892 144.9 54.6 50 145 15.8 54.6 
13 1843 144.1 54.6 51 124 13.3 54.6 
14 1794 142.8 54.6 52 105 11.2 54.6 
15 1744 141.2 54.6 53 90 9.4 54.6 
16 1692 139.4 54.6 54 76 8.0 54.6 
17 1640 137.4 54.6 55 64 6.8 54.6 
18 1589 135.2 54.6 56 54 5.7 54.6 
19 1537 132.8 54.6 57 45 4.7 54.6 
20 1484 130.1 54.6 58 37 3.9 54.6 
21 1430 127.2 54.6 59 30 3.2 54.6 
22 1376 124.2 54.6 60 25 2.6 54.6 
23 1323 121.0 54.6 61 20 2.1 54.6 
24 1269 117.5 54.6 62 16 1.7 54.6 
25 1216 114.0 54.6 63 12 1.3 54.6 
26 1163 110.4 54.6 64 9 1.0 54.6 
27 1110 106.6 54.6 65 6 0.7 54.6 
28 1056 102.5 54.6 66 0 0.0  
29 1003 98.5 54.6 67 0 0.0  
30 951 94.5 54.6 68 0 0.0  
31 899 90.2 54.6 69 0 0.0  
32 848 86.0 54.6 70 0 0.0  
33 798 81.7 54.6 71 0 0.0  
34 749 77.5 54.6 72 0 0.0  
35 701 73.2 54.6 73 0 0.0  
36 654 69.0 54.6 74 0 0.0  
37 607 64.6 54.6 75 0 0.0  
38 561 60.3 54.6 76 0 0.0  
39 516 56.0 54.6 77 0 0.0  
40 473 51.7 54.6 78 0 0.0  
    79 0 0.0  
NOTES: Table shows estimated effects on jobs and real earnings of original state residents who survive and stay in state of one-
time commitment of $1 billion in present value of year 2004 dollars to economic development subsidies. Under assumptions 
made in report, effects are scaleable to different resource commitments to economic development subsidies. 
  
Table 5 Jobs and Earnings Generated for State Residents From Ongoing Economic Development Program Equivalent in Size to Universal Preschool 
Program  
Jobs generated Real earnings generated Jobs generated Real earnings generated 
 
Year 
Absolute no. of jobs 




of baseline state 
employment 
In millions of year 
2004 dollars, per $1 
billion initial subsidy, 
growing w/economy
As percentage of 
baseline state wage 
and salary earnings 
 Year 
Absolute no. of jobs 
per $1 billion initial 
subsidy, growing 
w/economy 
As percentage of 
baseline state 
employment 
In millions of year 
2004 dollars, per $1 
billion initial subsidy, 
growing w/economy
As percentage of 
baseline state wage 
and salary earnings 
3 0 0.00 0.0 0.00 41 61638 0.58 6349.5 1.09 
4 4286 0.05 216.0 0.06 42 62216 0.59 6488.4 1.10 
5 8148 0.09 422.7 0.12 43 62759 0.59 6625.5 1.11 
6 11575 0.12 619.4 0.18 44 63269 0.59 6760.8 1.11 
7 14558 0.15 805.1 0.23 45 63747 0.60 6894.4 1.12 
8 17090 0.18 978.5 0.28 46 64195 0.60 7026.5 1.12 
9 19163 0.20 1138.6 0.32 47 64612 0.60 7156.9 1.13 
10 21203 0.22 1301.3 0.36 48 65002 0.60 7286.0 1.13 
11 23204 0.24 1466.3 0.39 49 65366 0.60 7414.1 1.13 
12 25166 0.26 1633.3 0.43 50 65707 0.60 7541.3 1.13 
13 27084 0.28 1801.9 0.47 51 66027 0.61 7668.1 1.14 
14 28959 0.30 1971.9 0.51 52 66331 0.61 7794.6 1.14 
15 30790 0.31 2142.8 0.54 53 66619 0.61 7921.1 1.14 
16 32574 0.33 2314.4 0.58 54 66896 0.61 8048.2 1.14 
17 34313 0.35 2486.6 0.61 55 67161 0.61 8176.0 1.14 
18 36004 0.36 2659.1 0.65 56 67416 0.61 8304.6 1.14 
19 37649 0.38 2831.9 0.68 57 67663 0.61 8434.2 1.14 
20 39247 0.40 3004.6 0.71 58 67903 0.61 8564.9 1.14 
21 40795 0.41 3177.0 0.74 59 68137 0.61 8696.9 1.14 
22 42294 0.42 3348.9 0.77 60 68366 0.61 8830.2 1.14 
23 43743 0.44 3520.3 0.79 61 68592 0.61 8965.1 1.14 
24 45144 0.45 3690.8 0.82 62 68813 061 9101.6 1.14 
25 46496 0.46 3860.3 0.84 63 69032 0.61 9239.8 1.15 
26 47798 0.47 4028.7 0.87 64 69248 0.61 9379.7 1.15 
27 49052 0.48 4195.8 0.89 65 69462 0.61 9521.5 1.15 
28 50255 0.49 4361.5 0.91 66 69671 0.61 9664.6 1.15 
29 51409 0.50 4525.5 0.93 67 69880 0.61 9809.9 1.15 
30 52514 0.51 4688.1 0.95 68 70089 0.61 9957.4 1.15 
31 53571 0.52 4848.8 0.97 69 70299 0.61 10107.2 1.15 
32 54580 0.53 5007.7 0.99 70 70510 0.61 10259.1 1.15 
33 55542 0.54 5164.7 1.00 71 70722 0.61 10413.4 1.15 
34 56458 0.55 5319.9 1.02 72 70934 0.61 10570.0 1.15 
35 57329 0.55 5473.1 1.03 73 71147 0.61 10728.9 1.15 
36 58154 0.56 5624.3 1.04 74 71360 0.61 10890.2 1.15 
37 58935 0.56 5773.6 1.05 75 71574 0.61 11054.0 1.15 
38 59673 0.57 5920.7 1.07 76 71789 0.61 11220.2 1.15 
39 60368 0.57 6065.7 1.08 77 72004 0.61 11388.9 1.15 
40 61023 0.58 6208.6 1.08 78 72220 0.61 11560.1 1.15 
     79 72437 0.61 11733.9 1.15 
NOTES: Table shows effects on jobs and real earnings of state residents of an economic development subsidy program that each year from initial year (year 4) to 75 years later 
(year 79) devotes resources to economic development subsidy program equal in present value to what would be cost of universal preschool program. The absolute jobs and real 
earnings in millions generated are for program in hypothetical state in which this economic development subsidy program had present value of $1 billion in year 4, and grows with 
economy at 1.5% per year for next 75 years. This can be scaled up or down to any economic development subsidy program that grows at 1.5% annually and is in a state with 
typical growth and migration trends.  The percentage numbers would apply to the typical state that adopted subsidy program equivalent in size to universal preschool program.
Table 6 Long-Run Effects of Traditional Economic Development Subsidies on Various Aspects of Economic Development from Each State’s 
Perspective 
State 
Assumed annual economic 
development subsidy costs 
(in millions of 2004 dollars)
PV of real earnings 
generated  divided by 
PV of costs 
Long-run effect on 
number of jobs 
Long-run effects on annual 
real earnings (in millions of 
2004 dollars) 
Long-run effect on annual 
gross state product (in 
millions of 2004 dollars) 
Long-run effect on 
annual state and local tax 
revenue (in millions of 
2004 dollars) 
Alabama 179.9 3.14 12304 691.3 1606.6 126.2 
Alaska 35.5 3.04 1952 131.3 376.6 26.2 
Arizona 246.9 3.15 15293 953.0 2307.0 192.2 
Arkansas 99.2 3.07 7307 372.2 907.7 81.7 
California 1903.8 3.20 99007 7475.1 18203.2 1607.6 
Colorado 250.2 3.10 13902 946.8 2262.3 173.5 
Connecticut 235.8 3.12 10483 899.0 2117.9 191.5 
Delaware 50.4 3.10 2672 191.0 614.4 35.1 
District of Columbia 124.9 2.78 3803 418.6 768.3 36.9 
Florida 759.8 3.18 49357 2959.5 6975.7 599.4 
Georgia 422.6 3.17 25662 1645.0 3993.2 312.5 
Hawaii 64.6 3.10 3989 245.0 570.8 55.2 
Idaho 51.3 3.05 3787 191.0 484.7 41.7 
Illinois 689.3 3.12 36718 2632.6 5958.7 510.5 
Indiana 282.0 3.15 18555 1086.3 2620.9 219.0 
Iowa 131.1 3.07 9116 492.3 1247.5 106.2 
Kansas 124.9 3.05 8398 465.2 1102.1 97.8 
Kentucky 168.3 3.12 11512 643.0 1558.5 138.1 
Louisiana 173.9 3.16 12533 674.1 1772.1 160.7 
Maine 55.0 3.13 3880 210.3 495.5 57.7 
Maryland 306.1 3.14 16277 1177.1 2621.4 256.8 
Massachusetts 436.2 3.12 20285 1667.9 3633.0 302.3 
Michigan 490.9 3.18 28038 1912.4 4334.5 383.4 
Minnesota 299.8 3.16 17090 1160.3 2590.1 239.9 
Mississippi 93.3 3.08 7265 351.7 857.9 81.6 
Missouri 265.2 3.12 17177 1013.8 2323.3 187.8 
Montana 33.1 3.03 2569 122.5 304.0 27.1 
Nebraska 82.9 3.05 5689 308.8 759.6 66.7 
Nevada 123.0 3.10 7219 466.6 1137.4 88.8 
New Hampshire 68.3 3.09 3909 257.7 585.4 45.7 
New Jersey 528.5 3.11 24808 2012.3 4735.8 434.1 
New Mexico 72.2 3.08 4995 271.6 686.6 62.7 
New York 1175.0 3.10 52768 4460.3 10176.0 1126.5 
North Carolina 384.8 3.18 25492 1503.1 3928.6 294.4 
North Dakota 28.0 2.98 2051 101.5 245.5 21.2 
Ohio 548.2 3.16 34510 2120.9 4856.5 455.4 
Oklahoma 128.8 3.08 9284 485.5 1212.0 111.6 
Oregon 161.6 3.12 10275 617.7 1463.9 114.4 
Pennsylvania 605.3 3.15 35956 2331.7 5390.4 477.4 
Rhode Island 51.5 3.08 3056 193.9 469.6 45.9 
South Carolina 167.0 3.15 11935 644.3 1570.3 125.2 
South Dakota 30.9 3.01 2350 113.4 322.0 23.0 
Table 6 (Continued) 
 
State 
Assumed annual economic 
development subsidy costs 
(in millions of 2004 dollars)
PV of real earnings 
generated  divided by 
PV of costs 
Long-run effect on 
number of jobs 
Long-run effects on annual 
real earnings (in millions of 
2004 dollars) 
Long-run effect on annual 
gross state product (in 
millions of 2004 dollars) 
Long-run effect on 
annual state and local tax 
revenue (in millions of 
2004 dollars) 
Tennessee 264.5 3.15 17346 1021.6 2513.3 170.4 
Texas 1035.9 3.22 62919 4096.4 10452.6 795.0 
Utah 101.5 3.16 7151 392.5 955.0 78.1 
Vermont 28.5 3.08 1919 107.0 246.2 24.9 
Virginia 424.5 3.13 23505 1628.0 3775.6 289.3 
Washington 324.8 3.15 18132 1255.1 3021.4 252.0 
West Virginia 60.0 3.03 4308 221.4 545.6 56.1 
Wisconsin 269.9 3.17 17949 1050.7 2462.4 241.8 
Wyoming 22.9 2.96 1534 82.4 258.1 23.1 
United States 14662.2 3.14 847995 56472.7 134377.8 11672.6 
       
NOTES:  Annual economic development subsidy costs are assumed to equal the costs of universal preschool. This is calibrated, as mentioned in Table 2, based on the assumption 
that costs of such a universal program will be 0.299% of state wage and salary earnings. The present value of real earnings generated is calculated by adjusting the state’s PV based 
on the state residents’ tendency to move out compared to the average state. Specifically, as shown in Chapter 5, the PV ratio in an “average state” without migration would be 3.36, 
whereas in a state with normal out-migration this PV ratio is 3.14. To adjust for differential out-migration, we multiply 3.36 by the following ratio: 3.36[1 − ((3.36 − 3.14) / 3.36) H 
R], where R = (% born in state who leave state) / (% born in U.S. who leave state)]. The percentage born in state who leave the state is based on the 2000 U.S. Census Public Use 
Microdata files, which reports both birth state and current state of residence, and is based on all U.S. residents born in the U.S. The effect on jobs is based on the percentage effects 
on jobs reported in Table 5 as of year 79, that is after the program has been in effect for 75 years. However, the percentage effect is calculated by considering the state’s wage and 
salary employment as of 2004. Therefore, this effect on jobs should be considered the effects that would have occurred as of 2004 if the program had been in effect for 75 years. 
The percentage effect is also adjusted for differential out-migration in each state. That is, as the long-run percentage effect on employment after 75 years without out-migration is 
calculated to be 0.66%, and the average U.S. effect with out-migration is calculated to be 0.61%, the percentage effect actually used is adjusted by % job effect = 0.66[1 − ((0.66 − 
0.61) / 0.66) H R].  The effect on earnings is also derived from the percentage effect on real earnings after 75 years in Table 5 of 1.15%, and wage and salary earnings in the state as 
of 2004. Wage and salary earnings is, however, adjusted to wage and salary employment so that the average hourly wage rate is $17.67 per hour, as explained in Table 2. Each 
state’s percentage effect is also adjusted based on the state’s differential out-migration. Long-run percentage effects on real earnings without any out-migration is 1.24%, whereas 
the typical state’s percentage effect, based on Table 5, is 1.15%. Therefore the percentage effect on real earnings in each state is equal to 1.24[1 − ((1.24 − 1.15) / 1.24) H R]. The 
effects on real gross state product are based on the ratio of each state’s GSP to real wage and salary earnings. Figures for state GSP are for 2004 and come from the Regional 
Economic Information System of the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Figures for state and local tax revenue are based on the ratio of state and 
local tax revenue to GSP in each state. State and local tax revenues are for fiscal year 2001–2002, and come from the U.S. Census of Governments; real GSP figures for this ratio 
are for 2002.  The U.S. totals sum what each state perceives as the effects on its jobs, earnings, GSP, and tax revenue. These U.S. totals do not reflect the actual national effects 
after allowing for spillover effects on other states of each state=s economic development program, as explained in Chapter 5. 
 
  
Table 7 Assumptions About How Enrollment in Universal Preschool is Divided Among Different Groups 
How group affected by 
universal preschool program 
High risk: 






> $50K  
family income Total all risk groups
In public now, none 
otherwise 
5% of 4-year-olds 
(100% benefits) 
3% (50%) 7% (25%) 15% 
In public now, lower-cost 
public otherwise 
12% (50%  8% (25%) 13% (0%) 33% 
In public now, private 
otherwise 
1% (0%) 3% (0% ) 18% (0%) 22% 
Total in public program now 18%  14% 38% 70% 
Private now 1% 2% 7% 10% 
Total in preschool now 19% 16% 45% 80% 
None now 6% 4% 10% 20% 
Total in risk group 25% 20% 55% 100% 
NOTES: The first number in each cell is the percentage of all 4-year-olds in that cell. The number in parentheses in the nine cells 
in upper quadrant is the percentage of benefits the group in that cell gets, compared to the benefits assumed for high-risk group 
members who otherwise would not be in any preschool. The columns divide up all 4-year-olds by their family income. The rows 
divide up all 4-year-olds by whether they are enrolled in the universal preschool program, and by what type of preschool, if any, 
they would have been enrolled in if the universal preschool program did not exist. For example, for the high risk group, the 
bottom row shows that this group constitutes 25% of all 4-year-olds. The top row for the high risk group shows that 5% of all 4-
year-olds are high-risk group members who enroll in the universal preschool program, but would otherwise have not been 





Table 8 Balanced Budget Multiplier Effects of Permanent Universal Preschool Education Program on Jobs and Earnings in a State’s Economy 
Job generation effects Real earnings generation effects Job generation effects Real earnings generation effects 
 
Year 
Per $1 billion of 
initial state 
spending 
As % of baseline 
employment in 
state 
In millions of 2004 
dollars, per $1 
billion of initial 
state spending 
As % of baseline 
real earnings in 
state  
Year
Per $1 billion of 
initial state 
spending 
As % of baseline 
employment in 
state 
In millions of 2004 
dollars, per $1 
billion of initial 
state spending 
As % of baseline 
real earnings in 
state 
3 0 0.000 0.0 0.000 41 492 0.005 53.1 0.009 
4 3425 0.036 172.6 0.052 42 462 0.004 50.1 0.008 
5 3085 0.033 163.1 0.048 43 434 0.004 47.3 0.008 
6 2738 0.029 153.1 0.044 44 408 0.004 44.6 0.007 
7 2384 0.025 142.4 0.041 45 382 0.004 41.9 0.007 
8 2023 0.021 130.9 0.037 46 357 0.003 39.4 0.006 
9 1657 0.017 118.5 0.033 47 334 0.003 36.8 0.006 
10 1629 0.017 119.1 0.033 48 311 0.003 34.6 0.005 
11 1600 0.017 119.4 0.032 49 291 0.003 32.5 0.005 
12 1567 0.016 119.4 0.032 50 272 0.003 30.6 0.005 
13 1533 0.016 119.1 0.031 51 256 0.002 28.9 0.004 
14 1498 0.015 118.5 0.031 52 243 0.002 27.6 0.004 
15 1463 0.015 117.6 0.030 53 231 0.002 26.4 0.004 
16 1426 0.015 116.6 0.029 54 221 0.002 25.6 0.004 
17 1389 0.014 115.4 0.028 55 212 0.002 24.9 0.003 
18 1352 0.014 114.0 0.028 56 204 0.002 24.4 0.003 
19 1314 0.013 112.5 0.027 57 197 0.002 23.9 0.003 
20 1276 0.013 110.8 0.026 58 192 0.002 23.6 0.003 
21 1237 0.012 108.9 0.025 59 187 0.002 23.3 0.003 
22 1198 0.012 107.0 0.024 60 183 0.002 23.2 0.003 
23 1158 0.012 104.8 0.024 61 180 0.002 23.1 0.003 
24 1119 0.011 102.5 0.023 62 177 0.002 23.1 0.003 
25 1080 0.011 100.1 0.022 63 175 0.002 23.1 0.003 
26 1041 0.010 97.5 0.021 64 173 0.002 23.2 0.003 
27 1002 0.010 94.9 0.020 65 171 0.002 23.3 0.003 
28 962 0.009 92.1 0.019 66 167 0.001 23.1 0.003 
29 922 0.009 89.3 0.018 67 167 0.001 23.4 0.003 
30 883 0.009 86.5 0.018 68 168 0.001 23.8 0.003 
31 844 0.008 83.5 0.017 69 168 0.001 24.2 0.003 
32 806 0.008 80.5 0.016 70 169 0.001 24.5 0.003 
33 769 0.007 77.4 0.015 71 169 0.001 24.9 0.003 
34 732 0.007 74.4 0.014 72 170 0.001 25.3 0.003 
35 695 0.007 71.4 0.013 73 170 0.001 25.6 0.003 
36 660 0.006 68.4 0.013 74 171 0.001 26.0 0.003 
37 624 0.006 65.3 0.012 75 171 0.001 26.4 0.003 
38 589 0.006 62.2 0.011 76 172 0.001 26.8 0.003 
39 556 0.005 59.1 0.010 77 172 0.001 27.2 0.003 
40 523 0.005 56.0 0.010 78 173 0.001 27.6 0.003 
     79 173 0.001 28.0 0.003 
NOTES: Effects shown are the net effects on the employment and real earnings of the original state residents of a permanent universal preschool program. Two of the columns 
show absolute numbers of jobs generated and real earnings generated, for a program scaled to $1 billion in initial net new state spending and taxes, which will then grow at 1.5% 
per year. This can be rescaled to whatever spending is required in another state. The other two columns show effects as a percentage of baseline employment and real earnings in 
the state of a universal preschool program with the characteristics assumed under the baseline assumptions of this report. This should be valid for all states that adopt a universal 
preschool program with similar spending per participant and offsets from displaced public spending and private spending as are assumed here. For characteristics of a state’s 
program with radically different spending per participant or offsets, the figures per $1 billion should be rescaled to the required net new public spending for that state’s program, 
and the percentage numbers should be recalculated based on that state’s total employment and earnings.  
  
Table 9 Preschool’s Effects in Generating Jobs and Earnings for State Residents By Increasing the Labor 
Supply of Parents by Providing Free Child Care to Participants 
Year 
Jobs generated via free 
child care per $1 
billion of spending on 
universal preschool 
Real earnings generated 
via free child care, in 
millions of 2004 $, per 
$1 billion of spending 
on universal preschool  Year
Jobs generated via free 
child care per $1 billion 
of spending on 
universal preschool 
Real earnings generated 
via free child care, in 
millions of 2004 $, per $1 
billion of spending on 
universal preschool 
3 0 0.0 41 2709 91.4 
4 2425 52.6 42 2717 92.7 
5 2432 53.4 43 2726 94.1 
6 2440 54.2 44 2734 95.6 
7 2447 55.0 45 2742 97.0 
8 2454 55.8 46 2750 98.4 
9 2462 56.7 47 2758 99.9 
10 2469 57.5 48 2767 101.4 
11 2476 58.4 49 2775 103.0 
12 2484 59.3 50 2783 104.5 
13 2491 60.2 51 2792 106.1 
14 2499 61.1 52 2800 107.7 
15 2506 62.0 53 2808 109.3 
16 2514 62.9 54 2817 110.9 
17 2521 63.9 55 2825 112.6 
18 2529 64.8 56 2834 114.3 
19 2536 65.8 57 2842 116.0 
20 2544 66.8 58 2851 117.8 
21 2552 67.8 59 2859 119.5 
22 2559 68.8 60 2868 121.3 
23 2567 69.8 61 2877 123.1 
24 2575 70.9 62 2885 125.0 
25 2582 72.0 63 2894 126.9 
26 2590 73.0 64 2902 128.8 
27 2598 74.1 65 2911 130.7 
28 2606 75.3 66 2920 132.7 
29 2614 76.4 67 2929 134.7 
30 2621 77.5 68 2937 136.7 
31 2629 78.7 69 2946 138.8 
32 2637 79.9 70 2955 140.9 
33 2645 81.1 71 2964 143.0 
34 2653 82.3 72 2973 145.1 
35 2661 83.5 73 2982 147.3 
36 2669 84.8 74 2991 149.5 
37 2677 86.1 75 3000 151.8 
38 2685 87.4 76 3009 154.0 
39 2693 88.7 77 3018 156.4 
40 2701 90.0 78 3027 158.7 
   79 3036 161.1 
NOTES: The effects generated as a percentage of state jobs and earnings are constant for all years from year 4 to year 79.  The 
job effect of free child care, as a percentage of total state jobs, is 0.0256%. The earnings generation effect of free child care, as a 
percentage of total state earnings, is 0.0157%. The earnings generation effect is particularly low because of the assumption that 
the wage paid to the additional labor supply is at the 40th percentile of women’s wages, which is considerably below overall 
average wages. 
  
Table 10 Observed and Projected Effects of Perry Preschool and Chicago Child-Parent Centers on Educational Attainment 





















Perry Preschool               
HS dropout % 33 55 !22       28 47 !19 23 40 !17 
HS only % 67 45 22       69 51 18 68 55 13 
Assocs or bachelors degree % 0 0 0       3 2 1 9 5 4 
Chicago CPC               
HS dropout %    50 62 !12 38 49 !11 (37) (47) (!10) (31) (40) (!9) 
HS only %    50 38 12 62 51 11 (60) (51) (9) (61) (55) (6) 
Assocs or bachelors degree %    0 0 0 0 0 0 (3) (2) (1) (8) (5) (3) 
NOTE: The figures in the cells are percentages of the control and program groups for the Perry Preschool program, and the Chicago CPC program, at different ages in various educational 
attainment categories. The numbers without parentheses are actually observed percentages. The numbers in parentheses are projections by this author. The data for the Perry Preschool 
program reported here for ages 19, 27, and 40 are based on the program statistics presented on Table 3.1 on p. 52 of Schweinhart et al., 2005. The data for ages 20 and 21 for the Chicago 
Child Parent Center are based on the program statistics presented on Table 4 on p. 279 of Reynolds et al. 2002. The figures presented in this table for a CPC-like program for ages 27 and 40 
are the author’s projections based on the Perry Preschool figures and the CPC figures. The high school drop-out results for a CPC-like program for ages 27 and 40 are based on the 
observation that the effects of the CPC program on high school dropouts at ages 20 and 21 average a little more than half of the Perry Preschool program’s effects on high school dropouts at 
age 19. Carrying this differential forward into the future, I assume that a CPC-like program would have a little more than half of the Perry Preschool program’s effects on high school 
dropouts as of ages 27 and 40, which implies, as seems reasonable, that the program’s effects in reducing high school dropouts decay somewhat over time as the control group catches up to 
the program group. In addition, because the average high school dropout rates for the CPC control group at ages 20 and 21 are similar to those of the Perry Preschool control group at age 19, 
I assume that the control group for a CPC-like program would have similar dropout rates to the Perry Preschool program at ages 27 and 40. This also makes sense because both programs 
target a similar disadvantaged clientele, and by definition the control group has not experienced either program. Finally, associate/bachelor degrees projected percentages for a CPC-like 
program at ages 27 and 40 are derived by assuming that the Perry Preschool data on the proportion of high school graduates completing one of these college degrees for the program and 
control groups, respectively, can be applied to the projected CPC data. For example, at age 40, 9 / 77 = 11.7% of all Perry program group high school graduates had succeeded in getting an 
associates’ degree or bachelors’ degree. Multiplying 11.7% times the projected percentage of high school graduates at age 40 for a CPC-like program of 69% yields a projection of 8%.  
 
  
Table 11 Employment Rate Effects of the Perry Preschool Program: Predicted Effects Based on the 

























control group for 
CPC program 
19 Program group 51.7 50   
 Control group 49.0 32   
 Difference 2.7 18 15.3 31.2 15.6 
      
27 Program group 72.5 69   
 Control group 70.1 56   
 
Difference 2.4 13 10.6 15.2 7.7 
(half of average 
of 15.2 and 15.8)
      
40 Program group 77.8 76   
 Control group 75.8 62   
 Difference 2.0 14 12.0 15.8 
NOTE: This table first predicts employment rates of program and control group in Perry Preschool program at different ages 
based on proportion of program and control group in three educational attainment categories (high school dropout, high school 
degree but no higher degree, associates’ degree or higher) and data from 2004 Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation 
Group on average employment rate, at time of monthly survey, of individuals in each of these three educational attainment 
groups. The table also reports the employment rates actually observed for the program and control groups. Educational 
attainment figures for Perry Preschool come from Table 3.1, p. 52, Schweinhart et al. (2005). Employment rate figures for Perry 
Preschool come from Table 4.1, p. 74, Schweinhart et al. (2005) and from Barnett (1993). As seen in the table, the observed 
employment rate difference between program and control groups is much larger than would be predicted based on educational 
attainment. All of the greater observed difference occurs because the Perry control group has a lower employment rate than 
would be predicted based on  its economic status, which presumably reflects the disadvantaged status of this target group. The 
Perry program group has a very similar employment rate to what would be predicted based on educational attainment. The 
implication is that the program allows participants to overcome the disadvantages in employability due to their disadvantaged 
background and obtain jobs similarly to their educational counterparts. The table also calculates the unpredicted employment rate 
difference as a percent of the control group predicted mean. I also calculate half of this difference as a percentage of the control 
group mean. For calculations of employment rate effects of a CPC-like preschool education program, I assume that its 
unpredicted employment rate effects should be about half the size of those of the Perry Preschool program, as the CPC program 
has about half the educational attainment effects of the Perry Preschool program. In the simulations, this is operationalized by 
adjusting down the predicted control group employment rates by the percentage in the right most column. The first percentage 
given is used from ages 16–19, the second percentage given is used for ages 27 and up, and for years in-between 19 and 27, the 
percentage is assumed to change at a steady rate. One advantage of this simulation is that the extra employment rate shock of 
preschool education is assumed to gradually decline as control group employment rates decline with age, which seems 
reasonable.     
 
Table 12 Percentage Living in Same State, Different Educational Attainment Groups, Based on Data from the Panel Survey on Income Dynamics and 
Census PUMS data  
PSID: % living in same state as at age 4 PUMS: % living in same state as state of birth 
Age 
Education 
























program group at 
each age 





adjusted to PSID 
concept of 
percentage in 
state as lived in at 




16 85.8 87.3 84.0 85.8 78.7 74.5 69.6 78.7 109.0 85.1 
17 87.7 87.7 82.8 87.7 79.1 78.1 70.7 79.1 110.9 85.5 
18 85.2 85.2 82.9 85.2 78.4 71.2 73.0 78.4 108.6 84.8 
19 84.8 85.9 87.1 85.3 78.4 70.6 70.7 74.5 114.6 80.5 
20 81.9 83.9 88.4 82.9 77.8 70.9 71.2 74.4 111.5 80.4 
21 79.2 82.9 89.6 81.5 76.9 70.0 70.0 72.6 112.3 78.5 
22 79.0 80.4 81.4 79.9 77.0 70.0 65.3 72.6 110.0 78.5 
23 85.5 79.2 71.3 81.5 76.0 70.7 63.0 72.6 112.2 78.5 
24 86.3 77.3 65.2 80.5 76.2 70.8 61.2 72.6 110.8 78.5 
25 88.7 77.0 61.0 81.1 74.8 69.6 59.2 71.3 113.6 77.1 
26 84.2 75.5 58.6 78.3 75.4 69.3 58.4 71.3 109.8 77.0 
27 82.1 75.0 57.5 77.1 74.3 69.2 57.7 70.8 109.0 76.5 
28 82.6 73.5 58.0 76.3 73.3 68.7 57.1 70.0 109.0 75.7 
29 84.6 74.6 60.6 77.7 73.9 68.3 56.1 69.9 111.1 75.6 
30 74.3 71.8 59.2 72.2 72.4 67.7 55.6 68.9 104.8 74.4 
31 80.4 72.0 61.4 74.5 72.0 67.6 55.4 68.6 108.6 74.1 
32 82.8 70.9 59.1 74.4 72.2 67.8 55.0 68.7 108.3 74.3 
33 87.3 76.0 60.5 79.0 72.7 67.5 55.1 68.6 115.1 74.2 
34 62.1 70.8 57.2 67.1 72.0 67.6 54.9 68.3 98.2 73.8 
35 86.7 73.0 57.7 76.6 71.6 66.6 54.6 67.6 113.5 73.0 
36 46.1 69.9 54.2 61.1 71.9 66.2 53.6 67.2 90.8 72.7 
37 83.9 70.2 52.4 73.4 70.7 66.1 53.3 66.7 110.0 72.1 
38 42.6 62.6 54.9 55.6 71.4 66.4 53.6 67.1 82.9 72.5 
39 75.3 73.8 57.5 73.0 70.7 66.3 53.3 66.7 109.6 72.1 
40     70.7 66.2 53.1 66.5  71.9 
41     70.3 66.2 52.6 66.4  71.7 
42     70.5 65.9 52.9 66.3  71.6 
43     70.6 66.0 52.4 66.3  71.7 
44     71.1 65.8 52.0 66.4  71.7 
45     69.6 65.2 51.9 65.5  70.8 
46     70.2 64.7 52.2 65.4  70.7 
47     69.9 64.8 51.8 65.4  70.6 
48     69.9 64.4 51.7 65.1  70.4 
49     69.1 64.0 51.6 64.6  69.8 
50     69.1 63.4 51.7 64.2  69.4 
51     68.9 63.5 50.9 64.2  69.4 
52     69.0 62.6 49.7 63.5  68.7 
53     67.8 62.5 48.6 63.0  68.1 
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PSID: % living in same state as at age 4 PUMS: % living in same state as state of birth 
Age 
Education 
























program group at 
each age 





adjusted to PSID 
concept of 
percentage in 
state as lived in at 




54     67.6 60.9 46.6 61.9  66.9 
55     67.5 59.5 44.9 60.8  65.7 
56     66.0 60.3 45.0 60.9  65.8 
57     66.8 60.5 45.4 61.2  66.2 
58     67.0 60.7 45.7 61.5  66.4 
59     64.8 60.0 44.9 60.3  65.2 
60     66.2 59.9 45.7 60.7  65.6 
61     65.4 59.6 45.3 60.3  65.2 
62     65.5 60.0 45.7 60.6  65.5 
63     65.0 59.7 44.6 60.1  65.0 
64     65.3 59.6 44.8 60.2  65.0 
65     64.6 59.0 45.4 59.6  64.4 
66     64.8 59.2 45.3 59.8  64.6 
67     64.9 58.8 45.6 59.6  64.4 
68     64.7 59.5 44.7 59.9  64.8 
69     64.9 58.8 45.8 59.7  64.5 
70     64.8 58.7 45.6 59.6  64.4 
71     64.9 58.4 45.3 59.3  64.1 
72     64.8 58.6 44.7 59.4  64.2 
73     64.2 58.0 45.1 58.9  63.6 
74     64.5 58.0 44.6 58.9  63.7 
75     65.1 57.1 45.4 58.6  63.4 
76     64.8 57.1 43.6 58.4  63.1 
77     64.6 56.8 45.1 58.3  63.0 
78     64.7 56.4 43.8 58.0  62.7 
79     64.5 56.6 44.2 58.1  62.8 
NOTES: This table reports data from two sources on how inclined different educational groups are to stay in same state as they lived in at an early age. From the Panel Survey of 
Income Dynamics, I follow all 4-year-olds in the broadly representative Survey Research Center sample in the years 1968–1977 until they are last observed in the PSID, which 
currently runs until 2003. Given the years in which I select 4-year-olds, the sample size starts to rapidly fall off after age 30; (the 4-year-olds in 1977 are age 30 in 2003, so 
observations on 31-year-olds only use 4-year-olds from 1968–1976, etc. Total sample size is 953 as of age 16, drops off gradually with sample attrition to 578 at age 30, and then 
rapidly declines to zero by age 40. For three different educational attainment groups, I calculate the weighted percentage (using sample weights) of individuals at different ages 
who live in the same state they lived in at age 4. Educational attainment is measured based on last observed educational attainment. The educational classifications are based on 
total years of education completed, which does not exactly correspond to the categorization by degree attainment. I use 16 years or greater as the cutoff for education beyond 
college because the available information indicates that most individuals with from 13 to 15 years of completed education do not have an associates degree or a bachelors degree. 
For example, according to Table 1, p. 37 in Kominski and Siegel (1993), only 36% of those individuals with 14 completed years of school have an associates degree or higher, and 
only 28% of those with 15 completed years of school has an associates degree or higher. In contrast, 95% of those with 16 years of school have an associates degree or higher.  For 
PSID individuals who eventually graduate from college, the percentage living in same state as they lived in at age 4 is artificially inflated for the college attendance years, as the 
PSID does not record information on members of household who are away attending college. However, the PSID does collect data on these individuals again once they complete 
college. The weighted average of percentage of individuals staying in the same state is based on the proportion of individuals in the preschool program group in the simulation in 
Table 12 (Continued) 
 
each of the three education groups; I calculate this for the PSID knowing that the three educational groups are not defined exactly the same.  The Census PUMS data comes from 
the year 2000, and is based on cross section data for that year. I calculate using sample weights the percentage of individuals of different ages who live in the same state they were 
born in, for three different educational attainment groups defined by degree attainment. The weighted percentage for the overall PUMS sample is again based on the assumptions 
made about the percentages of individuals in each educational attainment category in the preschool program group. The PUMS data is of course a cross section that does not follow 
any individual over time, but should give a reasonable guide to how mobility varies over time with age if mobility dynamics have not changed dramatically for different cohorts. 
One would expect, and I in fact find, that  a somewhat lower percentage of individuals in the PUMS are in the same state than the corresponding percentage in the PSID, as the 
PSID measures mobility since age 4, and the PUMS measures mobility since birth, and some individuals will move between birth and age 4. On average, the PSID reported 
percentages are larger by a factor of 1.081 than the PUMS figures. The PSID figures correspond more closely to what we want to measure, which is the percentage of individuals 
who live in the same state as the state they attended preschool at age 4.  However, the PSID figures only go to age 39, whereas for the simulation we need to know something about 
mobility throughout the individual’s working life. In addition, the PSID numbers are in some cases based on very small sample sizes. Therefore, for the simulations used in the 
model, I assume that the percentage of individuals in the same state that they attended preschool in at age 4 is given by blowing up the PUMS percentages by the average ratio of 
the PSID numbers to the PUMS numbers. As the Table shows, the percentage in their “preschool state” declines from 85% as of age 16 to a low of 63% as of age 79. The decline 
in “same as preschool state” residence is somewhat faster in the late teens and early 20s, presumably as individuals relocate after finishing school, slows down a bit from the mid-
20s to about age 50, and then speeds up again in the early 50s before slowing down again. The somewhat greater mobility in the early 50s could reflect some early retirement 
behavior, or could be a reflection of cohort effects associated with World War II and its aftermath. In any event, the upshot from this table is that mobility rates out of state are 
much lower than I think most high-powered academics or media pundits would assume, probably because the mobility rates of the average college graduate are quite different 
from those of the most elite college graduates.   
 
  
Table 13 Job Generation Effects of One-Time Preschool Program of $1 Billion, Compared to Job 
Generation Effects of One-Time Economic Development Subsidy Program of $1 Billion 
Year 
Jobs created for local 
residents from one-time 
universal preschool 
program costing $1 billion 
Jobs created for local 
residents from one-time 
economic development 
program with present 
value of $1 billion Year
Jobs created for local 
residents from one-time 
universal preschool 
program costing $1 billion 
Jobs created for local 
residents from one-time 
economic development 
program with present 
value of $1 billion 
3 0 0 41 2824 432 
4 0 4286 42 2829 393 
5 0 3849 43 2692 356 
6 0 3403 44 2760 322 
7 0 2949 45 2791 288 
8 0 2488 46 2753 256 
9 0 2022 47 2705 225 
10 0 1982 48 2694 196 
11 0 1938 49 2600 169 
12 0 1892 50 2588 145 
13 0 1843 51 2573 124 
14 0 1794 52 2485 105 
15 0 1744 53 2456 90 
16 1460 1692 54 2366 76 
17 2317 1640 55 2105 64 
18 2855 1589 56 2136 54 
19 4018 1537 57 2004 45 
20 4110 1484 58 2013 37 
21 4004 1430 59 1894 30 
22 4028 1376 60 1660 25 
23 3902 1323 61 1524 20 
24 3790 1269 62 1397 16 
25 3339 1216 63 1213 12 
26 3183 1163 64 1179 9 
27 2821 1110 65 834 6 
28 2829 1056 66 793 0 
29 2804 1003 67 665 0 
30 2856 951 68 642 0 
31 2771 899 69 509 0 
32 2786 848 70 465 0 
33 2762 798 71 372 0 
34 2860 749 72 355 0 
35 2724 701 73 270 0 
36 2685 654 74 193 0 
37 2692 607 75 179 0 
38 2709 561 76 193 0 
39 2733 516 77 159 0 
40 2673 473 78 145 0 
   79 125 0 
NOTES: It is important to remember that these are not effects of permanent preschool program or economic development 
program, but rather the effects of during one year, dated as year 4, of either spending $1 billion on preschool or offering 
economic development subsidies whose present value is $1 billion. These effects can be scaled up or down to programs of 
different size as long as these programs are similar in their design to the modeled programs. 
  
Table 14 Real Earnings Generation Effects of One-Time Preschool Program of $1 Billion, Compared to Real 
Earnings Generation Effects of One-Time Economic Development Subsidy Program of $1 Billion 
Year 
Real earnings effects on 
participants and peers of 
one-time universal preschool 
program of $1 billion 
Real earnings effects of one-
time economic development 
program with present value 
cost of $1 billion Year
Real earnings effects on 
participants and peers of one-
time universal preschool 
program of $1 billion 
Real earnings effects of one-
time economic development 
program with present value 
cost of $1 billion 
3 0.0 0.0 41 196.7 47.6 
4 0.0 216.0 42 205.5 43.4 
5 0.0 203.5 43 201.5 39.5 
6 0.0 190.3 44 207.4 35.7 
7 0.0 176.3 45 210.6 31.9 
8 0.0 161.4 46 202.4 28.3 
9 0.0 145.4 47 214.2 24.8 
10 0.0 145.6 48 208.9 21.5 
11 0.0 145.5 49 205.9 18.5 
12 0.0 144.9 50 212.5 15.8 
13 0.0 144.1 51 210.9 13.3 
14 0.0 142.8 52 208.3 11.2 
15 0.0 141.2 53 205.1 9.4 
16 23.5 139.4 54 196.2 8.0 
17 39.1 137.4 55 179.3 6.8 
18 52.7 135.2 56 186.2 5.7 
19 84.9 132.8 57 173.9 4.7 
20 93.2 130.1 58 170.9 3.9 
21 99.5 127.2 59 161.2 3.2 
22 106.7 124.2 60 145.8 2.6 
23 113.4 121.0 61 131.2 2.1 
24 118.4 117.5 62 123.0 1.7 
25 123.6 114.0 63 105.1 1.3 
26 129.2 110.4 64 100.9 1.0 
27 120.9 106.6 65 69.6 0.7 
28 129.1 102.5 66 60.5 0.0 
29 132.8 98.5 67 51.4 0.0 
30 136.3 94.5 68 52.5 0.0 
31 139.7 90.2 69 40.1 0.0 
32 151.8 86.0 70 38.9 0.0 
33 151.2 81.7 71 30.9 0.0 
34 160.1 77.5 72 26.1 0.0 
35 164.7 73.2 73 22.7 0.0 
36 167.8 69.0 74 18.3 0.0 
37 180.1 64.6 75 13.5 0.0 
38 183.2 60.3 76 14.7 0.0 
39 189.2 56.0 77 13.8 0.0 
40 188.9 51.7 78 11.6 0.0 
   79 9.9 0.0 
NOTES: It is important to remember that these are not effects of permanent preschool program or economic development 
program, but rather the effects of during one year, dated as year 4, of either spending $1 billion on preschool or offering 
economic development subsidies whose present value is $1 billion. These effects can be scaled up or down to programs of 
different size as long as these programs are similar in their design to the modeled programs. 
  
Table 15 Jobs Generated for State Residents by Permanent Universal Preschool Program, Compared to 
Jobs Generated by Economic Development Subsidy Program of Same Cost 
Jobs generated per $1 
billion of initial resources 
Jobs generated as % of 
baseline employment 
Jobs generated per $1 
billion of initial resources





























3 0 0 0.00 0.00 41 81662 61638 0.77 0.58 
4 0 4286 0.00 0.05 42 84735 62216 0.80 0.59 
5 0 8148 0.00 0.09 43 87682 62759 0.82 0.59 
6 0 11575 0.00 0.12 44 90705 63269 0.85 0.59 
7 0 14558 0.00 0.15 45 93768 63747 0.88 0.60 
8 0 17090 0.00 0.18 46 96802 64195 0.90 0.60 
9 0 19163 0.00 0.20 47 99798 64612 0.93 0.60 
10 0 21203 0.00 0.22 48 102791 65002 0.95 0.60 
11 0 23204 0.00 0.24 49 105700 65366 0.98 0.60 
12 0 25166 0.00 0.26 50 108604 65707 1.00 0.60 
13 0 27084 0.00 0.28 51 111503 66027 1.02 0.61 
14 0 28959 0.00 0.30 52 114323 66331 1.05 0.61 
15 0 30790 0.00 0.31 53 117122 66619 1.07 0.61 
16 1460 32574 0.01 0.33 54 119839 66896 1.09 0.61 
17 3782 34313 0.04 0.35 55 122304 67161 1.11 0.61 
18 6648 36004 0.07 0.36 56 124807 67416 1.13 0.61 
19 10686 37649 0.11 0.38 57 127185 67663 1.15 0.61 
20 14827 39247 0.15 0.40 58 129580 67903 1.16 0.61 
21 18876 40795 0.19 0.41 59 131862 68137 1.18 0.61 
22 22960 42294 0.23 0.42 60 133918 68366 1.20 0.61 
23 26931 43743 0.27 0.44 61 135844 68592 1.21 0.61 
24 30801 45144 0.31 0.45 62 137648 68813 1.22 061 
25 34232 46496 0.34 0.46 63 139274 69032 1.23 0.61 
26 37518 47798 0.37 0.47 64 140871 69248 1.24 0.61 
27 40452 49052 0.40 0.48 65 142127 69462 1.25 0.61 
28 43402 50255 0.43 0.49 66 143346 69671 1.26 0.61 
29 46336 51409 0.45 0.50 67 144442 69880 1.26 0.61 
30 49331 52514 0.48 0.51 68 145517 70089 1.27 0.61 
31 52250 53571 0.51 0.52 69 146462 70299 1.27 0.61 
32 55193 54580 0.54 0.53 70 147366 70510 1.28 0.61 
33 58121 55542 0.56 0.54 71 148179 70722 1.28 0.61 
34 61155 56458 0.59 0.55 72 148979 70934 1.28 0.61 
35 64063 57329 0.62 0.55 73 149696 71147 1.29 0.61 
36 66939 58154 0.64 0.56 74 150339 71360 1.29 0.61 
37 69832 58935 0.67 0.56 75 150969 71574 1.29 0.61 
38 72750 59673 0.69 0.57 76 151615 71789 1.29 0.61 
39 75702 60368 0.72 0.57 77 152229 72004 1.29 0.61 
40 78602 61023 0.75 0.58 78 152831 72220 1.29 0.61 
    79 153414 72437 1.29 0.61 
NOTES: The jobs generated for the preschool program are solely due to effects on participants and peers, and omit all other 
avenues of influence of preschool programs on job generation (e.g., balanced budget multiplier, labor supply of parents, etc.) Jobs 
generated are for a hypothetical universal preschool program that initially spends an additional $1 billion per year, versus 
devoting the same present value per year to economic development subsidies. This program then grows in costs with the 
economy by 1.5% per year. These jobs generation numbers can be scaled up or down with size of program in a particular state, as 
long as design of programs is similar to what is assumed here, even if the program is not a universal preschool program. The jobs 
generated as % of baseline employment compares jobs generated to total state baseline employment, which is assumed to grow at 
0.3% per year. These percentage figures for preschool would apply to any state that adopted a universal preschool program of this 
design, or an economic development program that had same cost as such a program. 
  
Table 16 Real Earnings Generated for State Residents by Permanent Universal Preschool Program, 
Compared to Real Earnings Generated by Economic Development Subsidy Program of Same Cost 
Real earnings generated in 
millions of 2004 $, per $1 
billion of initial resources 
Earnings generated as % of 
baseline state earnings 
Real earnings generated in 
millions of 2004 $, per $1 
billion of initial resources 
Earnings generated as % of 

























3 0.0 0 0.00 0.00 41 3941.3 6349.5 0.68 1.09 
4 0.0 216.0 0.00 0.06 42 4206.1 6488.4 0.71 1.10 
5 0.0 422.7 0.00 0.12 43 4470.9 6625.5 0.75 1.11 
6 0.0 619.4 0.00 0.18 44 4745.5 6760.8 0.78 1.11 
7 0.0 805.1 0.00 0.23 45 5027.4 6894.4 0.82 1.12 
8 0.0 978.5 0.00 0.28 46 5305.4 7026.5 0.85 1.12 
9 0.0 1138.6 0.00 0.32 47 5599.4 7156.9 0.88 1.13 
10 0.0 1301.3 0.00 0.36 48 5892.5 7286.0 0.91 1.13 
11 0.0 1466.3 0.00 0.39 49 6186.9 7414.1 0.94 1.13 
12 0.0 1633.3 0.00 0.43 50 6492.5 7541.3 0.98 1.13 
13 0.0 1801.9 0.00 0.47 51 6800.9 7668.1 1.01 1.14 
14 0.0 1971.9 0.00 0.51 52 7111.5 7794.6 1.04 1.14 
15 0.0 2142.8 0.00 0.54 53 7423.4 7921.1 1.07 1.14 
16 23.5 2314.4 0.01 0.58 54 7731.3 8048.2 1.10 1.14 
17 63.0 2486.6 0.02 0.61 55 8026.9 8176.0 1.12 1.14 
18 116.6 2659.1 0.03 0.65 56 8333.8 8304.6 1.15 1.14 
19 203.3 2831.9 0.05 0.68 57 8633.0 8434.2 1.17 1.14 
20 299.5 3004.6 0.07 0.71 58 8933.7 8564.9 1.19 1.14 
21 403.5 3177.0 0.09 0.74 59 9229.2 8696.9 1.21 1.14 
22 516.3 3348.9 0.12 0.77 60 9513.8 8830.2 1.23 1.14 
23 637.5 3520.3 0.14 0.79 61 9788.0 8965.1 1.25 1.14 
24 765.5 3690.8 0.17 0.82 62 10058.2 9101.6 1.27 1.14 
25 900.6 3860.3 0.20 0.84 63 10314.5 9239.8 1.28 1.15 
26 1043.4 4028.7 0.22 0.87 64 10570.5 9379.7 1.29 1.15 
27 1180.0 4195.8 0.25 0.89 65 10799.1 9521.5 1.30 1.15 
28 1326.8 4361.5 0.28 0.91 66 11022.0 9664.6 1.31 1.15 
29 1479.5 4525.5 0.30 0.93 67 11239.1 9809.9 1.31 1.15 
30 1638.1 4688.1 0.33 0.95 68 11460.5 9957.4 1.32 1.15 
31 1802.3 4848.8 0.36 0.97 69 11673.0 10107.2 1.32 1.15 
32 1981.2 5007.7 0.39 0.99 70 11887.4 10259.1 1.33 1.15 
33 2162.2 5164.7 0.42 1.00 71 12097.0 10413.4 1.33 1.15 
34 2354.9 5319.9 0.45 1.02 72 12305.0 10570.0 1.33 1.15 
35 2554.9 5473.1 0.48 1.03 73 12512.7 10728.9 1.34 1.15 
36 2761.2 5624.3 0.51 1.04 74 12719.2 10890.2 1.34 1.15 
37 2982.8 5773.6 0.54 1.05 75 12924.0 11054.0 1.34 1.15 
38 3210.9 5920.7 0.58 1.07 76 13133.0 11220.2 1.34 1.15 
39 3448.4 6065.7 0.61 1.08 77 13344.3 11388.9 1.34 1.15 
40 3689.2 6208.6 0.64 1.08 78 13556.6 11560.1 1.34 1.15 
     79 13770.3 11733.9 1.34 1.15 
NOTES: The reported real earnings generation in this table for the preschool program are solely due to effects on participants and 
peers, and omit all other avenues of influence of preschool programs on job generation (e.g., balanced budget multiplier, labor 
supply of parents, etc.) Real earnings generated are for a hypothetical universal preschool program that initially spends an 
additional $1 billion per year, versus devoting the same present value per year to economic development subsidies. This program 
then grows in costs with the economy by 1.5% per year. These real earnings generation numbers can be scaled up or down with 
size of program in a particular state, as long as design of programs is similar to what is assumed here, even if the program is not a 
universal preschool program, and as long as corrections are made for different trends in real wages since 2004. The earnings 
generated as % of baseline state earnings compares earnings generated to total state baseline earnings, which is assumed to grow 
at 1.5% per year. These percentage figures for preschool would apply to any state that adopted a universal preschool program of 
this design, or an economic development program that had same cost as such a program. 
  
Table 17 Effects of a Universal Preschool Program on the Percentage College Graduates in a State’s 
Economy 
Year 
Effects on percentage college graduates 
in state’s population  Year 
Effects on percentage college graduates 
in state’s population 
3 0.00  41 0.04 
4 0.00  42 0.05 
5 0.00  43 0.05 
6 0.00  44 0.06 
7 0.00  45 0.06 
8 0.00  46 0.06 
9 0.00  47 0.07 
10 0.00  48 0.07 
11 0.00  49 0.07 
12 0.00  50 0.08 
13 0.00  51 0.08 
14 0.00  52 0.08 
15 0.00  53 0.09 
16 0.00  54 0.09 
17 0.00  55 0.09 
18 0.00  56 0.09 
19 0.00  57 0.09 
20 0.00  58 0.10 
21 0.00  59 0.10 
22 0.00  60 0.10 
23 0.00  61 0.10 
24 0.00  62 0.10 
25 0.00  63 0.10 
26 0.00  64 0.11 
27 0.00  65 0.11 
28 0.01  66 0.11 
29 0.01  67 0.11 
30 0.01  68 0.11 
31 0.01  69 0.11 
32 0.01  70 0.11 
33 0.02  71 0.12 
34 0.02  72 0.12 
35 0.02  73 0.12 
36 0.02  74 0.12 
37 0.03  75 0.12 
38 0.03  76 0.12 
39 0.04  77 0.12 
40 0.04  78 0.12 
   79 0.13 
NOTES: The table shows the effects of a permanent universal preschool program on the percentage of college graduates in the 
state’s workforce in the actual percentage rate points, not the percentage change in the percent. That is, the long-run figure of 
0.13% in year 79 should be interpreted as meaning that if the baseline percentage of college graduates in year 79 would have 
been 25%, then a permanent universal preschool program, started in year 4, would by year 79 increase the percentage college 
graduates in the state to 25.13%. 
 
  
Table 18 Preschool’s Effects on Jobs and Earnings Via Its Effects on the Social Productity Effects of Education by Increasing the State College 
Graduate Percentage 
Effects per $1 billion of spending 
on preschool program 
Effects of universal preschool program as 
a % of the state economy 
Effects per $1 billion of spending on 
preschool program 
Effects of universal preschool program as 





generation, in millions 
of 2004 dollars 
Job generation 
effects as % of 
baseline state jobs
Earnings generation 
effects as % of 
baseline state earnings Year 
Job 
generation 
Real earnings generation, 
in millions of 2004 
dollars 
Job generation 
effects as % of 
baseline state jobs
Earnings generation 
effects as % of 
baseline state earnings
3 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 41 779 72.4 0.007 0.012 
4 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 42 866 82.1 0.008 0.014 
5 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 43 955 92.1 0.009 0.015 
6 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 44 1044 102.6 0.010 0.017 
7 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 45 1134 113.4 0.011 0.018 
8 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 46 1222 124.4 0.011 0.020 
9 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 47 1308 135.6 0.012 0.021 
10 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 48 1393 147.0 0.013 0.023 
11 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 49 1475 158.5 0.014 0.024 
12 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 50 1556 170.1 0.014 0.026 
13 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 51 1633 181.7 0.015 0.027 
14 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 52 1709 193.3 0.016 0.028 
15 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 53 1781 204.8 0.016 0.029 
16 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 54 1846 215.9 0.017 0.031 
17 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 55 1905 226.6 0.017 0.032 
18 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 56 1958 236.9 0.018 0.033 
19 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 57 2007 246.9 0.018 0.033 
20 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 58 2051 256.5 0.018 0.034 
21 0 0.0 0.000 0.000 59 2091 265.6 0.019 0.035 
22 1 0.1 0.000 0.000 60 2125 274.3 0.019 0.036 
23 5 0.3 0.000 0.000 61 2155 282.6 0.019 0.036 
24 10 0.7 0.000 0.000 62 2182 290.4 0.019 0.037 
25 20 1.3 0.000 0.000 63 2203 297.8 0.020 0.037 
26 32 2.2 0.000 0.000 64 2221 304.7 0.020 0.037 
27 49 3.4 0.000 0.001 65 2236 311.2 0.020 0.037 
28 69 5.0 0.001 0.001 66 2247 317.3 0.020 0.038 
29 95 7.0 0.001 0.001 67 2255 322.9 0.020 0.038 
30 125 9.4 0.001 0.002 68 2260 328.1 0.020 0.038 
31 159 12.2 0.002 0.002 69 2262 333.0 0.020 0.038 
32 197 15.5 0.002 0.003 70 2263 337.5 0.020 0.038 
33 240 19.3 0.002 0.004 71 2260 341.6 0.020 0.038 
34 288 23.6 0.003 0.005 72 2256 345.4 0.019 0.037 
35 341 28.5 0.003 0.005 73 2249 348.8 0.019 0.037 
36 400 34.1 0.004 0.006 74 2240 351.8 0.019 0.037 
37 465 40.3 0.004 0.007 75 2229 354.5 0.019 0.037 
38 536 47.3 0.005 0.009 76 2216 356.8 0.019 0.036 
39 612 55.0 0.006 0.010 77 2200 358.7 0.019 0.036 
40 693 63.4 0.007 0.011 78 2183 360.3 0.018 0.036 
     79 2163 361.4 0.018 0.035 
Notes: This only shows the effects of preschool education on jobs and earnings, due to preschool’s effects on the state’s college graduation percentage, that occur due to the social 
productivity effects of education. The effects of increased educational attainment for each individual preschool participant, and his or her school peers, are already reflected in 
estimates previously presented. 
Table 19 Total Jobs and Earnings Effects of Universal Preschool Education, Compared to Economic 
Development Subsidies 
Job effects 
per $1 billion spent 
Job effects, 
as % total jobs 
Earnings effects,  
in millions of 2004 $,  
per $1 billion spent 
Earnings effects,  











3 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 
4 5850 4286 0.06 0.05 225.2 216.0 0.07 0.06 
5 5518 8148 0.06 0.09 216.5 422.7 0.06 0.12 
6 5178 11575 0.05 0.12 207.3 619.4 0.06 0.18 
7 4831 14558 0.05 0.15 197.4 805.1 0.06 0.23 
8 4477 17090 0.05 0.18 186.7 978.5 0.05 0.28 
9 4118 19163 0.04 0.20 175.2 1138.6 0.05 0.32 
10 4098 21203 0.04 0.22 176.6 1301.3 0.05 0.36 
11 4076 23204 0.04 0.24 177.8 1466.3 0.05 0.39 
12 4051 25166 0.04 0.26 178.6 1633.3 0.05 0.43 
13 4024 27084 0.04 0.28 179.3 1801.9 0.05 0.47 
14 3997 28959 0.04 0.30 179.6 1971.9 0.05 0.51 
15 3969 30790 0.04 0.31 179.6 2142.8 0.05 0.54 
16 5400 32574 0.06 0.33 203.0 2314.4 0.05 0.58 
17 7692 34313 0.08 0.35 242.2 2486.6 0.06 0.61 
18 10528 36004 0.11 0.36 295.4 2659.1 0.07 0.65 
19 14536 37649 0.15 0.38 381.6 2831.9 0.09 0.68 
20 18647 39247 0.19 0.40 477.1 3004.6 0.11 0.71 
21 22665 40795 0.23 0.41 580.2 3177.0 0.13 0.74 
22 26718 42294 0.27 0.42 692.1 3348.9 0.16 0.77 
23 30660 43743 0.31 0.44 812.4 3520.3 0.18 0.79 
24 34506 45144 0.34 0.45 939.5 3690.8 0.21 0.82 
25 37915 46496 0.38 0.46 1074.0 3860.3 0.23 0.84 
26 41181 47798 0.41 0.47 1216.2 4028.7 0.26 0.87 
27 44100 49052 0.43 0.48 1352.5 4195.8 0.29 0.89 
28 47039 50255 0.46 0.49 1499.1 4361.5 0.31 0.91 
29 49966 51409 0.49 0.50 1652.1 4525.5 0.34 0.93 
30 52961 52514 0.52 0.51 1811.5 4688.1 0.37 0.95 
31 55883 53571 0.54 0.52 1976.8 4848.8 0.39 0.97 
32 58834 54580 0.57 0.53 2157.2 5007.7 0.42 0.99 
33 61774 55542 0.60 0.54 2340.0 5164.7 0.45 1.00 
34 64827 56458 0.63 0.55 2535.2 5319.9 0.48 1.02 
35 67760 57329 0.65 0.55 2738.4 5473.1 0.52 1.03 
36 70668 58154 0.68 0.56 2948.5 5624.3 0.55 1.04 
37 73599 58935 0.70 0.56 3174.6 5773.6 0.58 1.05 
38 76560 59673 0.73 0.57 3407.7 5920.7 0.61 1.07 
39 79562 60368 0.76 0.57 3651.1 6065.7 0.65 1.08 
40 82519 61023 0.78 0.58 3898.6 6208.6 0.68 1.08 
41 85641 61638 0.81 0.58 4158.2 6349.5 0.72 1.09 
42 88781 62216 0.84 0.59 4431.0 6488.4 0.75 1.10 
43 91796 62759 0.86 0.59 4704.5 6625.5 0.79 1.11 
44 94890 63269 0.89 0.59 4988.2 6760.8 0.82 1.11 
45 98025 63747 0.92 0.60 5279.7 6894.4 0.86 1.12 
46 101132 64195 0.94 0.60 5567.6 7026.5 0.89 1.12 
47 104198 64612 0.97 0.60 5871.8 7156.9 0.92 1.13 
48 107262 65002 0.99 0.60 6175.5 7286.0 0.96 1.13 
49 110241 65366 1.02 0.60 6480.8 7414.1 0.99 1.13 
50 113216 65707 1.04 0.60 6797.6 7541.3 1.02 1.13 
51 116185 66027 1.07 0.61 7117.6 7668.1 1.06 1.14 
52 119074 66331 1.09 0.61 7439.9 7794.6 1.09 1.14 
Table 19 (Continued) 
 
Job effects 
per $1 billion spent 
Job effects, 
as % total jobs 
Earnings effects,  
in millions of 2004 $,  
per $1 billion spent 
Earnings effects,  











53 121942 66619 1.11 0.61 7764.0 7921.1 1.12 1.14 
54 124723 66896 1.13 0.61 8083.7 8048.2 1.15 1.14 
55 127246 67161 1.15 0.61 8391.0 8176.0 1.17 1.14 
56 129803 67416 1.17 0.61 8709.4 8304.6 1.20 1.14 
57 132232 67663 1.19 0.61 9019.8 8434.2 1.22 1.14 
58 134673 67903 1.21 0.61 9331.5 8564.9 1.25 1.14 
59 136999 68137 1.23 0.61 9637.7 8696.9 1.27 1.14 
60 139095 68366 1.24 0.61 9932.6 8830.2 1.29 1.14 
61 141056 68592 1.26 0.61 10216.9 8965.1 1.30 1.14 
62 142892 68813 1.27 061 10496.7 9101.6 1.32 1.14 
63 144546 69032 1.28 0.61 10762.3 9239.8 1.33 1.15 
64 146168 69248 1.29 0.61 11027.2 9379.7 1.35 1.15 
65 147445 69462 1.30 0.61 11264.3 9521.5 1.36 1.15 
66 148680 69671 1.30 0.61 11495.0 9664.6 1.36 1.15 
67 149792 69880 1.31 0.61 11720.1 9809.9 1.37 1.15 
68 150882 70089 1.32 0.61 11949.1 9957.4 1.37 1.15 
69 151839 70299 1.32 0.61 12168.8 10107.2 1.38 1.15 
70 152752 70510 1.32 0.61 12390.2 10259.1 1.38 1.15 
71 153573 70722 1.33 0.61 12606.5 10413.4 1.39 1.15 
72 154377 70934 1.33 0.61 12820.7 10570.0 1.39 1.15 
73 155097 71147 1.33 0.61 13034.4 10728.9 1.39 1.15 
74 155740 71360 1.33 0.61 13246.5 10890.2 1.39 1.15 
75 156369 71574 1.34 0.61 13456.6 11054.0 1.39 1.15 
76 157011 71789 1.34 0.61 13670.6 11220.2 1.40 1.15 
77 157619 72004 1.34 0.61 13886.6 11388.9 1.40 1.15 
78 158213 72220 1.34 0.61 14103.2 11560.1 1.40 1.15 
79 158786 72437 1.34 0.61 14320.9 11733.9 1.40 1.15 
NOTES: This table simply sums all the avenues by which a permanent preschool program is estimated to affect a state’s jobs and 
earnings in this report, and compares these effects with the effects of permanent economic development subsidies of the same 
cost. 
Table 20 Percentage of Persons Living in Birth State 
State of birth 
% living in state  
of birth 
 
State of birth 
% living in state 
of birth 
 
State of birth 
% living in state of 
birth 
        
Alabama 68.2  Kentucky 65.8 North Dakota 44.8 
Alaska 53.5  Louisiana 71.6 Ohio 70.9 
Arizona 69.9  Maine 66.3 Oklahoma 60.3 
Arkansas 58.8  Maryland 68.5 Oregon 66.0 
California 76.9  Massachusetts 66.2 Pennsylvania 69.1 
Colorado 62.0  Michigan 73.7 Rhode Island 60.4 
Connecticut 65.0  Minnesota 71.1 South Carolina 69.8 
Delaware 62.3  Mississippi 60.3 South Dakota 49.6 
District of Columbia 16.8  Missouri 66.0 Tennessee 70.2 
Florida  73.6  Montana 53.3 Texas 79.8 
Georgia 73.4  Nebraska 56.0 Utah 70.7 
Hawaii 63.0  Nevada 62.9 Vermont 59.1 
Idaho 55.4  New Hampshire 61.1 Virginia 67.3 
Illinois 65.7  New Jersey 64.5 Washington 70.4 
Indiana 69.1  New Mexico 59.9 West Virginia 52.2 
Iowa 59.0  New York 63.2 Wisconsin 73.3 
Kansas 55.9  North Carolina 74.8 Wyoming 42.8 
    
   U.S. Average 68.4  
  
NOTE: This is derived from a special tabulation by the U.S. Census Bureau from the 2000 U.S. Census, released on the internet 
on January 31, 2005, and available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/phc-t38.html. This includes all U.S. 
residents in 2000 born in the U.S. The percentage is simply what percentage of this total is living in the same state they were born 
in, broken down by state of birth. 
 
Table 21 Long-Run Effects of Preschool Education on Various Aspects of Economic Development from Each State’s Perspective 
State 
Assumed annual 
incremental costs of 
universal preschool 
program (in millions of 
2004 dollars) 
PV of real earnings 
generated divided by PV 
of costs 
Long-run effect on 
number of jobs 
Long-run effects on 
annual real earnings (in 
millions of 2004 dollars)
Long-run effect on 
annual gross state 
product (in millions of 
2004 dollars) 
Long-run effect on 
annual state and local tax 
revenue (in millions of 
2004 dollars) 
Alabama 179.9 2.77 27090 836.8 1944.9 152.7 
Alaska 35.5 2.31 3714 135.3 388.2 27.0 
Arizona 246.9 2.83 34182 1172.8 2839.0 236.6 
Arkansas 99.2 2.47 14703 408.1 995.3 89.6 
California 1903.8 3.05 234565 9802.4 23870.6 2108.1 
Colorado 250.2 2.58 28902 1076.1 2571.4 197.2 
Connecticut 235.8 2.67 22425 1054.4 2484.0 224.7 
Delaware 50.4 2.59 5570 217.7 700.5 40.1 
District of Columbia 124.9 1.13 3942 215.1 394.8 19.0 
Florida 759.8 2.95 113859 3769.7 8885.4 763.5 
Georgia 422.6 2.94 59087 2091.1 5076.0 397.2 
Hawaii 64.6 2.61 8375 281.5 655.7 63.5 
Idaho 51.3 2.37 7356 201.4 511.1 43.9 
Illinois 689.3 2.69 79022 3108.1 7035.0 602.7 
Indiana 282.0 2.80 41208 1327.4 3202.6 267.6 
Iowa 131.1 2.48 18388 541.3 1371.7 116.8 
Kansas 124.9 2.38 16401 493.6 1169.4 103.8 
Kentucky 168.3 2.70 24815 760.4 1843.3 163.4 
Louisiana 173.9 2.88 28423 842.8 2215.7 200.9 
Maine 55.0 2.71 8396 249.8 588.6 68.5 
Maryland 306.1 2.78 35933 1429.0 3182.3 311.8 
Massachusetts 436.2 2.71 43860 1979.3 4311.3 358.7 
Michigan 490.9 2.95 64725 2437.8 5525.5 488.7 
Minnesota 299.8 2.87 38597 1444.1 3223.7 298.6 
Mississippi 93.3 2.52 14850 392.4 957.1 91.1 
Missouri 265.2 2.71 37095 1201.5 2753.3 222.6 
Montana 33.1 2.30 4874 125.9 312.3 27.9 
Nebraska 82.9 2.38 11117 327.9 806.4 70.8 
Nevada 123.0 2.61 15137 535.3 1305.1 101.9 
New Hampshire 68.3 2.55 8051 289.9 658.5 51.4 
New Jersey 528.5 2.65 52790 2346.5 5522.3 506.1 
New Mexico 72.2 2.51 10173 301.8 762.9 69.7 
New York 1175.0 2.62 110993 5135.3 11716.2 1297.0 
North Carolina 384.8 2.98 59386 1935.2 5058.1 379.1 
North Dakota 28.0 2.03 3511 93.0 225.0 19.4 
Ohio 548.2 2.86 77814 2635.0 6033.9 565.8 
Oklahoma 128.8 2.52 18975 541.5 1352.1 124.5 
Oregon 161.6 2.71 22188 732.0 1734.8 135.6 
Pennsylvania 605.3 2.80 79820 2848.1 6584.0 583.2 
Rhode Island 51.5 2.53 6252 216.6 524.4 51.3 
South Carolina 167.0 2.83 26661 792.4 1931.1 154.0 
South Dakota 30.9 2.18 4275 111.2 315.8 22.5 
Tennessee 264.5 2.84 38896 1261.6 3103.7 210.4 




incremental costs of 
universal preschool 
program (in millions of 
2004 dollars) 
PV of real earnings 
generated divided by PV 
of costs 
Long-run effect on 
number of jobs 
Long-run effects on 
annual real earnings (in 
millions of 2004 dollars)
Long-run effect on 
annual gross state 
product (in millions of 
2004 dollars) 
Long-run effect on 
annual state and local tax 
revenue (in millions of 
2004 dollars) 
Texas 1035.9 3.15 152517 5507.3 14052.6 1068.8 
Utah 101.5 2.85 16092 486.5 1183.9 96.9 
Vermont 28.5 2.48 3875 117.8 271.0 27.4 
Virginia 424.5 2.75 51351 1954.0 4531.6 347.2 
Washington 324.8 2.84 40699 1551.6 3735.2 311.5 
West Virginia 60.0 2.26 8074 224.4 553.0 56.9 
Wisconsin 269.9 2.94 41309 1335.0 3128.7 307.2 
Wyoming 22.9 1.96 2559 73.4 229.7 20.6 
United States 14662.2 2.78 1882870 68949.2 164328.4 14265.2 
NOTES: Annual incremental costs of universal preschool program are based on the assumption that costs of such a universal program will be 0.299% of state wage and salary 
earnings, using calculations reported in Table 2. The present value of real earnings generated is calculated by adjusting the state’s PV effects on participants and peers based on the 
state residents’= tendency to move out compared to the average state. Specifically, as shown in Chapter 5, the PV ratio in an “average state” without migration for peers and 
participants would be 3.66, whereas in a state with normal out-migration this PV ratio is 2.65. To adjust for differential out-migration, we multiply 3.66 by the following ratio: 
3.66[1 − ((3.66 − 2.65) / 3.666) H R], where R = (% born in state who leave state) / (% born in U.S. who leave state)]. The percentage born in state who leave the state is reported in 
Table 20, based on the U.S. Census. I then add in the 0.13 in additional earnings ratio based on the other channels for effects of preschool on earnings, which I assume are 
unaffected by the relative migration of the state. The effect on jobs is based on the percentage effects on jobs reported in Table 15 and Table 19 as of year 79, that is after the 
program has been in effect for 75 years. However, the percentage effect is calculated by considering the state’s wage and salary employment as of 2004. Therefore, this effect on 
jobs should be considered the effects that would have occurred as of 2004 if the program had been in effect for 75 years. The percentage effect is also adjusted for differential out-
migration in each state. That is, as the long-run percentage effect of preschool, through its effects on peers and participants, on employment after 75 years without out-migration is 
calculated to be 1.78% (Chapter 5), and the average U.S. effect with out-migration is calculated to be 1.29%, the percentage effect actually used is adjusted by % job effect = 
1.78[1 − ((1.78 − 1.29) / 1.78) H R]. I then add back in the 0.05% long-run effect on jobs due to the other avenues by which preschool affects jobs, which are assumed to be 
unaffected by differential migration across states.  The effect on earnings is also derived from the percentage effect of preschool on real earnings (due to participant and peer 
effects) after 75 years in Table 16 of 1.34%, and wage and salary earnings in the state as of 2004. Wage and salary earnings is, however, adjusted to wage and salary employment 
so that the average hourly wage rate is $17.67 per hour, as explained in Table 2. Each state’s percentage effect is also adjusted based on the state’s differential out-migration. Long-
run percentage effects on real earnings due to peer and participant effects without any out-migration is 1.88%, whereas the typical state’s percentage effect, based on Table 16, is 
1.34%. Therefore the percentage effect on real earnings in each state is equal to 1.88[1 − ((1.88 − 1.34) / 1.88) H R]. The total percentage effect of preschool on earnings via all 
avenues of effects is then calculated by adding in 0.05%, which is assumed unchanged with differential migration.  The effects on real gross state product are based on the ratio of 
each state’s GSP to real wage and salary earnings. Figures for state GSP are for 2004 and come from the Regional Economic Information System of the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Figures for state and local tax revenue are based on the ratio of state and local tax revenue to GSP in each state. State and local tax 
revenues are for fiscal year 2001–2002, and come from the U.S. Census of Governments; real GSP figures using in figuring the ratio of tax revenue to GSP are for 2002.  The U.S. 
totals sum what each state perceives as the effects on its jobs, earnings, GSP, and tax revenue. These U.S. totals do not reflect the actual national effects after allowing for spillover 
effects on other states of each state=s preschool program, as explained in Chapter 5. 
 
Table 22: Alternative Assumptions About Preschool Benefits for Different Groups and How They Alter 










assumptions used up to 
now in this report for 





Assumptions for benefits of each group 
participating in universal preschool, as 
percentage of benefits from previous studies of 
preschool participation vs. no participation for 
high risk children: 
     
High risk children who otherwise would not 
have been in any preschool 
100 
 
100 100 100 100 
High risk children who otherwise would have 
been in lower cost public preschool  
50 50 50 70 100 
High risk children who otherwise would have 
been in private preschool 
0 0 0 0 50 
Medium risk children who otherwise would 
not have been in any preschool 
0 50 50 70 50 
Medium risk children who otherwise would 
have been in lower cost public preschool 
0 25 25 35 50 
Medium risk children who otherwise would 
have been in private preschool 
0 0 0 0 25 
Low risk children who otherwise would not 
have been in any preschool 
0 0 25 35 25 
Low risk children who otherwise would have 
been in lower cost public preschool 
0 0 0 0 25 
Low risk children who otherwise would have 
been in private preschool 
0 0 0 0 0 
      
Based on these assumptions, average benefits per 
universal preschool participant of universal 
preschool, as percentage of benefits from 
previous studies of preschool vs. no preschool for 
high risk children   
16 21 23 30 41 
      
Based on these assumptions, simulated ratio of 
present value of earnings effects of universal 
preschool to preschool costs.  
1.97 2.55 2.78 3.59 4.85 
NOTES: Alternative assumptions about benefit percentages are taken from Karoly and Bigelow (2005), Table 3.5 on p. 107. The 
average benefits in next to last row are derived based on those assumptions and assumptions about distribution of universal 
preschool enrollment across these nine groups. The ratio of PV earnings to preschool costs in the last row are derived from 
simulating the current report’s model. These estimates are easily derived by multiplying the baseline assumption results for peers 
and participants by the average percentage benefits for that set of assumptions (next to last row), divided by the average 
percentage benefits for baseline case (23%), and then adding in the other avenues of earnings effects of preschool. 

















Alabama 27090 37033 836.8 1163.5 1944.9 2704.1 
Alaska 3714 6107 135.3 229.3 388.2 657.9 
Arizona 34182 45827 1172.8 1597.2 2839.0 3866.5 
Arkansas 14703 22547 408.1 641.5 995.3 1564.4 
California 234565 291399 9802.4 12314.0 23870.6 29986.9 
Colorado 28902 42525 1076.1 1618.2 2571.4 3866.8 
Connecticut 22425 31814 1054.4 1525.1 2484.0 3592.9 
Delaware 5570 8168 217.7 326.2 700.5 1049.5 
District of Columbia 3942 13212 215.1 807.9 394.8 1482.9 
Florida 113859 146494 3769.7 4914.7 8885.4 11584.2 
Georgia 59087 76211 2091.1 2733.4 5076.0 6635.0 
Hawaii 8375 12170 281.5 417.8 655.7 973.1 
Idaho 7356 11790 201.4 332.0 511.1 842.5 
Illinois 79022 111244 3108.1 4458.7 7035.0 10092.0 
Indiana 41208 55709 1327.4 1823.9 3202.6 4400.5 
Iowa 18388 28107 541.3 847.9 1371.7 2148.6 
Kansas 16401 26108 493.6 807.6 1169.4 1913.3 
Kentucky 24815 34862 760.4 1088.5 1843.3 2638.5 
Louisiana 28423 37391 842.8 1125.0 2215.7 2957.5 
Maine 8396 11735 249.8 355.7 588.6 838.0 
Maryland 35933 48954 1429.0 1979.7 3182.3 4408.7 
Massachusetts 43860 61376 1979.3 2821.3 4311.3 6145.3 
Michigan 64725 83199 2437.8 3175.2 5525.5 7196.6 
Minnesota 38597 51055 1444.1 1938.9 3223.7 4328.0 
Mississippi 14850 22325 392.4 603.8 957.1 1472.8 
Missouri 37095 51989 1201.5 1715.5 2753.3 3931.1 
Montana 4874 8045 125.9 214.1 312.3 531.4 
Nebraska 11117 17684 327.9 536.1 806.4 1318.5 
Nevada 15137 22030 535.3 795.7 1305.1 1939.8 
New Hampshire 8051 11989 289.9 441.5 658.5 1003.0 
New Jersey 52790 75400 2346.5 3418.5 5522.3 8045.2 
New Mexico 10173 15365 301.8 466.8 762.9 1179.8 
New York 110993 160891 5135.3 7600.4 11716.2 17340.2 
North Carolina 59386 75429 1935.2 2488.8 5058.1 6504.9 
North Dakota 3511 6573 93.0 181.3 225.0 438.7 
Ohio 77814 103143 2635.0 3545.6 6033.9 8118.9 
Oklahoma 18975 28527 541.5 833.4 1352.1 2080.7 
Oregon 22188 31101 732.0 1045.2 1734.8 2477.1 
Pennsylvania 79820 107962 2848.1 3915.4 6584.0 9051.4 
Rhode Island 6252 9387 216.6 332.8 524.4 805.9 
South Carolina 26661 35772 792.4 1080.0 1931.1 2632.2 
South Dakota 4275 7432 111.2 200.1 315.8 568.2 
Tennessee 38896 51929 1261.6 1710.6 3103.7 4208.2 
Texas 152517 183811 5507.3 6700.2 14052.6 17096.5 
Utah 16092 21386 486.5 656.5 1183.9 1597.4 
Vermont 3875 5915 117.8 184.3 271.0 423.9 
Virginia 51351 70907 1954.0 2746.0 4531.6 6368.3 
Washington 40699 54267 1551.6 2100.9 3735.2 5057.6 
West Virginia 8074 13529 224.4 388.0 553.0 956.3 
Wisconsin 41309 53310 1335.0 1746.1 3128.7 4092.0 
Wyoming 2559 4945 73.4 148.1 229.7 463.7 
United States 1882870 2546076 68949.2 94838.7 164328.4 225577.6 
NOTES:  Figures from state perspective were previously reported in Table 21, as described in text and notes to that table.  These 
estimated effects are long-run effects, based on present size of state economy, if universal preschool program had been running 
for 75 years.  The national perspective figures simply produce the equivalent numbers in a model in which out-migration from 
the state is assumed to be zero.  This is equivalent to including the effects of out-migration even after they leave a state. 
  




















Alabama 12304 2571 691.3 143.8 1606.6 334.2 
Alaska 1952 424 131.3 28.3 376.6 81.3 
Arizona 15293 3182 953.0 197.4 2307.0 477.9 
Arkansas 7307 1565 372.2 79.3 907.7 193.4 
California 99007 20232 7475.1 1522.0 18203.2 3706.3 
Colorado 13902 2953 946.8 200.0 2262.3 477.9 
Connecticut 10483 2209 899.0 188.5 2117.9 444.1 
Delaware 2672 567 191.0 40.3 614.4 129.7 
District of Columbia 3803 917 418.6 99.9 768.3 183.3 
Florida 49357 10171 2959.5 607.4 6975.7 1431.8 
Georgia 25662 5291 1645.0 337.8 3993.2 820.1 
Hawaii 3989 845 245.0 51.6 570.8 120.3 
Idaho 3787 819 191.0 41.0 484.7 104.1 
Illinois 36718 7724 2632.6 551.1 5958.7 1247.3 
Indiana 18555 3868 1086.3 225.4 2620.9 543.9 
Iowa 9116 1952 492.3 104.8 1247.5 265.6 
Kansas 8398 1813 465.2 99.8 1102.1 236.5 
Kentucky 11512 2421 643.0 134.5 1558.5 326.1 
Louisiana 12533 2596 674.1 139.0 1772.1 365.5 
Maine 3880 815 210.3 44.0 495.5 103.6 
Maryland 16277 3399 1177.1 244.7 2621.4 544.9 
Massachusetts 20285 4261 1667.9 348.7 3633.0 759.5 
Michigan 28038 5777 1912.4 392.4 4334.5 889.5 
Minnesota 17090 3545 1160.3 239.6 2590.1 534.9 
Mississippi 7265 1550 351.7 74.6 857.9 182.0 
Missouri 17177 3610 1013.8 212.0 2323.3 485.9 
Montana 2569 559 122.5 26.5 304.0 65.7 
Nebraska 5689 1228 308.8 66.3 759.6 163.0 
Nevada 7219 1530 466.6 98.3 1137.4 239.8 
New Hampshire 3909 832 257.7 54.6 585.4 124.0 
New Jersey 24808 5235 2012.3 422.5 4735.8 994.4 
New Mexico 4995 1067 271.6 57.7 686.6 145.8 
New York 52768 11171 4460.3 939.4 10176.0 2143.2 
North Carolina 25492 5237 1503.1 307.6 3928.6 804.0 
North Dakota 2051 456 101.5 22.4 245.5 54.2 
Ohio 34510 7161 2120.9 438.2 4856.5 1003.5 
Oklahoma 9284 1981 485.5 103.0 1212.0 257.2 
Oregon 10275 2159 617.7 129.2 1463.9 306.2 
Pennsylvania 35956 7496 2331.7 483.9 5390.4 1118.7 
Rhode Island 3056 652 193.9 41.1 469.6 99.6 
South Carolina 11935 2484 644.3 133.5 1570.3 325.3 
South Dakota 2350 516 113.4 24.7 322.0 70.2 
Tennessee 17346 3606 1021.6 211.4 2513.3 520.1 
Texas 62919 12762 4096.4 828.1 10452.6 2113.1 
Utah 7151 1485 392.5 81.1 955.0 197.4 
Vermont 1919 411 107.0 22.8 246.2 52.4 
Virginia 23505 4923 1628.0 339.4 3775.6 787.1 
Washington 18132 3768 1255.1 259.7 3021.4 625.1 
West Virginia 4308 939 221.4 48.0 545.6 118.2 
Wisconsin 17949 3701 1050.7 215.8 2462.4 505.8 
Wyoming 1534 343 82.4 18.3 258.1 57.3 
United States 847995 176779 56472.7 11721.8 134377.8 27880.8 
NOTES: Figures from state perspective were previously reported in Table 6, as described in text and notes to that table.  These 
estimated effects are long-run effects, based on present size of state economy, if traditional economic development subsidy 
program had been running for 75 years.  This traditional economic development subsidy program is sized so its annual costs are 
equal in size to the annual costs in that state of a universal preschool program.  As outlined in the text, the national perspective 
figures simply produce the equivalent numbers in a model in which national effects are assumed to be 19.3% of the state effects 
that would occur if out-migration from the state is assumed to be zero.  This adjusts for the lesser effect on subsidies in changing 
business activity decisions versus business location decisions, as explained in the text.
  
Table 25 Comparison of Net Long-Run National Effects of Universal Preschool Education and Traditional 
Economic Development Subsidies 




Ratio of PV of earnings effects to costs 3.79 0.65 
Long-run effects on number of jobs 2,546,076 176,779 
Long-run effects on annual earnings (in millions of dollars) 94,839 11,722 
Long-run effects on annual GSP summed to national total (in 
millions of dollars) 
225,578 27,881 
Long-run effects on total government tax revenue: federal, state, 
and local (in millions of dollars) 
56,169 6,942 
NOTES: These figures show the national effects of each state simultaneously pursuing a universal preschool program, or a 
traditional economic development subsidy program of the same size. The national perspective considers spillover effects that 
occur due to household migration, and spillover effects that occur due to employment reallocation, but ignores spillover effects 
that occur due to changes in inflationary pressures. The present value calculation is presented in the report text, and is the only 
calculation that considers effects on all years, and is not scale dependent. The long-run effects in the jobs, earnings, and GSP 
rows are the same as the sum over all state effects, from a national perspective, reported in Table 23 and Table 24.  These are the 
annual effects on the nation at its current size, assuming these programs had been adopted 75 years ago. The sum of GSP to the 
national level is virtually the same as GDP. Tax revenue effects are based on the estimate that total federal, state, and local tax 
revenue is approximately 24.9% of GDP. This is based on figures from U.S. Census of Governments on state and local tax 
revenue in fiscal year 2003, and figures from the U.S. Statistical Abstract on federal tax revenue in the same fiscal year, 
compared to the sum of all GSP for 2003.    
Table 26 State-by-State Estimates of National Job Creation Possible by Reallocating Jobs to That State Due 





due to economic 
development 
program 
National job creation 
associated with state 
job creation, ignoring 
inflationary effects 
National job 
creation possible if 













Alabama 4.0 12304 2571 -812 -5126 
Alaska 6.8 1952 424 912 1278 
Arizona 4.7 15293 3182 1880 468 
Arkansas 4.9 7307 1565 1267 957 
California 5.4 99007 20232 25733 30928 
Colorado 5.0 13902 2953 2675 2391 
Connecticut 4.9 10483 2209 1781 1336 
Delaware 4.2 2672 567 -6 -701 
District of Columbia 6.5 3803 917 1736 2379 
Florida  3.8 49357 10171 -6714 -29376 
Georgia 5.3 25662 5291 6260 7192 
Hawaii 2.8 3989 845 -2432 -8400 
Idaho 3.8 3787 819 -477 -2216 
Illinois 5.7 36718 7724 11589 15047 
Indiana 5.4 18555 3868 4899 5872 
Iowa 4.6 9116 1952 961 -138 
Kansas 5.1 8398 1813 1813 1813 
Kentucky 6.1 11512 2421 4308 5886 
Louisiana 7.1 12533 2596 6126 8662 
Maine 4.8 3880 815 572 315 
Maryland 4.1 16277 3399 -571 -5509 
Massachusetts 4.8 20285 4261 2994 1647 
Michigan 6.7 28038 5777 12472 17569 
Minnesota 4.0 17090 3545 -1155 -7147 
Mississippi 7.9 7265 1550 4125 5788 
Missouri 5.4 17177 3610 4564 5465 
Montana 4.0 2569 559 -148 -1049 
Nebraska 3.8 5689 1228 -718 -3330 
Nevada 4.1 7219 1530 -231 -2421 
New Hampshire 3.6 3909 832 -797 -3104 
New Jersey 4.4 24808 5235 1288 -3286 
New Mexico 5.3 4995 1067 1255 1437 
New York 5.0 52768 11171 10116 9039 
North Carolina 5.2 25492 5237 5727 6208 
North Dakota 3.4 2051 456 -569 -2107 
Ohio 5.9 34510 7161 11841 15886 
Oklahoma 4.4 9284 1981 504 -1208 
Oregon 6.1 10275 2159 3844 5252 
Pennsylvania 5.0 35956 7496 6777 6043 
Rhode Island 5.0 3056 652 591 528 
South Carolina 6.8 11935 2484 5468 7705 
South Dakota 3.9 2350 516 -207 -1153 
Tennessee 5.6 17346 3606 5154 6565 
Texas 5.3 62919 12762 15137 17421 
Utah 4.3 7151 1485 154 -1424 
Vermont 3.5 1919 411 -466 -1745 
Virginia 3.5 23505 4923 -5822 -21479 
Washington 5.5 18132 3768 5087 6309 
West Virginia 5.0 4308 939 853 765 
Wisconsin 4.7 17949 3701 2174 516 
Wyoming 3.6 1534 343 -296 -1202 
Table 26 (Continued) 
 
NOTE: Unemployment rate is from BLS. The average U.S. unemployment rate in 2005 was 5.1%.  Economic development 
program considered in each state is same one we have always considered, which is equal in size to assumed size of universal 
preschool program. Job creation effects reported are the long-run effects we have been considering. The state job creation and 
national job creation numbers in next two columns are the numbers previously reported in Table 24. The next column adds on to 
the national effects the additional national job creation possible by the inflationary implications of reallocating jobs to this state. 
Inflation is assumed to vary with local unemployment as estimated by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). The last column is the 
same, except it uses the functional form for how unemployment affects inflation that is estimated by Bartik (2001).  These last 
two columns only make sense if only the state in that row is pursuing economic development. Therefore, the effects in this 
column, when summed across states, do not correspond to any feasible real-world policy alternative.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Jobs Generated Over Time for Original State Residents from One-Time Economic 



















Note:  Figure shows jobs generated for original state residents who stay in state from one-time economic development subsidy program of $1 billion.  
Jobs are in absolute numbers.  Years are labelled so that economic development program is initiated in year 4.
Figure 2.  Real Earnings Generated Over Time for Original State Residents from One-Time 


















Notes:  Real earnings are in millions of year 2004 dollars per year.  Year 4 is year the economic development subsidy program is started.
Figure 3.  Jobs and Real Earnings Generated from Permanent Economic Development 
Subsidy Program Equal in Costs to Universal Preschool Program, as Percentage of Baseline 




































































Jobs generated as % of baseline state employment
Real earnings generated as % of baseline state wage
and salary earnings
NOTES:  Economic development program examined would each year devote as much resources to new subsidies as the cost of operating a universal preschool program in 
that state that year.  The jobs and earnings generated reflect effects on the current state residents of each year, as a percentage of the state baseline jobs and earnings in each 
year without the program.
Figure 4.  Balanced Budget Multiplier Effects of Universal Preschool on State Residents' Jobs 



































































Job generation effects as % of baseline
employment in state
Real earnings generation effects as % of
baseline real earnings in state
Notes:  Effects shown are effects of universal preschool program, due to increased net spending and taxes, on the jobs and earnings of state residents, 
compared to their baseline jobs and earnings.
Figure 5.  Job Generation Effects of One-Time Preschool Program of $1 Billion, Compared to 



















































































Figure 6.  Real Earnings Generation Effects of One-Time Preschool Program of $1 Billion, 
Compared to Real Earnings Generation Effects of One-Time Economic Development Subsidy 

























































































































Figure 7.  Percentage of Real Earnings Effect Over Time Due to Effects on Employment Rates, 


























































































NOTE: Figure shows the percentage of the real earnings increase of a one-time program of either preschool or economic development, that is due to increased 
employment rates.  The remainder is due to increases in wage rates.  These percentages are based on real earnings effects for the original state residents, 
excluding in-migrants and out-migrants.  In addition, these effects are based on employment rate gains and wage rate gains for individuals, rather than change in 
averages for state due to changing composition of workforce.  As discussed further elsewhere in this report, preschool programs, by increasing employment of 
lower education individuals, tends to have depressing effects on state average wages.  However, preschool does increase wages of all participants and peers.
Figure 8.  Average Real Wages of Jobs Generated Under Preschool Programs and Economic 










































NOTE: This figure shows the average real wage of jobs generated for state residents by a one-time program of either preschool or economic development 
subsidies, at various years after program is initiated and completed in year 4.  The real wages incorporate assumption that overall real wages increase over time 
by 1.2% per year.  The real wage figures for the economic development program assume that real wage is initially equal to average real wage of $17.79 per 
hour, and that added jobs are divided among all ages in proportion to their share in employment.  Real wage alters over time as this initial cohort ages and as 
secular increase in real wages occurs.  The real wage figures for the preschool program assume that real wages are based on the educational attainment of the 
program cohort at that age, and the secular increase in wages.
Figure 9.  Jobs Generated for State Residents by Permanent Universal Preschool Program, 































































































NOTE: The jobs generated for the preschool program are solely due to effects on participants and peers, and omit all other avenues of influence of preschool 
programs on job generation (e.g., balanced budget multiplier, labor supply of parents, etc.).  The jobs generated as % of baseline employment compares jobs 
generated to total state baseline employment, which is assumed to grow at 0.3% per year.  These percentage figures for preschool would apply to any state that 
adopted a universal preschool program of this design, or an economic development program that had same cost as such a program.
Figure 10.  Real Earnings Generated for State Residents by Permanent Universal Preschool 









































































































 NOTE: The earnings generated for the preschool program are solely due to effects on participants and peers, and omit all other avenues of influence of 
preschool programs on earnings generation (e.g., balanced budget multiplier, labor supply of parents, etc.).  The earnings generated as % of baseline state 
earnings compares earnings generated to total state baseline earnings, which is assumed to grow at 1.5% per year.  These percentage figures for preschool 
would apply to any state that adopted a universal preschool program of this design, or an economic development program that had same cost as such a 
program
Figure 11.  Preschool's Effects on Jobs and Earnings Via Its Effects on the Social Return to 




















































NOTE:  This only shows the effects of preschool education on jobs and earnings, due to preschool's effects on the state's college graduation percentage, 
that occur due to the social return to education.  The effects of increased educational attainment for each individual preschool participant, and his or her 
school peers, are already reflected in estimates previously presented.
